

# Israeli History Post 1967

# Ron's Web Site

- ▣ **North Shore Flashpoints**
- ▣ <http://northshoreflashpoints.blogspot.com/>

# Palestinian Groups

- ▣ 1955-Egypt forms Fedayeem
  - Official detachment of armed infiltrators from Gaza National Guard
  - “Those who sacrifice themselves”
  - Recruited ex-Nazis for training
- ▣ Fatah created in 1958
  - Young Palestinians who had fled Gaza when Israel created
  - Core group came out of the Palestinian Students League at Cairo University that included Yasser Arafat (related to the Grand Mufti)
  - Ideology was that liberation of Palestine had to precede Arab unity

# Palestinian Groups

- ▣ PLO created in 1964 by Arab League Summit with Ahmad Shuqueri as leader
- ▣ Founder (George Habash) of Arab National Movement formed in 1960 forms
- ▣ Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in December of 1967 with Ahmad Jibril
- ▣ Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation (PDFLP) for the Liberation of Democratic Palestine formed in early 1969 by Nayif Hawatmah


# Palestinian Groups

	Fatah	PFLP	PDFLP
Founder	Arafat	Habash	Hawatmah
Religion	Sunni	Christian	Christian
Philosophy	Recovery of Palestine	Radicalize Arab regimes	Marxist Leninist
Supporter	All regimes	Iraq	Syria


# Palestinian Leaders



Ahmad Jibril



George Habash



Nayif Hawatmah

# Mohammed Yasser Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa

- ▣ 8/24/1929 - 11/11/2004
- ▣ Born in Cairo, Egypt
- ▣ Father born in Gaza of an Egyptian mother
- ▣ Mother from Jerusalem
- ▣ Beaten by father for going into Jewish section of Cairo
- ▣ Graduated from University of King Faud I (1944-1950)
- ▣ Fought along side Muslim Brotherhood during 1948



# Yasser Arafat

- ▣ President of the General Union of Palestinian Students (1952-1956)
- ▣ Called up to fight in the 1956 Suez War, but never fought
- ▣ Expelled in 1957 because part of Fedayeen
- ▣ Went to Kuwait where he became a school teacher
- ▣ Founded Fatah in late 1950's
  - Reverse acronym in Arabic for Palestinian National Liberation Movement
  - In early Islamic times meant conquest



# Fatah Philosophy

- ▣ Liberation of Palestine by armed struggle
- ▣ How did this differ from other political & guerrilla organizations?
- ▣ Other organizations:
  - United Arab response
  - Accepted money from other countries &
  - Effectively became their satellites
- ▣ Fatah didn't want to alienate countries, and
- ▣ Only accepted money from wealthy Palestinians

# Fatah

- ▣ Arafat moves to Syria in 1962 with 300 members – none fighters
- ▣ Recruited members by offering them higher incomes than Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
- ▣ PLA was military force of PLO, created by Nasser
- ▣ Began raids on Israel
- ▣ Arafat found guilty of murdering a Palestinian Syrian Army officer, (a close friend of then Defense Minister Assad)

# Palestinian Groups

- ▣ Commando groups absorbed in PLO in 1968
- ▣ Fatah gains most seats in Palestinian National Council & Arafat elected as head of PLO 2/69
  - 105 total seats
  - Commando groups have 57
  - Fatah had 33 of 57

# Palestinian Charter

## ARTICLE 2

- ▣ Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

## BRITISH MANDATE



# Palestinian Charter

- ▣ Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian.
- ▣ Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians

# Ethnic Cleansing?

- ▣ Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.
- ▣ Article 15: The liberation of Palestine...and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.

# Palestinian Charter

- ▣ Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase.
- ▣ Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution.

# Palestinian Groups

- ▣ “... armed struggle was the only means to liberate Palestine...” to be accomplished through commando actions-
- ▣ often undertaken by factions competing for prestige & recruits.
- ▣ BUT, particular hostility between Habash’s PFLP & Arafat



# Palestinian Groups

PLO. In the view of a colleague of Arafat,

it wasn't that we didn't want to [get rid of the PFLP]. But it was practically impossible to unify the commando organizations when each one of them was supported and subsidized by one or another Arab country whose causes and quarrels they espoused. That is why the Central Committee of the Palestinian Resistance, instead of being a coordinating and decision-making body, turned out to be a sort of parliament where all the conflicts and intrigues of the Arab world were reflected. Yasir Arafat, speaking for more than half the Fidayin members, had to deal as an equal with the delegate of a tiny group just because the latter was the protégé of one of the richest Arab states [Iraq]. That's how difficult, if not impossible, it was to enforce even a minimum of discipline at the very heart of the movement.<sup>16</sup>

*possibly given*

# Jordan & the Palestinians

- ▣ Fatah initially fails in West Bank due to:
  - Effective Israeli retaliation & intelligence
  - Unwillingness of Palestinians to participate
- ▣ Marriage of convenience between Hussein & Arafat
  - Hussein thought
    - ▣ Arafat's assaults would discourage Israeli settlement efforts
    - ▣ Encourage U.S. diplomatic intervention
    - ▣ And could discard Arafat if talks arose
    - ▣ Arafat's intention to destroy Israel was a fantasy
    - ▣ Having a Palestinian State on the West bank was unacceptable to Hussein who wanted it for himself and would at best allow Palestinian autonomy under cloak of Jordanian sovereignty
  - Arafat used as springboard for assaults

# Jordan & the Palestinians

- ▣ School bus blown up killing & wounding children
- ▣ Massive Israeli response against Jordanian town of al-Karamah in 2/68 backfires
- ▣ Though technically a defeat for Palestinians
- ▣ Inflicted numerous Israeli casualties
- ▣ Became basis for propaganda & recruiting

# Jordan & the Palestinians



# Jordan & the Palestinians

- ▣ Fatah & other Palestinian groups begin taking control of civilian life in Jordan
- ▣ How?
- ▣ Roadblocks, publicly humiliated Jordanian police forces, molested women and levied illegal taxes, taking Westerners in tourist hotels hostage
- ▣ Hussein tries to avoid military confrontation by dismissing anti-PLO cabinet ministers and inviting Arafat to become P.M.
- ▣ Arafat refuses.
- ▣ Why?
- ▣ Believes in a Palestinian state with Palestinian leadership.

# Palestinian Charter

## ARTICLE 2

- ▣ Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

## BRITISH MANDATE



# British Mandate Adjustment Transjordan Separation-1923



# Palestine Population

Year	Jews	Non-Jews	Total	% Jewish
1517	5,000	295,000	300,000	1.7
1882	24,000	276,000	300,000	8.0
1918	60,000	600,000	660,000	8.1
1931	174,610	861,211	1,035,821	16.9
1936	384,078	982,614	1,366,692	28.1



# Jordan & the Palestinians

## Black September

- ▣ 9/15/1970-PFLP hijacks 5 planes & takes them to Amman airport
  - Blows planes up after letting passengers go
  - Arafat condemns attacks, but his image is tarnished
- ▣ Hussein declares martial law-civil war breaks out
- ▣ Syrian tanks are repulsed by Jordanian Army
- ▣ Nixon declares U.S. intervention might be required. Why?
  - Convey signal to Russia
  - Israel promises to intervene on Hussein's behalf

# And Nixon said:

One thing was clear. We could not allow Hussein to be overthrown by a Soviet-inspired insurrection. If it succeeded, the entire Middle East might erupt in war: the Israelis would almost certainly take pre-emptive measures against a Syrian-dominated radical government in Jordan; the Egyptians were tied to Syria by military alliances; and Soviet prestige was on the line with both the Syrians and Egyptians. Since the United States could not stand idly by and watch Israel being driven into the sea, the possibility of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation was uncomfortably high. It was a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end.<sup>32</sup>

- ▣ And Kissinger said to Rabin: “ The President will never forget Israel’s role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan and in blocking the attempt to overthrow the regime there...”

# Jordan & the Palestinians

- ▣ Arafat becomes Supreme Commander of PLA
- ▣ 9/21/70 at Arab Summit, Nasser negotiates a cease fire between PLA & Jordan
- ▣ Nasser dies the next day and cease fire falls apart
- ▣ Jordan army achieves dominance
- ▣ Both sides violate it
- ▣ Arafat calls for overthrow of Hussein
- ▣ Hussein ousts PLO
- ▣ Escape to Syria, but Assad forces them to go to Lebanon

# Black September

- ▣ Derives it's name from the 9/1970 Jordanian civil war.
- ▣ Began as a small Fatah cell.
- ▣ Recruits from other groups joined later.
- ▣ Who controlled Black September?

# Black September

- ▣ In his book *Stateless*, Salah Khalaf, Arafat's chief of security and a founding member of Fatah, wrote that: "Black September was not a terrorist organization, but was rather an auxiliary unit of the resistance movement, at a time when the latter was unable to fully realize its military and political potential. The members of the organization always denied any ties between their organization and Fatah or the PLO."

# But

- ▣ According to American journalist Charlie Cranston Black September represented a "total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the *fedayeen*. Its members operated in air-tight cells of four or more men and women. Each cell's members were kept purposely ignorant of other cells. Leadership was exercised from outside by intermediaries and 'cut-offs' [*sic*]", though there was no centralized leadership

# And

- ▣ Fatah needed Black September, according to Benny Morris. He writes that there was a "problem of internal PLO or Fatah cohesion, with extremists constantly demanding greater militancy. The moderates apparently acquiesced in the creation of Black September in order to survive".<sup>[6]</sup> As a result of pressure from militants, writes Morris, a Fatah congress in Damascus in August–September 1971 agreed to establish Black September. The new organization was based on Fatah's existing special intelligence and security apparatus, and on the PLO offices and representatives in various European capitals, and from very early on, there was cooperation between Black September and the PFLP.<sup>[6]</sup>

# So

- ▣ The PLO closed Black September down in September 1973, on the anniversary it was created by the "political calculation that no more good would come of terrorism abroad" according to Morris.<sup>[7]</sup> In 1974 Arafat ordered the PLO to withdraw from acts of violence outside the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel.



# Lebanon, the Palestinians & Israel

- ▣ Previously Lebanon stayed out of conflict
- ▣ 1968 PLO (primarily PFLP) tries to establish Lebanon as base for hijacking
- ▣ Israel holds Lebanon responsible and launches a massive, selective retaliation designed to teach Lebanon a lesson, but resulting in
  - Civil strife between Christians, Palestinians and Maronite Catholics
  - Collapse of Lebanese government
  - Unresolved tensions resulted in civil war by 1975

# Lebanon, the Palestinians & Israel

- ▣ Cairo Agreement signed in 1969 between Arafat & the Lebanese government provided for:
  - PLO autonomy in controlling refugee camps previously supervised by Lebanese security forces
  - PLO gains specific access routes to Israeli border
  - Syria supply lines to PLO permitted
- ▣ But Christian paramilitary groups outside of government control confronted Palestinians
- ▣ Eshkol dies 2/26/69, Allon interim P.M. until Golda Meir takes over on 3/17/69

# Golda Meir

- ▣ Born Golda Mabovitch  
5/3/1898 in Kiev, Russia
- ▣ First Memory is of her  
father boarding up door in  
anticipation of a pogrom
- ▣ 1906 with rest of family  
follows her father to  
Milwaukee
- ▣ Teacher in Milwaukee
  - Public schools & Yiddish  
speaking Folks Schule
- ▣ Married at 19 to Morris  
Meyerson
- ▣ She was a Labor Zionist;  
he a socialist
- ▣ Both joined a Kibbutz in  
1921
- ▣ Had 2 children



# Golda Meir

- ▣ 1928 became Secretary of Working Women's Council & spent 2 years in U.S.
- ▣ 1934 became Executive Committee Member of Histarudt
- ▣ 1938 Evian Council observer
- ▣ 1946 heads Political Department of Jewish Agency
- ▣ 1948 (pre-war) raises \$50,000,000
- ▣ 5/10/48 meets with King Abdullah of Jordan urging him not to attack
  - Abdullah asks her not to hurry to proclaim a State
  - She replies: "We've been waiting for 2,000 years, is that hurrying"
- ▣ She likened the Arab exodus from Israel in 1948 to what had happened to Jews in Germany

# Doomed to Succeed

Perhaps his foremost villain is Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. chairman who, in the waning days of the Clinton administration, walked away from the best deal ever offered to the Palestinians because he was unable to make the transition from revolutionary leader to statesman. A close second appears to be Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli prime minister whom President George H.W. Bush pegged as an unscrupulous liar, a characterization that, from the evidence presented here, seems justified. For sheer coldblooded cunning, however, it's hard to top America's own Machiavelli, Henry Kissinger. In 1969, with President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers eager to pursue regional peace efforts in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, the president's national security adviser vigorously argued that the United States do nothing of the sort lest the Soviet Union share credit. "The prerequisite of effective Middle East diplomacy," Kissinger wrote, "was to reduce the Soviet influence so that progress could not be ascribed to its pressures." The ensuing diplomatic paralysis helped provoke the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

# Doomed to Succeed

On the flip side, Ross displays enormous admiration for the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, the former hard-line general who, perhaps more than any other Israeli leader, genuinely sought a lasting settlement with the Palestinians, only to be assassinated for his troubles. Joining Rabin in the good-guy camp are the first President Bush and President Clinton, the former for what Ross sees as his principled forthrightness, the latter for the extraordinary energy — and political capital — he expended in his own peace effort. The writer also reveals a soft spot for Bush's secretary of state James Baker, just about the only person in these pages with the good sense to lose his temper periodically at the endless haggling and nit-picking debate he's forced to endure. In one particularly amusing anecdote, Ross recounts a meeting he and Baker held on the eve of an international conference, at which a Palestinian delegation raised a series of last-minute issues. "With you people, the souk never closes, but it is closed with me," Baker thundered, before leaving the room. "Have a nice life."

# Doomed to Succeed

at the heart of the Palestinian Question is a conundrum no American administration has been willing or able to unravel. The Palestinians, seeing themselves as the aggrieved party, have never taken the initiative in offering up peace terms, and whatever the Israelis have offered has never been enough. For their part, and despite the lip service paid to their American allies, most Israelis see little to be gained and much to be risked in a peace agreement and are seemingly content with the status quo, a contentment increased by the concrete wall as high as 26 feet that now separates them from their Palestinian neighbors. As for the Americans, the traditional overseers of this contest, their tepid response to the settlements issue adds constant fuel to Palestinian rage – and obstinacy – while their military support further enhances Israel's sense of security, giving it even less motive to negotiate. As James Baker might say, "Have a nice life."

# She likened the Arab exodus from Israel in 1948 to what had happened to Jews in Germany

On the political plane, though, no policy decision had yet been taken. In early May, after a visit to Haifa, Golda Myerson (Meir), the powerful acting director of the Jewish Agency Political Department, noted the “dreadful” exodus of the town’s Arabs and how they had left “the coffee and pita bread” on the tables. She told her colleagues, “I could not avoid [thinking] that this, indeed, had been the picture in many Jewish towns [that is, in World War II Europe]. . . . [Should the Jews] make an effort to bring the Arabs back to Haifa, or not [?] We have decided on a number of rules, and these include: we won’t go to Acre and Nazareth to bring back [Haifa’s] Arabs. But, at the same time, our behavior should be such that if, because of it, they come back—[then] let them come back. We shouldn’t behave badly with the Arabs [who have remained] so that others [who fled] won’t return.”<sup>160</sup>

- Benny Morris quoting Meir from the minutes of the Jewish Agency Executive, May, 1948



# Golda Meir

- ▣ First Ambassador to Soviet Union
- ▣ 1949 elected Knesset member as Mapai party member
- ▣ 1949-1956 Minister of Labor
- ▣ 1956-1966 Minister of Foreign Affairs
  - 1958- Praised the work of Pius on behalf of Jewish people
  - Huh????
  - Letter to Israel's Ambassador to Poland "A proposal was raised in the coordination committee to inform the Polish government that we want to institute selection in Aliyah, because we cannot continue accepting sick and handicapped people. Please give your opinion as to whether this can be explained to the Poles without hurting immigration."<sup>[31]</sup>

# Golda Meir

- ▣ Diagnosed with lymphoma in 1960
- ▣ Retires from public life in 1966
- ▣ On Eshkol's death agrees to serve as interim P.M.
- ▣ Expected to be a caretaker P.M. and
- ▣ To prevent a contest between Dayan & Allon
- ▣ "Golda Meir chose to use 200 words although her vocabulary extended to 500." Abba Eban

# Israeli Political Parties

NAME		Dates	Composition	Philosophy
MAPAI	Workers Party of Israel	1930-1968		Left
Alignment 1		1965-1968	MAPAI & Ahudut Havodah	Social Democrats & Labor Zionists
Labor		1968- Present	MAPAI, Rafi &Ahudut Havodah	Center Left
Alignment 2		1969-1991	Labor & MAPAM	Center Left
GAHAL	Freedom, Liberal Bloc	1965-1973	Liberal & Herut	Center Right
Ahudut Havodah	Labor Unity	1919-1968	went through incarnations	Left-Labor Zionists
MAPAM	United Workers	1948-1992	Hashomer Hatzair Ahudut Havodah	Socialist Marxist

- ▣ <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/assassination-shattered-mideast-peace-dreams/>
- ▣ <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/20-years-since-rabins-death-changed-peace-prospects/>

# Golda Meir

- ▣ Avi Shlaim's analysis:
  - Strong & decisive
  - Imperious, overbearing, intolerant of opposition
  - Subtlety & ambiguity were alien to her character
  - Remarkable capacity for simplifying complex problems
  - Saw the world in black & white
  - Very difficult to reason with her because she always saw herself as right
- ▣ Remind you of any other woman in politics?

# Golda Meir

- ▣ “Her talent lay in the simplification of issue. She went straight to the crux and center of each problem. When officials analyzed the contradictory waves of influence that flowed into decision making, she tended to interrupt them with an abrupt request for the bottom line. The quest for the simple truth is not easy when the truth is not simple”

Abba Eban

# Golda Meir

tion. As her biographer pointed out,

Golda was afraid of the Arabs, and these fears were connected with her memories of pogroms and the Holocaust. She may have also been afraid of the quest for revenge that she detected among the Arabs. She could not come to terms with the thought that maybe the Arabs felt that an injustice had been committed against them. She also rejected absolutely the possibility that some of the Arab demands might be justified. She refused to recognize that the Arabs felt humiliated. She did not agree with the assumption that the Palestinian Arabs felt that they were a people without a country. . . . It was very hard for her to face up soberly to the main problem that confronted Zionism: the Arab question. Her position was simple: they or us.<sup>2</sup>

# Golda Meir

claim of the critics that this was evidence of expansionism. In her memoirs she noted,

And of course, “intransigent” was to become my middle name. But neither Eshkol nor I, nor the overwhelming majority of other Israelis, could make a secret of the fact that we weren’t at all interested in a fine, liberal, anti-militaristic, dead Jewish state or in a “settlement” that would win us compliments about being reasonable and intelligent but that would endanger our lives. . . . Israeli democracy is so lively that there were, and are, almost as many “doves” as “hawks,” but I have yet to come across any Israeli who thinks that we should turn

ourselves, permanently, into clay pigeons – not even for the sake of a better image.



# Meir vs Eshkol

- ▣ Meir was a fighter, dogmatic, domineering & intransigent
- ▣ Eshkol was a compromiser, open minded, often hesitant and flexible
- ▣ But-
  - Both wanted to preserve the Jewish & democratic character of Israel
  - Viewed the most promising solution to the Palestinian problem as a compromise with Jordan that would keep most of the Palestinians outside Israel
- ▣ Eshkol put the emphasis on what to concede to make a deal
- ▣ Meir put emphasis on security

# Meir's Principles

- ▣ No return to pre-war borders
- ▣ No withdrawal
- ▣ Without direct negotiations & peace treaties
- ▣ “ The peace treaties must include agreement on final, secure and recognized boundaries. The peace treaties must annul claims of belligerency, blockades, boycotts, interference with free navigation and the existence and activity of organizations and groups engaged in preparing or executing sabotage operations from bases and training camps on the territories of the states signatory to the peace treaties” Golda Meir



# The Military

- ▣ Gained influence under Meir
- ▣ Chief of Staff began attending cabinet meetings
- ▣ Foreign Ministry became marginalized
- ▣ Political and diplomatic considerations became subordinate to military ones in policy making
- ▣ Military activism & retaliation again became policy
- ▣ Previous P.M.s were all capable of not accepting the military view
  - “But Mrs. Meir herself has more or less said that on security matters, ‘I would do nothing but blindly accept the military view.’ That is not the function of a prime minister” Abba Eban
- ▣ What do you think?

# Movements within Israel

- ▣ Greater Israel Movement
  - Incorporate all of occupied territories into Israel
- ▣ Peace Movement
  - Return most of the territories coupled with a conciliatory policy designed to lead to accommodation with the Arabs
- ▣ Shlaim claims these were fringe movements that cut across party lines

# New Faces



# More New Faces



# War of Attrition

## March, 1969 – August, 1970

- ▣ Three fronts
  - Northern Jordan valley
  - Syria
  - Egypt-main theater of operations
- ▣ Nasser's policy –all that is taken by force can only be returned by force
- ▣ “...no concession to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”
- ▣ Three Stages
  - Defensive rehabilitation
  - Offence-defense
  - “Liberation”

# Prelude to the War of Attrition

- ▣ 9/1/67 - Egyptians fired on Israeli shipping in the Mediterranean from northern Suez
- ▣ Resulting in artillery exchanges
- ▣ 10/21/67- Israeli flagship, destroyer *Eliat*, sunk by missile fire.
  - First time in history warship had been sunk by missile fire
- ▣ 10/25/67 - Israel retaliates with artillery bombardment of oil depots & petrochemical installations along southern Canal
- ▣ Retaliation significantly greater than Egypt anticipates
- ▣ Relative calm ensues



# Defensive Rehabilitation

## 11/1/67-9/1/68

- ▣ Russia resupplies Egypt
- ▣ Stronger military position than prior to 1967
- ▣ More modern weaponry
  - MiG-21 instead of MiG-17
  - T-54 & T-55 tanks in place of T-34 & T-35 tanks
- ▣ Military advisors
  - Initially hundreds, limited to organization & training but
  - grows to thousands, that become involved in all aspects of the military including air operations
  - Sound familiar?

# Russia Makes Several Unworkable Proposals

In addition to the Soviet proposal, French president Charles de Gaulle, whom both Nixon and Kissinger greatly admired, had pushed for talks on the Middle East between France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. When de Gaulle first proposed the meeting between the “four great powers” during the Johnson Administration, the former president is reputed to have asked sarcastically, “Who are the other two?” and didn’t give the matter much consideration.<sup>16</sup> In February 1969, however, Nixon approved Rogers’ recommendation for two sets of parallel talks, the first between the four powers, which the president saw as being largely for show, and the second between the Americans and Soviets, where the serious business could be done.

# Offense-Defense

## 9/68-3/69

- ▣ 9/8/68-Egypt launches massive military barrage
- ▣ Commando raids on Israeli positions on Suez west bank
- ▣ Israel outgunned
  - This tendency of Israel not to place a heavier emphasis on the importance of artillery was to prove a costly mistake that only became apparent in the 1973 war. Hezog
- ▣ Israel takes indirect approach.
  - Commando raids into heart of Egypt to within 300 miles of Cairo
  - Message is clear
  - Wide areas of Egyptian populated area are open to attack
- ▣ Relative quiet ensues

# Bar-Lev Line

- ▣ Observation fortifications along the East Bank of the canal
  - Warning outpost system
  - 7 miles apart
  - For 15 troops, designed to withstand the heaviest artillery barrage
  - Visual & electronic capabilities
- ▣ Tanks patrolling between the fortifications
- ▣ Artillery & tanks in the rear ready to move forward if there was any attempt to cross the Canal
- ▣ Completed March, 1969
- ▣ Objective to preserve status quo until Egypt agreed to peace treaty

# Israeli Elections 10/69

- ▣ MAPAI had merged with dovish MAPAM to form Alignment, which Dayan opposed
- ▣ Dayan insists on doctrine that binds all members and defines secure borders
  - Jordan is Israel's eastern security border
  - Golan Heights and Gaza Strip to remain under Israeli control
  - Israel to retain strip of land in Sinai down to Straits of Tiran
  - "Sharm el-Sheik without Peace is better than peace without Sharm el-Sheik"
- ▣ Alignment wins 56 seats compared with 63 seats held before election
- ▣ Meir forms a unity government similar to Eshkol's





# Great Ideas: Israeli History

# Liberation Phase

## 4/69-8/1970

- ▣ Nasser May Day speech
  - 60% of Bar-Lev Line destroyed
  - Egyptian Army is ready to move from “active defense” to “liberation”
  - No longer recognizes the 1967 cease fire
- ▣ Egypt's strategy
  - Wear out IDF by constant attack
  - Reduce Israel's civilian & military morale
  - Impose an economic burden by destroying as much military equipment as possible
  - What gave rise to this strategy?



# Liberation Phase

- ▣ Reasons for Egyptian strategy
  - IDF strength was in a war in which speed & maneuverability were of the essence and
  - Egypt had a substantial artillery advantage
  - Israel's extreme sensitivity to casualties
- ▣ Resulting in a softening of IDF forces along the Canal allowing Egyptian forces to cross and
- ▣ Would keep the issue alive before the U.N.
- ▣ So constant mutual artillery & commando raid exchanges
- ▣ MiG-21 shot down by Hawk missile for 1st time

# Flying Artillery

- ▣ Policy originally proposed by Ezer Weizman
  - Previously IAF Chief of Staff
  - Gahal minister of transportation
- ▣ Rabin, who is now ambassador to U.S. says that the Nixon administration would welcome deep penetration bombing in Egypt because it would serve U.S. interests
- ▣ How?
- ▣ Would Soviets respond?
- ▣ Cabinet believes Russia will only protest
- ▣ Eban disagrees with both conclusions

# So Eban Proposes

ing to a halt. On 7 February he proposed to the cabinet a political initiative to restore the cease-fire for a limited period as part of a new “peace offensive.” His idea was that they should not only declare their policies but also give dramatic expression to their readiness for a temporary cease-fire on the Suez Canal as a first step toward military de-escalation. He argued that there was nothing to lose by exploring the possibility of ending the War of Attrition, and there was some support for his proposal. But Golda Meir turned all her fury against him. Did Eban not recall that Nasser himself had proposed a temporary cease-fire? If this was in Nasser’s interest, how could it be in the interest of Israel? Was Eban not proposing a dangerous trap for Israel in contradiction to its stated policy?

- ▣ “This episode illustrated the difficulty of being a foreign minister in a cabinet that had an exaggerated vision of the role of war in international politics”

# Flying Artillery

- ▣ Military objective:
  - Reduce Egyptian military pressure in the forward Canal area
  - Deter Egypt from planning a full scale war
  - Bring an end to the War of Attrition
  - Compel Egypt to observe a cease fire
- ▣ Psychological & Political objectives
  - Break Egyptian morale
  - Bring about downfall of Nasser regime
  - To be replaced by a pro-Western regime

# Flying Artillery

- ▣ Use IAF rather than increase strength of ground artillery
  - Bad policy in long term. Why?
  - Unmitigated success in the short term
- ▣ Raids & artillery barrages by both sides continue, and
  - IDF mounts coordinated air, tank and frogmen attack , destroying PT boats, a military camp and several radar installations
  - Another attack results in the capture of Russian radar equipment
  - IAF raids continue resulting in the destruction of a considerable part of the Russian supplied air defense system
  - Israel flies 1,000 sorties compared to 100 Egyptian sorties
  - Dog fights result in loss of 26 Egyptian planes and 3 Israeli planes in July & August of 1969
  - IAF flies over pyramids

# Flying Artillery

- ▣ Negative effect on Egyptian public primarily because of attacks on military installations in and near Cairo - Herzog
- ▣ Stability of Nasser regime becomes a concern
- ▣ But Shlaim says the bombing reinforced the will to resist and rallied the people behind Nasser
- ▣ Kremlin is concerned because Western planes flown by Israeli pilots operated with virtual impunity against a similar air defense system that protected Communist bloc countries

# Russia and SAMs

- ▣ Russia sends
  - 1,500 advisors ( totaling 15,000 troops) with
  - The latest SAM 3 system
  - And assumed responsibility for protection by taking over operation of the missiles and flying the planes
- ▣ Soviet strategic aim
  - By establishing forces along the Suez, Russia controls the main link between the Mediterranean & the Indian Ocean
- ▣ Israeli air attacks into Egypt virtually cease in April , 1970 in order to avoid direct confrontation with Soviets.
- ▣ Why didn't Israel want a direct confrontation?
- ▣ Now MiGs fly over Sinai

# But There Were Direct Confrontations

Soviet aircraft were shot down for no loss on the part of Israel. According to Moshe Dayan,\* the Israeli pilots thought the Soviet pilots lacked experience and flexibility: they behaved in battle as they had been taught in training exercises, and stuck to the book, flying in pairs, close together, and not breaking off fast enough. The five pilots bailed out and landed on the Egyptian side.



# Prelude To Cease Fire

It became clear that, in addition to a policy of achieving air parity with Israel, the anti-aircraft capability of the Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal had become a vital element in developing future Egyptian offensive strategy. The increased reach of the missile system would bring the airspace over the Israeli front-line within range of Egyptian missiles. This stage would be set, as far as the anti-aircraft phase was concerned, for the ultimate crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians.

# And Dogfight Results in 5 Of 8 Mig21's Being Shot down with No Israeli Losses Over Northern Sector of Gulf of Suez

indeed did the Egyptians or Russians mention a word of it in public. There was considerable consternation in the Soviet Union, but the Egyptians openly rejoiced at the Soviet discomfiture: they heartily disliked their Soviet allies, whose crude, gauche behaviour had created bitter antagonism, and whose officers looked down on the Egyptian officers, treating them with faintly-concealed disdain. The commander of the Soviet Air Defences and the commander of the Soviet Air Force rushed to Egypt on that very day.

# So

The War of Attrition continued to rage across the Suez Canal after the bombing of the Egyptian interior had ceased. Nearly all the assumptions that prompted the deep-penetration bombing turned out to be mistaken. Nasser's regime did not collapse under the blows inflicted by the IAF; the Soviet Union intervened physically and not only verbally to parry the blows; and the United States evinced none of the enthusiasm for the bombing that Ambassador Rabin had predicted. Israel had seriously misjudged both the Soviet and the American reactions. It now had to turn to its superpower patron as the only possible source of deterrence against the other superpower. Israel's dependence for strategic support and arms supplies on the United States increased sharply, and with it the susceptibility to American political pressure. Thus, by pressing too far its military advantage against Egypt, Israel helped to defeat its own important postwar objective of keeping the superpowers out of the Middle East as far as possible.

# War of Attrition Cease Fire

- ▣ Rogers Plan-12/69
  - Peace treaty between Israel, Egypt & Jordan
  - Almost complete withdrawal from occupied territories
  - Status of Gaza & Sharm el-Shek left open
  - Israel immediately rejects .
  - Why?
  - Rabin reports U.S. encouragement of Israeli efforts to destroy Egypt's military & indirectly humiliate Soviets
  - Kissinger & Nixon undermine State Department

# War of Attrition U.S. Policy

## ▣ New York Times Editorial 12/69

U.S. policy as it is now unfolding comes close to the advocacy and development of an imposed settlement. While this may not be deliberate, the mechanics and dynamics are moving in that direction. Israel will resist this. By addressing itself in detail to matters of substance, the U.S. proposals do more than undermine the principle of negotiation; they preempt its very prospect. If the United States has already determined what the “secure and recognized boundaries” are there is no point in Israel taking part in any negotiations with anybody at all. Why should the Arabs consent to give Israel more than what America is recommending publicly?

# War of Attrition

## U.S. Policy

- ▣ Globalism vs. Regionalism
- ▣ Kissinger-diplomacy should wait until the U.S. could dominate the negotiating process & exclude the Soviets
  - “The longer Israel holds its conquered Arab territory the longer the Soviets cannot deliver what the Arabs want.”
- ▣ Rogers-cooperation with the Soviets had merit if each power could bring its satellite to the bargaining table
- ▣ Nixon establishes a special channel between Kissinger & Rabin to sidestep the State Department

# War of Attrition U.S. Policy

“This is a snippet of an exchange between Kissinger and Rogers a few days ago,” he said. “It took place the day after a meeting I had with Kissinger. It speaks for itself. Please don’t ask me how I got hold of it.”

Peering over Begin’s shoulder I read what he was reading:

*Rogers:* The meeting you had last night with Rabin screwed it up badly.

*Kissinger:* Don’t be ridiculous.

*Rogers:* I’m not being ridiculous.

*Kissinger (shouting):* You are being absurd. If you have any complaint, talk to the president. I’m sick and tired of this.

*Rogers:* You and I don’t see eye-to-eye on these things. The Israelis have the impression that they have two channels to the president, and they exploit them differently.

*Kissinger:* There is no separate channel.

*Rogers:* Why do you think they go to you?

*Kissinger:* To try to end-run you and to get the president to overrule you.

*Rogers:* That’s right!

*Kissinger:* But that has never happened.

*Rogers:* But why give them the impression that it might? I don’t think you should see those people.<sup>19</sup>

# War of Attrition U.S. Policy

Begin handed back the page, and with a twinkle in the eye, said, “How enlightening! I take it that Dr. Kissinger is here telling a – how did Churchill define a lie in Parliament? – a ‘terminological inexactitude.’ Tell me, how big a terminological inexactitude is Kissinger’s assertion that there is no separate channel to the president?”



# War of Attrition U.S. Policy

- ▣ Rabin Tells Kissinger they are embarking on a full scale public relations campaign against the Rogers Plan
- ▣ Kissinger tells Rabin-Ok. But don't attack the President. And
- ▣ Kissinger asks Rabin. "Would you like to meet the President."

# War of Attrition

## U.S. Policy

- ▣ Nixon tells Rabin
  - “I promise that we will not only provide for Israel’s defense needs, but for her economic needs as well.”
  - “In all matters connected with arms supplies, don’t hesitate to approach Laird or Kissinger. Actually it would be better if you approached Kissinger”
  - Rabin has a direct line to Kissinger
  - “You always know what he (Rabin) wants. He wants more” Kissinger
- ▣ Rabin doesn’t know if Nixon is trying:
  - to drive a wedge between Kissinger & Rogers or
  - to ensure no criticism of White House
  - political benefit
- ▣ And the Rogers Plan dies.
- ▣ Why?

# Because

The Rogers plan was effectively dead on arrival. William Quandt cites three reasons. First, he argues, it was based on the mistaken assumption that the United States and Soviet Union could “deliver” their respective clients. Second was the marginal involvement of the White House. Lastly, Quandt writes, was that Rogers underestimated Israel’s “will and ability to resist American pressure.”<sup>28</sup>

# And Nixon Says

Of the Rogers Plan, Nixon wrote in his memoirs:

I knew that the Rogers Plan could never be implemented, but I believed that it was important to let the Arab world know that the United States did not automatically dismiss its case regarding the occupied territories or rule out a compromise settlement of the conflicting claims. With the Rogers Plan on the record, I thought it would be easier for the Arab leaders to propose reopening relations with the United States without coming under attack from the hawks and pro-Soviet elements in their own countries.<sup>29</sup>

# Nixon Memo to Kissinger 3/70

They must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. We are *for* Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is *pro*-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion.... This is the kind of friend that Israel needs and will continue to need, particularly when the going gets very tough in the next five years....<sup>39</sup>

# Meir & Nixon

the U.S.S.R. was virtually inevitable in case of an Arab-Israeli war.” As a result, he had a “tendency to oversimplify, if not actually to distort” complexities in the region by accepting the idea that “the Soviets are the main cause of Middle East tensions.”<sup>41</sup> Nixon was encouraged in this view by Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, who, for example, told him on September 18, 1970, that “Israel’s problems were not caused primarily by the Arabs. They were the direct result of the Soviet presence and Soviet military equipment.”<sup>42</sup>

# Nixon & Meir

evangelical movement,” he writes, “Israel’s public support for the Administration’s approach in Vietnam and for Nixon’s reelection campaign won appreciation and sympathy in the White House, and fostered a sense of common purpose that went well beyond a strict strategic calculus.”<sup>43</sup> However, Kochavi contends that Israel’s discreet backing for the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which linked U.S.-Soviet relations to the issue of Jewish emigration and thereby threatened the Administration’s efforts to achieve détente, “undermined Nixon’s and Kissinger’s perception of Israel as a trusted, like-minded ally, since they both strongly opposed the amendment and placed great stock in the unswerving loyalty of friends.” Though Nixon squarely put Israel in the category of “friend,” the basic “DNA” of the U.S.-Israeli relationship under Nixon’s tenure could best be characterized as cooperation with bouts of friction.<sup>44</sup>

# War of Attrition

## U.S. Policy

- ▣ Rogers Plan B-June, 1970
  - 3 month cease fire along Egyptian front
  - Acceptance of UN Resolution 242, specifically withdrawal from occupied territories
  - Undertaking from Israel to negotiate with Egypt & Jordan under Dr. Jarring's auspices
  - Standstill- neither Egypt nor Israel can move missiles closer to the Canal
- ▣ Egypt & Jordan accept proposal.
- ▣ Why?



# War of Attrition Cease fire

- ▣ Nasser is sick
- ▣ Realizes political cost, i.e., what he has to give up to Russia
- ▣ Cease fire could advance his military plans
- ▣ Kissinger thinks Nasser feared another Israeli pre-emptive strike
- ▣ Nasser afraid of U.S. involvement
- ▣ Israel also accepts
- ▣ Why?

# War of Attrition Cease fire

- ▣ Nixon sends letter to Meir stating:
  - Final boundaries must be agreed between parties
  - U.S. would not exert pressure on Israel to accept a solution to the refugee problem
  - No withdrawal until a peace agreement reached.
- ▣ Reiterated promise of military & economic assistance
- ▣ Begin resigns. Why?
- ▣ Nasser dies
- ▣ But Egypt immediately violates standstill agreement by moving missiles to Canal
- ▣ And Israel suspends talks
- ▣ But cease fire remains in place

# War Of Attrition Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ 12/70 Israel agrees to peace talks “...after protracted negotiations with the Nixon administration”
- ▣ Gunnar Jarring on 2/8/71 proposes:
  - Egypt agree to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and
  - Israel to withdraw to former Egypt-Palestinian border

# War Of Attrition

## Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ Egypt agrees, to enter an agreement with Israel pursuant to 242, and also demands
  - Israel not only to withdraw from Gaza as well as Sinai
  - A commitment to settle the refugee problem
  - Establishment of a UN peace force
- ▣ First time an Egyptian Government declared publicly its readiness to sign a peace treaty with Israel
- ▣ Similar to decision by Eshkol cabinet on 6/19/67

# War Of Attrition

## Negotiation Attempt

### ▣ Israeli Response

lating to a peace agreement. The problem arose over the pledge for complete territorial withdrawal requested by Jarring. Initially, the cabinet was inclined to accept Eban's noncommittal formulation: "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the cease-fire line with Egypt to secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement." But Yisrael Galili, with help from Moshe Dayan, succeeded in persuading the cabinet not to leave any doubt about the boundary issue. The cabinet opted for a categorical refusal to restore the previous boundary, and this gave its reply a peremptory and negative tone. To Eban's withdrawal clause it added a short but highly significant sentence: "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines."<sup>19</sup>

# War Of Attrition Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ Rabin agrees

reply a milestone: “For the first time in the chronicles of the Middle East conflict, an Arab country—indeed, the largest Arab country and the leader of the Arab world—had issued an official document expressing its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel!” He recommended to the cabinet a similar reply: an expression of readiness to sign a peace treaty followed by a detailed exposition of Israel’s views on the issues of borders and refugees. The cabinet’s reply was no less disappointing to him than to his American colleagues. It “turned out to be a rambling document whose long-windedness was exceeded only by its vagueness. Worst of all, it failed in its main task: presenting Israel’s demands in return for peace.”<sup>21</sup>

# War Of Attrition Negotiation Attempt Kissinger Analysis

Israel is dependent on the U.S. as no other country is on a friendly power. Increasingly, Washington is the sole capital to stand by Israel in international forums. We are its exclusive military supplier, its only military ally (though no formal obligation exists)... It takes a special brand of heroism to turn total dependence into defiance, to insist on support as a matter of right rather than as a favor; to turn every American deviation from an Israeli cabinet consensus into a betrayal to be punished rather than a disagreement to be negotiated. And yet Israel's obstinacy, maddening as it can be, serves the purposes of both our countries best. A subservient client would soon face an accumulation of ever-growing pressures. It would tempt Israel's neighbors to escalate their demands. It would saddle us with opprobrium for every deadlock.... Our relationship with Israel is exhilarating and frustrating, ennobled by the devotion and faith that contain a lesson for an age of cynicism; exasperating because the interests of a superpower and of a regional minstate are not always easy to reconcile, and are on occasion unbridgeable. Israel affects our decisions through inspiration, persistence, and a judicious, not always subtle or discreet influence on our domestic policy.<sup>26</sup>

# War Of Attrition Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ Failure
- ▣ Whose fault?
- ▣ Some cabinet members said Jarring
- ▣ What do you think?



# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ 2/4/71 Sadat proposes
  - opening the Canal
  - a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops in Sinai
  - U.S. mediation instead of U.N.
  - an interim instead of an overall settlement
- ▣ 3/71 Sadat visits Russia and says in Radio speech:
  - “The Soviet Union’s viewpoint was that peaceful solution was the only solution”
- ▣ Coup attempted by, Ali, Sabry, (a V.P.) a Soviet favorite
- ▣ Rogers thinks Sadat will cut ties to Russia
- ▣ But by now Kissinger is “Secretary of State in everything , but title.” Senator Stuart Symington

# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ 5/71 Rogers visits Sadat; then visits Israel
- ▣ According to Shlaim
  - Sadat understood Israel's need for security
- ▣ Dayan proposes withdrawal of 30 km & destruction of Bar-Lev line
  - ▣ Dayan believes danger of war would be decline if Israel pulled back
- ▣ Rabin & Eban counsels acceptance, but Meir rejects.
- ▣ Why?

# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ Meir viewed Rogers as pro-Arab & had sharp exchanges
- ▣ Afraid it would lead to Israeli withdrawal to old borders
- ▣ Withdrawal without a treaty was anathema
- ▣ Didn't like linkage between opening the Canal and adoption of 242
- ▣ But with Eban & Dayan supporting cabinet accepted the principle of limited withdrawal without a peace treaty, but that Egypt must renounce the state of belligerency

# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ Rabin meets with Kissinger first & proposes in addition to Egypt renouncing a state of belligerency in exchange for partial undefined withdrawal that
  - Canal opening includes Israeli shipping
  - Unlimited duration of cease fire
  - No Egyptian forces in the area evacuated by Israel
  - Thinning out of Egyptian forces on west side of canal
  - Release of all prisoners of war
- ▣ Kissinger goes nuts

# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

- ▣ U.S. feels Israeli position is main stumbling block to an interim settlement & suspends delivery of Phantom jets
- ▣ Meir tells U.S., we won't consider any more proposals until you resume delivery of jets

# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

### Russian Involvement

- ▣ Kissinger advises Rabin that Brezhnev has sent a secret 2 stage peace proposal to Nixon
  - Interim agreement now for reopening canal
  - Overall agreement after the 1972 presidential elections
- ▣ Israeli Cabinet rejects & Kissinger says Israel can't go on rejecting without stating acceptable terms
- ▣ Kissinger believes central weakness with Israel's approach is that Egypt waive her military option & reject link between partial & overall settlement

# War Of Attrition

## New Negotiation Attempt

### Meir & Nixon Meet

- ▣ Meir's Objectives
  - Kill Rogers Plan
  - Resume delivery of jets
- ▣ Both achieved and Nixon
  - assures her no U.S. -Soviet deal at Israel's expense, and
  - transfers negotiating responsibility from State Department to Kissinger, to whom she makes concessions
  - defined withdrawal to passes; cease fire limited to 18-24 months; link between interim settlement & final; small number of Egyptian soldiers would be allowed to cross canal
- ▣ Sadat's position hardened & Kissinger never transmits Meir's proposal. Why not?
- ▣ Way to agreement was thru Moscow

# War of Attrition Consequences

- ▣ Ended in a draw?
- ▣ Eban thinks the psychological & international balance changed to Egypt's advantage
- ▣ Ezer Weizman feels Israel lost air superiority because
  - Russia developed SAM-6
  - which are now deployed along Canal
- ▣ Mordechai Gur claims the wrong reading of War of Attrition lulled Israel to sleep



# War of Attrition Consequences

- ▣ Continued to cling to a defensive military doctrine
  - Initially added to the Bar-Lev line
  - Then cost constraints and cloudy purpose resulted in dismantling
- ▣ Intransigent negotiating policy; 2 alternatives offered to Arabs :
  - Full contractual peace without full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, or
  - Continuation of status quo

# War of Attrition

## Consequences

### Nuclear Policy

- ▣ Israel refuses to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty that was signed in 1968
- ▣ Rabin tells U.S. that Israel would not be the 1<sup>st</sup> to test such weapons or to reveal their existence publicly.
- ▣ Dayan principally responsible for decision to produce nuclear weapons. Why?
  - He was afraid Israel couldn't maintain conventional arms superiority forever
  - More dependent on U.S. arms
  - More Russian involvement
  - The "bomb in the basement"

# War of Attrition

## Consequences

### Nuclear Policy

- ▣ Bomb in the basement means no testing and no declaring its existence
- ▣ Doesn't require Israel to adopt an open nuclear policy and
- ▣ Signals to the Arabs & rest of world that Israel has a nuclear arsenal

# Hussein's Federal Plan, 3/72

- ▣ United Arab Kingdom comprised of:
  - Region of Jordan on East Bank of Jordan
  - Region of Palestine made up of West Bank & Gaza
- ▣ Rejected by PLO, Egypt & Israel.
- ▣ Why?

# And

Meir's strident rejection of King Hussein's federal plan was music to the ears of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO. Arafat and his colleagues regarded the king's plan as "an attempt to put the PLO out of business." Arafat told his biographer that if Israel had agreed to withdraw from the West Bank, King Hussein would have made peace with her immediately "and the PLO would have been finished. Absolutely finished. Sometimes I think we are lucky to have the Israelis as our enemies. They have saved us many times!"<sup>43</sup>

President Sadat broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan in

# Prelude to War

- ▣ Israeli military intelligence acknowledged the possibility of war,
  - but believed that would not occur until 1975
  - when Egypt had an adequate number of the type of plane to strike deep into Israel to neutralize the IAF
- ▣ Sadat felt he had to act earlier because of internal political problems
- ▣ Russia presents an alternative when Minister of War visits Moscow 2/72
  - Create a missile wall over the field of battle and
  - Provide SCUD missiles that could strike populated areas within Israel that would deter Israel from deep raiding

# Preparation for War

- ▣ Decision made sometime in 1972
- ▣ Plan of deception developed on 7/12/72 according to Sadat's biographer
  - Sadat leaked information that the Egyptians had not been able to use the Soviet's sophisticated weaponry
- ▣ Jordan & Egypt resume diplomatic relations.12/72
- ▣ Sadat tells Hussein that the only way to regain lost territory is to start a war with Israel

# Nixon - Brezhnev Meet 5/72

- ▣ Only mention of Middle East in joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement called for “military relaxation”
- ▣ Egypt never receives promised weapons
- ▣ U.S. is supplying Israel
- ▣ Sadat orders immediate withdrawal of all 15,000 military advisers in July
- ▣ And all equipment either withdrawn or sold to Egypt
- ▣ Why?



# Because

One of the reasons behind my decision was the Soviet attitude to me; but another important reason was that within the strategy I had laid down, no war could be fought while Soviet experts worked in Egypt. The Soviet Union, the West, and Israel misinterpreted my decision to expel the military experts and reached an erroneous conclusion, which in fact served my strategy, as I had expected—that it was an indication that I had finally decided not to fight my own battle. That interpretation made me happy; it was precisely what I wanted them to think....

# And Because

Yet another reason for my decision was that I wanted to put the Soviet Union in its place—in its natural position as a friendly country, no more, no less. The Soviets had thought at one time that they had Egypt in their back pocket, and the world had come to think that the Soviet Union was our guardian. I wanted to tell the Russians that the will of Egypt was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to tell the whole world that we are always our own masters. Whoever wished to talk to us should come over and do it, rather than approach the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup>

# Israel's Reaction

- ▣ “Sadat had obtained an emotional satisfaction at the expense of his strategic and political power. The disruption of the military organization in which the Soviet officers had played would surely weaken the Egyptian order of battle along the Suez canal. Egypt deprived of the Soviet presence , also appeared less formidable as a political adversary.” Abba Eban
- ▣ Gideon Rafael , Director General of Foreign Ministry thought Sadat regarded the Soviets as an inhibiting factor. Soviets expelled to get more freedom.
- ▣ But Eban did not agree with the decision to stop diplomatic activity. Why?

# Meanwhile in the U.S.

- ▣ Nixon & Kissinger meet with Hussein 2/73
- ▣ Kissinger meets with Sadat's national security adviser in series of meetings from 2/73-5/73
- ▣ Kissinger says the tragedy for the peace process in the Middle East was the personal distrust between Sadat & Hussein
- ▣ Kissinger wants to “stand back”, but Nixon says no “... I totally disagree. This thing is getting ready to blow.”
- ▣ Meir meets with Nixon & Kissinger on 3/1/73
  - Agrees to supply Phantom jets
  - Agrees to co-production of Super Mirage aircraft in Israel

# Meanwhile in the U.S.

- ▣ 4/73- Sadat says in Newsweek “the time has come for a shock”
- ▣ CIA tells Kissinger that Egypt has moved missiles to within 20 miles of Suez & Mirage jets have been moved from Libya to Egypt
- ▣ But unlikely that Sadat would initiate military action in the near future
- ▣ U.S. Economy suffering from inflation
- ▣ Palestinians viewed as terrorists
- ▣ Saudi oil minister threatens Kissinger and Saudi King Faisal threatens president of Arabian American Oil Company with an oil embargo if the U.S. continues to support status quo.
- ▣ All ignored by administration

# And in Israel

- ▣ Meir returns home after talks fail convinced that the Arab's had no military option, Israel's military superiority guaranteed and the status quo could continue indefinitely.
- ▣ “Our American friends offer us money, arms & advice. We take the money, we take the arms and we decline the advice.” Moshe Dayan
- ▣ Dayan wants territorial expansion. Create large scale settlements on the West Bank. Why?
- ▣ Pinchas Sapir, Finance Minister, thinks prolonged occupation would destroy the moral fabric of Israeli society

# But in Egypt

- ▣ First delivery of SCUD missiles arrive in April, 1973
- ▣ Then a crash program to deliver the various types of SAM missiles was instituted
- ▣ Including missile batteries to protect Damascus
- ▣ And various types of anti-tank weapons
- ▣ And even though Israeli Intelligence observed this they still believed nothing would happen, but
- ▣ Chief of Staff Elezar orders a partial mobilization
  - Nothing happens
  - Confirms Intelligence estimates

# Egyptian Plans

- ▣ Interviews and press leaks played on Israeli believe that there was not going to be war
- ▣ Examples;
  - London Daily Mail describes poor maintenance of Egyptian equipment and lack of preparedness
  - Movement of troops and tanks were described as war games, exercises.
  - In fact, plans were so secret that 95% of the officers prisoners did not know until 10/6
- ▣ Russia was to use the Security Council to bring about a cease fire if attack went badly
- ▣ Sadat tells Faisal that war is essential to activate oil weapon
  - So oil was not used because of war
  - Sadat's intention was to use it to guarantee Arab unity



# May, 1973

- ▣ 5/7: Brezhnev meets with Kissinger in Moscow: “But the mistake of the U.S. – and obviously ourselves too – may lie in the fact that neither side can count on its influence being effective if the sides there don’t see prospects for a peace settlement.”
- ▣ 5/15: Sadat encourages other Arab states to use oil to pressure U.S. to abandon its support of Israel
- ▣ 5/20: Kissinger meets with Egyptian Foreign Minister who tells him status quo is intolerable
- ▣ 5/31: State Department memo to Rogers: A resumption of hostilities by autumn will become better than an even bet.

# June, 1973

- ▣ Russia continues arms shipments to Egypt
- ▣ CIA says :
  - “Designed to maintain Cairo’s arms inventory rather than introduce new weapons systems.”
  - But also noted Egyptians viewed “...the present stalemate with Israel as intolerable...”
- ▣ At Nixon-Brezhnev summit in San Clemente, Brezhnev wakes Nixon to discuss Middle East
  - He wants to settle Middle East conflict based on Arab demands
  - Demonstrates Brezhnev thought situation would spiral out of control
  - Coupled with intelligence reports suggesting Syria & Egypt were preparing for war
- ▣ Why wasn’t anything done?

# Eban's Answer

the wilderness. As he himself recalled, “By 1973 the diplomatic deadlock, the failure of the Jarring mission, the strong support given by the Nixon-Kissinger administration to an attrition policy, all created a climate of exuberant self-confidence that began to border on fantasy. There was an obsession with the physical frontiers of the country without regard to its political or moral frontiers. The rhetoric of 1973 is almost inconceivable. Opinion passed from sobriety to self-confidence and from self-confidence to fantasy, reaching a somewhat absurd level in 1973.”<sup>55</sup>

# And

to break the political deadlock. The intelligence chiefs were confident that the Arabs would not risk such an attack, which they knew would be suicidal; and even if they did, they would be flung back so swiftly and violently that Israel's deterrent power would become even greater than before.<sup>56</sup> A low opinion of the Arabs' ability to wage modern war contributed to this sanguine outlook. As one former director of military intelligence later confessed, "a mixture of conceit and complacency tended to colour the evaluation of future developments in the area."<sup>57</sup>

# Galili Document

- ▣ Individuals can buy land in West Bank
- ▣ Reinforce existing Jewish Settlements
- ▣ Create new settlements
- ▣ Expand settlements around Jerusalem
- ▣ To be settled primarily by Russian emigres
- ▣ Gives incentives to industrialists to build factories
- ▣ Build a new city called Yamit in the northeast sector of Sinai
- ▣ Partition Sinai to gain control of oil fields
- ▣ Arab reaction?

# And at the U.N.

- ▣ U.N. resolution calling for a reaffirmation of U.N. resolution 242 and the safeguarding of the Palestinians rights is vetoed by U.S.
- ▣ Secretary-General Waldheim travels to meet with Sadat and Meir
  - Sadat critical of U.N.'s inability to help
  - Meir tells him: “Dr. Waldheim, we know you are always saying the situation in the Middle East is dangerous and explosive, but we don't believe you. The Arabs will get used to our existence and in a few years they will recognize us and we shall have peace. So don't worry. It is a disagreeable situation, but we do not believe there is a real danger for us.”

# October, 1973

- ▣ 10/4 - Soviets execute airlift of dependents from Cairo & Damascus
- ▣ Kissinger misinterprets it as another quarrel between the Arabs & Russia
- ▣ 10/5 - Meir sends message to Washington warning:

Syria and Egypt were in a state of alert and poised for battle. The only possible conclusion, Shalev said, was either they felt that Israel intended an offensive military move, or that they themselves were planning an attack. Meir stated that should Syria or Egypt attack, it would be important to make it clear to them that Israel will “react militarily, with firmness and in great strength.” She asked Kissinger to convey the information to the Arabs and Soviets.<sup>128</sup>

# But

- ▣ Elezar receives information on morning of 10/6 that attack will happen that day
- ▣ Wants a preemptive air attack against Egypt & Syria and general mobilization
- ▣ Dayan & Meir turn him down
- ▣ Reserve call up is facilitated because everyone in Synagogue on Yom Kippur



# Meir in Her Memoirs

Today I know what I should have done. I should have overcome my hesitations. I knew as well as anyone else what full-scale mobilization meant and how much money it would cost, and I also knew that only a few months before, in May, we had had an alert and the reserves had been called up, but nothing had happened. But I also understood that perhaps there had been no war in May exactly because the reserves had been called up. That Friday morning, I should have listened to the warnings of my own heart and ordered a call-up. For me, that fact cannot and never will be erased, and there can be no consolation in anything that anyone has to say or in all of the common-sense rationalizations with which my colleagues have tried to comfort me.<sup>130</sup>

# Meir Distracted?

- ▣ 9/29/73-Palestinian Gunmen hold up a train carrying Russian Jews from Moscow to Vienna
- ▣ 5 Jews & an Austrian official taken hostage
- ▣ Austrian transit center closed by Austrian Jewish chancellor, Bruno Kreisky
- ▣ Meir flies to Vienna to confront him unsuccessfully
- ▣ Returns to Israel 10/3
- ▣ Was terrorist attack part of plan?

# Meir Not Alone

- ▣ Israeli overall defense strategy
  - Intelligence-which would give sufficient warning to mobilize reserves
  - A standing army - which would fight the holding phase
  - The air force- which had a large regular component
- ▣ Here intelligence failed, And
  - Decision not to mobilize was based overwhelming Israeli defensive capability
  - Desire to avoid any semblance of Israeli aggression to make sure of U.S. support

# Erroneous Intelligence Assumptions

- ▣ No attack unless Egypt had superior air power
- ▣ Syria would not attack without Egypt
  - But Israeli intelligence did not relate the increased activity along northern & southern borders with Arab intentions
- ▣ Underestimated Sadat's resolve to break the status quo;
  - didn't believe Sadat would take such a risk
- ▣ "Kissinger's stalling and gradualist approach to the Arab-Israeli impasse became a direct cause of Sadat's decision to launch an attack"

David Morse

- Thought that Egypt would understand that only the U.S. could compel Israel to make concessions
  - Assumed Soviets didn't want war either
- ▣ Kissinger says the breakdown was not administrative, but intellectual:

# Kissinger

There were questions crying to be asked that would have rapidly reached the heart of the matter. That they occurred to no one, including me, seems inexplicable in retrospect. What crisis could possibly occur in Soviet-Arab relations that involved *both* Egypt and Syria simultaneously? Why would the Soviets evacuate dependents but not advisers if there was a political crisis? Why would they undertake an emergency airlift if they were not working against a deadline? What could that deadline be other than the opening of hostilities? The Israeli view that the Soviets might fear the outbreak of war should have given us pause. For if we had reflected, it would have been clear that the Soviets could not be fearing an Israeli attack. Had they done so they would have made urgent representations in Washington to get us to dissuade Israel, and perhaps added public threats. If the Soviets evacuated dependents because they feared a war, they must have had a very good idea that it would be started by the Arabs.<sup>143</sup>

# Arab Objectives

- ▣ Break political deadlock , provoke international crisis that would force superpowers to put pressure on Israel
- ▣ Capture territory on east bank before negotiations begin
- ▣ Capture parts of Golan Heights
- ▣ Destroy large part of Israeli air force

# Arab Strategy

- ▣ Defeat IAF air supremacy
  - Even though Arab air forces had a 3-1 advantage in planes ; IAF much better
- ▣ Allowing Arab preponderance of artillery troops & armour to succeed
- ▣ Missiles supplied by Russia
  - SAMs with various ranges (24,000 -55,000 yds.) to support troops
  - FROGs- with range of 55 miles that could reach Israeli urban centers, as a deterrent against Israel attacking inside Egypt

# Kissinger

- ▣ Kissinger notified early morning of 10/6
  - Meir tells U.S. ambassador to Israel Arabs are about to attack
  - Asks U.S. to convey message to Egypt, Syria & Russia that Israel under no circumstances will either Syria or Egypt
  - Asks Dobrynin to have Moscow use their influence to stop attack



# But In Russia

asked Kuznetsov, “If we and the Americans just go ahead and get a cease-fire favorable to the Arabs, how could that seem to be a blow to proletarian internationalism?” Kuznetsov replied, “Can you imagine what would happen if some of the Arabs oppose our joint step with the Americans, and the Chinese consequently veto the resolution? Do you want the Chinese to become leaders of the national liberation, anti-imperialist forces?” That was it. For the first time during the October War, the “Chinese Syndrome” came up and influenced Soviet decision-making.”<sup>46</sup>

# Egypt & Syria Attack

- ▣ 2 P.M. October 6, 1973. Yom Kippur
  - Also anniversary of Muhammad's 1<sup>st</sup> victory over Mecca adversaries (624 CE)
- ▣ Equivalent of total forces of NATO in Europe
- ▣ Bar-Lev line overrun
  - Purpose of line unclear
    - ▣ Defensive?
    - ▣ Observation?
    - ▣ Herzog thinks it makes no difference.
  - By midday 10/7 Egypt in control of east bank of Suez Canal in the north
  - By evening of 10/8 Egypt in control of east bank in the south

# The Big Picture

By the end of the first day, American strategy was set. The U.S., which expected a quick Israeli victory, would maintain a low profile during the crisis. Kissinger would maintain close diplomatic contact with the Soviets, Egyptians, and Israelis. He would push for a return to the *status quo ante*, though such a proposition had virtually no likelihood of being accepted. Given that Israel had been attacked, it was a defensible position. Once Israel turned the tables, the United States would then acquiesce to a cease-fire in place.

- ▣ Kissinger wants to ensure U.S. holds upper hand
- ▣ And both countries want to maintain détente
- ▣ While “...preserving the U.S.- - U.S.S.R. duopoly of power and facilitating the evolution of the Soviet Union from a revolutionary power intent on destabilizing the global system into a supporter of the status quo”

# The Big Powers

- ▣ Israel asks Kissinger for Sidewinder missiles
- ▣ Defense Department refuses
- ▣ Haig says Nixon agrees with Kissinger
- ▣ And Dobrynin delivers vague response to Kissinger because
  - Moscow under strong pressure from Cairo & Damascus to keep out of U.N. even tho
  - Russia against the war in general & did not believe Arabs could win
- ▣ But U.S. decides to go to U.N.

# And

- ▣ Nixon tells Kissinger that U.N. won't do anything
- ▣ Nixon's orders for aggressive airlift eventually is what turns the tide
- ▣ After things go from bad to worse for Israel
- ▣ Even though CIA estimates that Israel will turn the tide the 3<sup>rd</sup> day
- ▣ Herzog only mentions the resupply once

# Kissinger Memoirs

estimated that Israel would begin to reverse its losses the following day and would win the war by the end of the week. Kissinger summed up the U.S. strategy:

Egypt doesn't want a confrontation with us at the U.N. and the Soviets don't want a confrontation with us. Period. Our general position will be a restoration of the ceasefire lines. The Arabs will scream that they are being deprived of their birthright, but by Thursday they will be on their knees begging us for a ceasefire. ... We're trying to get this over with a limited amount of damage to our relations with the Arabs and the Soviets. If we can also put some money in the bank with the Israelis to draw on in later negotiations, well and good.<sup>63</sup>

- ▣ Sadat tells Kissinger to take charge of peace process and
- ▣ Sadat did not intend to widen the confrontation

# 3<sup>rd</sup> Day

- ▣ 10/8 Israeli counterattack fails
- ▣ Ariel Sharon ignores order to halt attack & head of Southern Command requests Chief of Staff relieve Sharon
- ▣ Dayan supports Sharon
- ▣ Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Dinitz gives “...intimations (to Kissinger) if they didn’t get military equipment & quickly they might go nuclear”
- ▣ But
  - CIA (Director Colby) thinks Israel doesn’t need it
  - And Defense Secretary Schlesinger concern was that if the U.S. turned a losing battle around for Israel it would be nearly impossible to obtain Arab support after the war
- ▣ Nixon Sides with Kissinger and orders support

# And War Continues

- ▣ By 10/9 Israeli forces succeed in stabilizing the line
- ▣ 10/10 Soviet airlift to Syria begins
- ▣ But Schlesinger continues to stall by canceling a meeting with Dinitz
- ▣ U.N. Security Council does nothing
- ▣ And Agnew resigns



# October 12 in the U.S.

- ▣ Alarm about potential oil embargo
  - At press conference Kissinger Asked if the Arab threat to cut off oil effect the decision to resupply Israel
  - “...we have to pursue what we consider to be the right course, we will take the consequences
- ▣ But Dinitz complains to Schlesinger about the unbelievably slow response
  - And then Schlesinger there will be only 16 Phantom jets sent to Israel
  - Because U.S. has to maintain a low profile so as not to antagonize the Arabs

# Dinitz Replies

Mr. Secretary, in the recent period, we have undergone two crises in the Middle East. One, the Syrian and Jordanian crisis of 1970, and the other one, we are going through now. In 1970, your country needed something from us. Now we need something from you. I must humbly say that we acted differently at the time of that crisis than you do now.<sup>134</sup>

## And tells Kissinger:

in two or three days.<sup>141</sup> He added that if a “massive American airlift” did not start immediately, it would be a signal that the U.S was reneging on its promises, and that “we will have to draw very serious conclusions from all this.”<sup>142</sup>

# So

Kissinger, note the Kalbs, not unaware of domestic considerations, understood that the Israelis might soon “go public,” which would provoke an upsurge of pro-Israeli sentiment, and provoke another blow to a weakened administration. They quote an NSC insider: “The Congress was behind the Israelis. The press was behind them. And to judge from the polls, the public was behind them. If the Israelis had gone public at that time, it could have been the end of the Nixon Administration.” A high State Department source told them:

There were enough people in the country just looking for a breach of confidence in *foreign* affairs, above and beyond Watergate. We had always told the Israelis, “When the chips are down, we’re with you.” Well, the chips were down, and it looked as though we were not with them. They had taken a terrible beating from the Arabs. They were the victims of aggression. No doubt about that. They held their hand, because Kissinger told them not to strike first. After all that, we reneged. We didn’t come through. That’s all Jackson needed. If Dinitz had gone public with everything he knew, it could have toppled the Administration.<sup>143</sup>

# Was Kissinger Responsible for the Delay?

I remember Kissinger saying to Schlesinger in one of the meetings, "You are going to have to bear the responsibility for whatever delay there is because I have to deal with the Israelis on the diplomatic front. Nixon and I cannot be viewed as the problem; right now is not the time" ... It wasn't Schlesinger, he was doing what he was told: "get ready to do it but don't do it!" and so he had to take the fall.<sup>149</sup>

One of the most scathing critiques of Kissinger's conduct during the war is that of Italian historian Mario Del Pero, who accuses him of being at the "zenith" of his "unscrupulousness" at that time. According to Del Pero, Kissinger "worked to delay the airlift ... in the hope of trading U.S. military aid for help from the Israeli government and the American Jewish community in stopping [the] Jackson-Vanik [amendment]." He accuses Kissinger of contacting Dinitz "to ask him to intercede" with Jackson to withdraw the bill, which was under discussion in Congress.<sup>152</sup>

# Or Nixon?

For instance, Edward Sheehan claims that “Nixon told the Pentagon to ‘play tough,’ to appear to impede major deliveries to Israel until such time as he and Kissinger determined otherwise. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger intended to be rushed by the Israelis, and both of them coveted the credit amongst American Jews should later circumstances constrain them to unleash an airlift.”<sup>151</sup>

# But Haig Claims:

Schlesinger had his own policy priorities. It soon became evident that he feared that U.S. intervention on the scale mandated by the president would alienate the Arab nations and might lead to an oil embargo against the West. He found reasons to delay shipments to Israel, citing the military and diplomatic dangers of a massive airlift by U.S. military aircraft and the legal difficulties in using civilian aircraft to transport arms into a war zone.... Kissinger repeatedly complained to me about what he described as “Schlesinger’s sabotage.”<sup>153</sup>

# And Schlesinger Explains

Here is where we stood: The Israelis were increasingly desperate. They were running short of some supplies and were beginning to economize on consumption rates. We at DOD were under conflicting pressures. First, we were now being urged to get substantial supplies to Israel quickly—or, it was hinted not too obliquely, the DOD would be at fault if Israel were defeated. Second, we were not supposed to show the U.S. hand. The DOD or the Department of Transportation (not the White House) was supposed to find aircraft to be chartered. Such charters were largely unavailable though it was a prevalent, if unrealistic, belief at the Department of State that airlines could readily be persuaded to allow their aircraft to be chartered.

Under those circumstances, I decided that the constraint was simply irreconcilable with the demand. In early evening on Friday, I called the

White House with this essential message: There is simply no halfway house. If the United States wanted supplies to be delivered to Israel in time, it would have to be the MAC (Military Airlift Command) aircraft all the way into Israel.<sup>154</sup>

# Nixon Moves

- ▣ Nixon appoints Ford as V.P.
- ▣ 10/12 Nixon proposes cease fire
  - Meir accepts
  - Sadat refuses
- ▣ And on 10/14-Egyptian forces launch an attack across Sinai that fails
  - Because beyond range of Egyptian missile cover
  - One of largest tank battles in history
  - Major turning point



# October 13 Meeting

now!” he ordered.<sup>159</sup> According to Kalb and Kalb, at 10:30 a.m., Nixon summoned Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, Haig and Colby to an emergency meeting at the White House. The authors write:

They heard the president ask one key question: Why had there been a delay in implementing his previous orders about supplies for Israel? Schlesinger tried to explain his difficulty in chartering civilian transport planes. “To hell with the charters,” Nixon exploded, according to one eyewitness. “Get the supplies there with American military planes! Forget the Azores! Get moving! I want no further delays.”<sup>160</sup>

# Egyptian Politics

- Egypt had decided on major offensive to relieve pressure on the Syrians
- Egyptian Chief of Staff General Shazli wants to retreat to west bank of Canal
- But Minister of War Ismail opposes
- Because Sadat is to give a major speech to Parliament & wants to speak from a position of strength

# So

- ▣ Sadat's refusal to accept cease fire on 10/12 prompts Nixon to agree to resupply Israel
- ▣ Israel counterattacks on 10/15 & on 10/16 the first wave of Israeli troops cross the Canal
- ▣ Egypt dismisses the crossing as a "television operation" (Sadat's words)
- ▣ Why?
- ▣ Various levels of command were so blinded by "self adulation of their initial success" Herzog
- ▣ And Israel advance on the West bank destroys missile positions and equipment giving Israel air superiority
- ▣ Chief of Staff Shazli wants a retreat from east bank of Canal, but Sadat refuses

# Russia Gets Involved

- ▣ Russia realizes the Arabs are once again facing a complete military collapse
- ▣ Kosigin assures Sadat that Russia will unilaterally guarantee a cease fire. How?
- ▣ Brezhnev, thru Ambassador Dobrynin asks Kissinger to fly to Moscow for urgent consultations
- ▣ They agree to Resolution 338 which passes on morning of 10/22 to take effect that evening
- ▣ And immediately before cease fire to take effect Egypt for first time launches a SCUD that lands harmlessly in the Sinai

# Cease Fire?

- Egyptian 3<sup>rd</sup> Army on West bank of Canal surrounded and in danger of complete destruction
- Disorderly retreat
- Attempt to break out
- Egyptian 2<sup>nd</sup> Army on East Bank continues fighting
- Russia readys its airborne divisions

# So

- ▣ Russia sees destruction of Egyptian 3<sup>rd</sup> Army would hurt Russia's prestige
- ▣ Kissinger believes rescuing the 3<sup>rd</sup> Army would be an important bargaining chip with the Soviets and believes each side (Israel & Egypt) get a bargaining chip
  - Israel has territory on west bank
  - Egypt has territory on East bank & 3<sup>rd</sup> army saved
- ▣ 10/24 second Security Council cease fire resolution passes which holds

# And on the Syrian Front

- ▣ 10/7 Syrian tanks within 10 minutes of River Jordan & Sea of Galilee
- ▣ 10/9 Syrian tanks had broken through the Israeli lines & were everywhere
- ▣ 10/10 Soviet airlift to Syria begins
- ▣ Assad wants a cease fire to consolidate the gains, but Sadat refuses
- ▣ 10/14 Egyptian offensive was in response to Assad's request
- ▣ 10/11 Israel counterattacks and by 10/14 destroys or immobilizes over 1,100 tanks

# And

- ▣ IAF in control of skys-had discovered the way to defeat surface to air missiles
- ▣ IDF advancing to Damascus
- ▣ 10/11 Dobrynin tells Kissinger that that Soviet airborne forces are on alert to defend Damascus
- ▣ U.S.6<sup>th</sup> fleet strengthened
- ▣ Soviet warships move to protect Syrian ports
- ▣ Israel decides not to capture Damascus.
- ▣ Why not?



# Because

- ▣ Effect on Arb world very serious
- ▣ Military value is dubious
- ▣ Cost in lives of taking a city of 1 million would be high
- ▣ Forces spread to thin
- ▣ Soviet threat
- ▣ There were some airstrikes on Damascus, but only after Syria launched missile strikes against Israeli towns

# Jordan & Iraq in Syria

- ▣ War had caught Hussein by surprise
- ▣ His initial reaction was to only defend his border
- ▣ On 10/11 Hussein calls British P.M. Heath who calls Kissinger if the U.S. will intervene with the Israelis to allow him “to do this as a minimum’ and not attack...” if he moves a tank brigade into Syria
- ▣ “Only in the Middle East is it conceivable that a belligerent would ask its adversary’s approval for engaging in a war against it”

# Jordan & Iraq in Syria

- ▣ 10/13 Jordanian tanks enter Syria to help defend Damascus
- ▣ Ironic?
- ▣ Same tank brigade that repulsed Syrian tanks in 9/70
- ▣ Iraqi's launch a series of uncoordinated attacks
  - Leadership hesitant
  - Movement slow
  - Performance disappointing
- ▣ 10/22 Syria accepts U.N. initial cease fire resolution


# Losses

	Dead	Wounded	Aircraft	Tanks
Arabs	8,528	19,549	392	2,554
Israel	2,838	8,800	103	840

# War Effects

- ▣ Political purpose was to break the negotiating log jam which was successful even though Israel was militarily victorious
- ▣ Sadat establishes direct relationship with U.S.
- ▣ U.S. pressures Israel initially to allow supplies to go to 3<sup>rd</sup> Army & then to pull back from west bank of Suez
- ▣ U.S. improves position in Egypt at expense of Russia

# Territory Held After Yom Kippur War



# Why was this 1<sup>st</sup> Arab-Israeli War to be Followed by a Political Settlement?

- ▣ Israel was not invincible
  - Shlaim says Arab pride & honor restored
- ▣ Extent of losses promoted a more realistic understanding on both sides
- ▣ U.S. engagement.
  - Shlaim says Kissinger moved with remarkable speed to develop an Arab dimension to U.S. foreign policy