

Israeli History

Post 1967

Ron's Web Site

- **North Shore Flashpoints**
- <http://northshoreflashpoints.blogspot.com/>

Palestinian Groups

- 1955-Egypt forms Fedayeem
 - Official detachment of armed infiltrators from Gaza National Guard
 - “Those who sacrifice themselves”
 - Recruited ex-Nazis for training
- Fatah created in 1958
 - Young Palestinians who had fled Gaza when Israel created
 - Core group came out of the Palestinian Students League at Cairo University that included Yasser Arafat (related to the Grand Mufti)
 - Ideology was that liberation of Palestine had to precede Arab unity


Palestinian Groups

- PLO created in 1964 by Arab League Summit with Ahmad Shuqeri as leader
- Founder (George Habash) of Arab National Movement formed in 1960 forms
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in December of 1967 with Ahmad Jibril
- Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation (PDFLP) for the Liberation of Democratic Palestine formed in early 1969 by Nayif Hawatmah

Palestinian Groups

	Fatah	PFLP	PDFLP
Founder	Arafat	Habash	Hawatmah
Religion	Sunni	Christian	Christian
Philosophy	Recovery of Palestine	Radicalize Arab regimes	Marxist Leninist
Supporter	All regimes	Iraq	Syria

Palestinian Leaders



Mohammed Yasser Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa

- 8/24/1929 - 11/11/2004
- Born in Cairo, Egypt
- Father born in Gaza of an Egyptian mother
- Mother from Jerusalem
- Beaten by father for going into Jewish section of Cairo
- Graduated from University of King Faud I (1944-1950)
- Fought along side Muslim Brotherhood during 1948



Yasser Arafat

- President of the General Union of Palestinian Students (1952-1956)
- Called up to fight in the 1956 Suez War, but never fought
- Expelled in 1957 because part of Fedayeen
- Went to Kuwait where he became a school teacher
- Founded Fatah in late 1950's
 - Reverse acronym in Arabic for Palestinian National Liberation Movement
 - In early Islamic times meant conquest

Fatah Philosophy

- Liberation of Palestine by armed struggle
- How did this differ from other political & guerrilla organizations?
- Other organizations:
 - United Arab response
 - Accepted money from other countries &
 - Effectively became their satellites
- Fatah didn't want to alienate countries, and
- Only accepted money from wealthy Palestinians

Fatah

- Arafat moves to Syria in 1962 with 300 members – none fighters
- Recruited members by offering them higher incomes than Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
- PLA was military force of PLO, created by Nasser
- Began raids on Israel
- Arafat found guilty of murdering a Palestinian Syrian Army officer, (a close friend of then Defense Minister Assad)

Palestinian Groups

- Commando groups absorbed in PLO in 1968
- Fatah gains most seats in Palestinian National Council & Arafat elected as head of PLO 2/69
 - 105 total seats
 - Commando groups have 57
 - Fatah had 33 of 57

Palestinian Charter

Article 2

- Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

British mandate



Palestinian Charter

- Article 5: The Palestinians are those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or have stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father - whether inside Palestine or outside it - is also a Palestinian.
- Article 6: The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians

Ethnic Cleansing?

- Article 3: The Palestinian Arab people possess the legal right to their homeland and have the right to determine their destiny after achieving the liberation of their country in accordance with their wishes and entirely of their own accord and will.
- Article 15: The liberation of Palestine...and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.

Palestinian Charter

- Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. This is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase.
- Article 10: Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution.

Palestinian Groups

- “... armed struggle was the only means to liberate Palestine...” to be accomplished through commando actions-
- often undertaken by factions competing for prestige & recruits.
- BUT, particular hostility between Habash’s PFLP & Arafat

Palestinian Groups

PLO. In the view of a colleague of Arafat,

it wasn't that we didn't want to [get rid of the PFLP]. But it was practically impossible to unify the commando organizations when each one of them was supported and subsidized by one or another Arab country whose causes and quarrels they espoused. That is why the Central Committee of the Palestinian Resistance, instead of being a coordinating and decision-making body, turned out to be a sort of parliament where all the conflicts and intrigues of the Arab world were reflected. Yasir Arafat, speaking for more than half the Fidayin members, had to deal as an equal with the delegate of a tiny group just because the latter was the protégé of one of the richest Arab states [Iraq]. That's how difficult, if not impossible, it was to enforce even a minimum of discipline at the very heart of the movement.¹⁶

possibly great

Jordan & the Palestinians

- Fatah initially fails in West Bank due to:
 - Effective Israeli retaliation & intelligence
 - Unwillingness of Palestinians to participate
- Marriage of convenience between Hussein & Arafat
 - Hussein thought
 - Arafat's assaults would discourage Israeli settlement efforts
 - Encourage U.S. diplomatic intervention
 - And could discard Arafat if talks arose
 - Arafat's intention to destroy Israel was a fantasy
 - Having a Palestinian State on the West bank was unacceptable to Hussein who wanted it for himself and would at best allow Palestinian autonomy under cloak of Jordanian sovereignty
 - Arafat used as springboard for assaults

Jordan & the Palestinians

- School bus blown up killing & wounding children
- Massive Israeli response against Jordanian town of al-Karamah in 2/68 backfires
- Though technically a defeat for Palestinians
- Inflicted numerous Israeli casualties
- Became basis for propaganda & recruiting

Jordan & the Palestinians



Jordan & the Palestinians

- Fatah & other Palestinian groups begin taking control of civilian life in Jordan
- How?
- Roadblocks, publicly humiliated Jordanian police forces, molested women and levied illegal taxes, taking Westerners in tourist hotels hostage
- Hussein tries to avoid military confrontation by dismissing anti-PLO cabinet ministers and inviting Arafat to become P.M.
- Arafat refuses.
- Why?
- Believes in a Palestinian state with Palestinian leadership.

Palestinian Charter


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British mandate



British Mandate Adjustment Transjordan Separation-1923



Palestine Population

Year	Jews	Non-Jews	Total	% Jewish
1517	5,000	295,000	300,000	1.7
1882	24,000	276,000	300,000	8.0
1918	60,000	600,000	660,000	8.1
1931	174,610	861,211	1,035,821	16.9
1936	384,078	982,614	1,366,692	28.1

Jordan & the Palestinians

Black September

- 9/15/1970-PFLP hijacks 5 planes & takes them to Amman airport
 - Blows planes up after letting passengers go
 - Arafat condemns attacks, but his image is tarnished
- Hussein declares martial law-civil war breaks out
- Syrian tanks are repulsed by Jordanian Army
- Nixon declares U.S. intervention might be required. Why?
 - Convey signal to Russia
 - Israel promises to intervene on Hussein's behalf

And Nixon said:

One thing was clear. We could not allow Hussein to be overthrown by a Soviet-inspired insurrection. If it succeeded, the entire Middle East might erupt in war: the Israelis would almost certainly take pre-emptive measures against a Syrian-dominated radical government in Jordan; the Egyptians were tied to Syria by military alliances; and Soviet prestige was on the line with both the Syrians and Egyptians. Since the United States could not stand idly by and watch Israel being driven into the sea, the possibility of a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation was uncomfortably high. It was a ghastly game of dominoes, with a nuclear war waiting at the end.³²

...and Kissinger said to Nixon: "The President will never forget Israel's role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan and in blocking the attempt to overthrow the regime there..."

Jordan & the Palestinians

- Arafat becomes Supreme Commander of PLA
- 9/21/70 at Arab Summit, Nasser negotiates a cease fire between PLA & Jordan
- Nasser dies the next day and cease fire falls apart
- Jordan army achieves dominance
- Both sides violate it
- Arafat calls for overthrow of Hussein
- Hussein ousts PLO
- Escape to Syria, but Assad forces them to go to Lebanon

Black September

- Derives its name from the 9/1970 Jordanian civil war.
- Began as a small Fatah cell.
- Recruits from other groups joined later.
- Who controlled Black September?

Black September

- In his book *Stateless*, Salah Khalaf, Arafat's chief of security and a founding member of Fatah, wrote that: "Black September was not a terrorist organization, but was rather an auxiliary unit of the resistance movement, at a time when the latter was unable to fully realize its military and political potential. The members of the organization always denied any ties between their organization and Fatah or the PLO."

But

- According to American journalist Charlie Cranston Black September represented a "total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the *fedayeen*. Its members operated in air-tight cells of four or more men and women. Each cell's members were kept purposely ignorant of other cells. Leadership was exercised from outside by intermediaries and 'cut-offs' [*sic*]", though there was no centralized leadership

And

- Fatah needed Black September, according to Benny Morris. He writes that there was a "problem of internal PLO or Fatah cohesion, with extremists constantly demanding greater militancy. The moderates apparently acquiesced in the creation of Black September in order to survive".^[6] As a result of pressure from militants, writes Morris, a Fatah congress in Damascus in August–September 1971 agreed to establish Black September. The new organization was based on Fatah's existing special intelligence and security apparatus, and on the PLO offices and representatives in various European capitals, and from very early on, there was cooperation between Black September and the PFLP.^[6]

So

- The PLO closed Black September down in September 1973, on the anniversary it was created by the "political calculation that no more good would come of terrorism abroad" according to Morris.^[7] In 1974 Arafat ordered the PLO to withdraw from acts of violence outside the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel.

Lebanon, the Palestinians & Israel

- Previously Lebanon stayed out of conflict
- 1968 PLO (primarily PFLP) tries to establish Lebanon as base for hijacking
- Israel holds Lebanon responsible and launches a massive, selective retaliation designed to teach Lebanon a lesson, but resulting in
 - Civil strife between Christians, Palestinians and Maronite Catholics
 - Collapse of Lebanese government
 - Unresolved tensions resulted in civil war by 1975

Lebanon, the Palestinians & Israel

- Cairo Agreement signed in 1969 between Arafat & the Lebanese government provided for:
 - PLO autonomy in controlling refugee camps previously supervised by Lebanese security forces
 - PLO gains specific access routes to Israeli border
 - Syria supply lines to PLO permitted
- But Christian paramilitary groups outside of government control confronted Palestinians
- Eshkol dies 2/26/69, Allon interim P.M. until Golda Meir takes over on 3/17/69

Golda Meir

- Born Golda Mabovitch 5/3/1898 in Kiev, Russia
- First Memory is of her father boarding up door in anticipation of a pogrom
- 1906 with rest of family follows her father to Milwaukee
- Teacher in Milwaukee
 - Public schools & Yiddish speaking Folks Schule
- Married at 19 to Morris Meyerson
- She was a Labor Zionist; he a socialist
- Both joined a Kibbutz in 1921
- Had 2 children



Golda Meir

- 1928 became Secretary of Working Women's Council & spent 2 years in U.S.
- 1934 became Executive Committee Member of Histarudt
- 1938 Evian Council observer
- 1946 heads Political Department of Jewish Agency
- 1948 (pre-war) raises \$50,000,000
- 5/10/48 meets with King Abdullah of Jordan urging him not to attack
 - Abdullah asks her not to hurry to proclaim a State
 - She replies: "We've been waiting for 2,000 years, is that hurrying"
- She likened the Arab exodus from Israel in 1948 to what had happened to Jews in Germany

Doomed to Succeed

Perhaps his foremost villain is Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. chairman who, in the waning days of the Clinton administration, walked away from the best deal ever offered to the Palestinians because he was unable to make the transition from revolutionary leader to statesman. A close second appears to be Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli prime minister whom President George H.W. Bush pegged as an unscrupulous liar, a characterization that, from the evidence presented here, seems justified. For sheer coldblooded cunning, however, it's hard to top America's own Machiavelli, Henry Kissinger. In 1969, with President Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers eager to pursue regional peace efforts in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War, the president's national security adviser vigorously argued that the United States do nothing of the sort lest the Soviet Union share credit. "The prerequisite of effective Middle East diplomacy," Kissinger wrote, "was to reduce the Soviet influence so that progress could not be ascribed to its pressures." The ensuing diplomatic paralysis helped provoke the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Doomed to Succeed

On the flip side, Ross displays enormous admiration for the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, the former hard-line general who, perhaps more than any other Israeli leader, genuinely sought a lasting settlement with the Palestinians, only to be assassinated for his troubles. Joining Rabin in the good-guy camp are the first President Bush and President Clinton, the former for what Ross sees as his principled forthrightness, the latter for the extraordinary energy — and political capital — he expended in his own peace effort. The writer also reveals a soft spot for Bush's secretary of state James Baker, just about the only person in these pages with the good sense to lose his temper periodically at the endless haggling and nit-picking debate he's forced to endure. In one particularly amusing anecdote, Ross recounts a meeting he and Baker held on the eve of an international conference, at which a Palestinian delegation raised a series of last-minute issues. "With you people, the souk never closes, but it is closed with me," Baker thundered, before leaving the room. "Have a nice life."

Doomed to Succeed

at the heart of the Palestinian Question is a conundrum no American administration has been willing or able to unravel. The Palestinians, seeing themselves as the aggrieved party, have never taken the initiative in offering up peace terms, and whatever the Israelis have offered has never been enough. For their part, and despite the lip service paid to their American allies, most Israelis see little to be gained and much to be risked in a peace agreement and are seemingly content with the status quo, a contentment increased by the concrete wall as high as 26 feet that now separates them from their Palestinian neighbors. As for the Americans, the traditional overseers of this contest, their tepid response to the settlements issue adds constant fuel to Palestinian rage — and obstinacy — while their military support further enhances Israel's sense of security, giving it even less motive to negotiate. As James Baker might say, "Have a nice life."

She likened the Arab exodus from Israel in 1948 to what had happened to Jews in Germany

On the political plane, though, no policy decision had yet been taken. In early May, after a visit to Haifa, Golda Myerson (Meir), the powerful acting director of the Jewish Agency Political Department, noted the “dreadful” exodus of the town’s Arabs and how they had left “the coffee and pita bread” on the tables. She told her colleagues, “I could not avoid [thinking] that this, indeed, had been the picture in many Jewish towns [that is, in World War II Europe]. . . . [Should the Jews] make an effort to bring the Arabs back to Haifa, or not [?] We have decided on a number of rules, and these include: we won’t go to Acre and Nazareth to bring back [Haifa’s] Arabs. But, at the same time, our behavior should be such that if, because of it, they come back—[then] let them come back. We shouldn’t behave badly with the Arabs [who have remained] so that others [who fled] won’t return.”¹⁶⁰

Golda Meir

- First Ambassador to Soviet Union
- 1949 elected Knesset member as Mapai party member
- 1949-1956 Minister of Labor
- 1956-1966 Minister of Foreign Affairs
 - 1958- Praised the work of Pius on behalf of Jewish people
 - Huh????
 - Letter to Israel's Ambassador to Poland "A proposal was raised in the coordination committee to inform the Polish government that we want to institute selection in Aliyah, because we cannot continue accepting sick and handicapped people. Please give your opinion as to whether this can be explained to the Poles without hurting immigration."[\[31\]](#)

Golda Meir

- Diagnosed with lymphoma in 1960
- Retires from public life in 1966
- On Eshkol's death agrees to serve as interim P.M.
- Expected to be a caretaker P.M. and
- To prevent a contest between Dayan & Allon
- "Golda Meir chose to use 200 words although her vocabulary extended to 500." Abba Eban

Israeli Political Parties

NAME		Dates	Composition	Philosophy
MAPAI	Workers Party of Israel	1930-1968		Left
Alignment 1		1965-1968	MAPAI & Ahudut Havodah	Social Democrats & Labor Zionists
Labor		1968- Present	MAPAI, Rafi & Ahudut Havodah	Center Left
Alignment 2		1969-1991	Labor & MAPAM	Center Left
GAHAL	Freedom, Liberal Bloc	1965-1973	Liberal & Herut	Center Right
Ahudut Havodah	Labor Unity	1919-1968	went through incarnations	Left-Labor Zionists
MAPAM	United Workers	1948-1992	Hashomer Hatzair Ahudut Havodah	Socialist Marxist

- <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/assassination-shattered-mideast-peace-dreams/>
- <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/20-years-since-rabins-death-changed-peace-prospects/>

Golda Meir

- Avi Shlaim's analysis:
 - Strong & decisive
 - Imperious, overbearing, intolerant of opposition
 - Subtlety & ambiguity were alien to her character
 - Remarkable capacity for simplifying complex problems
 - Saw the world in black & white
 - Very difficult to reason with her because she always saw herself as right
- Remind you of any other woman in politics?

Golda Meir

- “Her talent lay in the simplification of issue. She went straight to the crux and center of each problem. When officials analyzed the contradictory waves of influence that flowed into decision making, she tended to interrupt them with an abrupt request for the bottom line. The quest for the simple truth is not easy when the truth is not simple”

Abba Eban

Golda Meir

tion. As her biographer pointed out,

Golda was afraid of the Arabs, and these fears were connected with her memories of pogroms and the Holocaust. She may have also been afraid of the quest for revenge that she detected among the Arabs. She could not come to terms with the thought that maybe the Arabs felt that an injustice had been committed against them. She also rejected absolutely the possibility that some of the Arab demands might be justified. She refused to recognize that the Arabs felt humiliated. She did not agree with the assumption that the Palestinian Arabs felt that they were a people without a country. . . . It was very hard for her to face up soberly to the main problem that confronted Zionism: the Arab question. Her position was simple: they or us.²

Golda Meir

claim of the critics that this was evidence of expansionism. In her memoirs she noted,

And of course, “intransigent” was to become my middle name. But neither Eshkol nor I, nor the overwhelming majority of other Israelis, could make a secret of the fact that we weren’t at all interested in a fine, liberal, anti-militaristic, dead Jewish state or in a “settlement” that would win us compliments about being reasonable and intelligent but that would endanger our lives. . . . Israeli democracy is so lively that there were, and are, almost as many “doves” as “hawks,” but I have yet to come across any Israeli who thinks that we should turn

Meir vs Eshkol

- Meir was a fighter, dogmatic, domineering & intransigent
- Eshkol was a compromiser, open minded, often hesitant and flexible
- But-
 - Both wanted to preserve the Jewish & democratic character of Israel
 - Viewed the most promising solution to the Palestinian problem as a compromise with Jordan that would keep most of the Palestinians outside Israel
- Eshkol put the emphasis on what to concede to make a deal
- Meir put emphasis on security

Meir's Principles

- No return to pre-war borders
- No withdrawal
- Without direct negotiations & peace treaties
- “ The peace treaties must include agreement on final, secure and recognized boundaries. The peace treaties must annul claims of belligerency, blockades, boycotts, interference with free navigation and the existence and activity of organizations and groups engaged in preparing or executing sabotage operations from bases and training camps on the territories of the states signatory to the peace treaties”
Golda Meir


The Military

- Gained influence under Meir
- Chief of Staff began attending cabinet meetings
- Foreign Ministry became marginalized
- Political and diplomatic considerations became subordinate to military ones in policy making
- Military activism & retaliation again became policy
- Previous P.M.s were all capable of not accepting the military view
 - “But Mrs. Meir herself has more or less said that on security matters, ‘I would do nothing but blindly accept the military view.’ That is not the function of a prime minister” Abba Eban
- What do you think?

Movements within Israel

- Greater Israel Movement
 - Incorporate all of occupied territories into Israel
- Peace Movement
 - Return most of the territories coupled with a conciliatory policy designed to lead to accommodation with the Arabs
- Shlaim claims these were fringe movements that cut across party lines

New Faces



More New Faces



War of Attrition

March, 1969 – August, 1970

- Three fronts
 - Northern Jordan valley
 - Syria
 - Egypt-main theater of operations
- Nasser's policy –all that is taken by force can only be returned by force
- “...no concession to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”
- Three Stages
 - Defensive rehabilitation
 - Offence-defense
 - “Liberation”

Prelude to the War of Attrition

- 9/1/67 - Egyptians fired on Israeli shipping in the Mediterranean from northern Suez
- Resulting in artillery exchanges
- 10/21/67- Israeli flagship, destroyer *Eliat*, sunk by missile fire.
 - First time in history warship had been sunk by missile fire
- 10/25/67 - Israel retaliates with artillery bombardment of oil depots & petrochemical installations along southern Canal
- Retaliation significantly greater than Egypt anticipates
- Relative calm ensues

Defensive Rehabilitation

11/1/67-9/1/68

- Russia resupplies Egypt
- Stronger military position than prior to 1967
- More modern weaponry
 - MiG-21 instead of MiG-17
 - T-54 & T-55 tanks in place of T-34 & T-35 tanks
- Military advisors
 - Initially hundreds, limited to organization & training but
 - grows to thousands, that become involved in all aspects of the military including air operations
 - Sound familiar?

Russia Makes Several Unworkable Proposals

In addition to the Soviet proposal, French president Charles de Gaulle, whom both Nixon and Kissinger greatly admired, had pushed for talks on the Middle East between France, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. When de Gaulle first proposed the meeting between the “four great powers” during the Johnson Administration, the former president is reputed to have asked sarcastically, “Who are the other two?” and didn’t give the matter much consideration.¹⁶ In February 1969, however, Nixon approved Rogers’ recommendation for two sets of parallel talks, the first between the four powers, which the president saw as being largely for show, and the second between the Americans and Soviets, where the serious business could be done.

Offense-Defense

9/68-3/69

- 9/8/68-Egypt launches massive military barrage
- Commando raids on Israeli positions on Suez west bank
- Israel outgunned
 - This tendency of Israel not to place a heavier emphasis on the importance of artillery was to prove a costly mistake that only became apparent in the 1973 war. Hezog
- Israel takes indirect approach.
 - Commando raids into heart of Egypt to within 300 miles of Cairo
 - Message is clear
 - Wide areas of Egyptian populated area are open to attack
- Relative quiet ensues

Bar-Lev Line

- Observation fortifications along the East Bank of the canal
 - Warning outpost system
 - 7 miles apart
 - For 15 troops, designed to withstand the heaviest artillery barrage
 - Visual & electronic capabilities
- Tanks patrolling between the fortifications
- Artillery & tanks in the rear ready to move forward if there was any attempt to cross the Canal
- Completed March, 1969
- Objective to preserve status quo until Egypt agreed to peace treaty

Israeli Elections

10/69

- MAPAI had merged with dovish MAPAM to form Alignment, which Dayan opposed
- Dayan insists on doctrine that binds all members and defines secure borders
 - Jordan is Israel's eastern security border
 - Golan Heights and Gaza Strip to remain under Israeli control
 - Israel to retain strip of land in Sinai down to Straits of Tiran
 - "Sharm el-Sheik without Peace is better than peace without Sharm el-Sheik"
- Alignment wins 56 seats compared with 63 seats held before election
- Meir forms a unity government similar to Eshkol's



Liberation Phase

4/69-8/1970

- Nasser May Day speech
 - 60% of Bar-Lev Line destroyed
 - Egyptian Army is ready to move from “active defense” to “liberation”
 - No longer recognizes the 1967 cease fire
- Egypt’s strategy
 - Wear out IDF by constant attack
 - Reduce Israel’s civilian & military morale
 - Impose an economic burden by destroying as much military equipment as possible
 - What gave rise to this strategy?

Liberation Phase

- Reasons for Egyptian strategy
 - IDF strength was in a war in which speed & maneuverability were of the essence and
 - Egypt had a substantial artillery advantage
 - Israel's extreme sensitivity to casualties
- Resulting in a softening of IDF forces along the Canal allowing Egyptian forces to cross and
- Would keep the issue alive before the U.N.
- So constant mutual artillery & commando raid exchanges
- MiG-21 shot down by Hawk missile for 1st time

Flying Artillery

- Policy originally proposed by Ezer Weizman
 - Previously IAF Chief of Staff
 - Gahal minister of transportation
- Rabin, who is now ambassador to U.S. says that the Nixon administration would welcome deep penetration bombing in Egypt because it would serve U.S. interests
- How?
- Would Soviets respond?
- Cabinet believes Russia will only protest
- Eban disagrees with both conclusions

So Eban Proposes

ing to a halt. On 7 February he proposed to the cabinet a political initiative to restore the cease-fire for a limited period as part of a new “peace offensive.” His idea was that they should not only declare their policies but also give dramatic expression to their readiness for a temporary cease-fire on the Suez Canal as a first step toward military de-escalation. He argued that there was nothing to lose by exploring the possibility of ending the War of Attrition, and there was some support for his proposal. But Golda Meir turned all her fury against him. Did Eban not recall that Nasser himself had proposed a temporary cease-fire? If this was in Nasser’s interest, how could it be in the interest of Israel? Was Eban not proposing a dangerous trap for Israel in contradiction to its stated policy?

- “This episode illustrated the difficulty of being a foreign minister in a cabinet that had an exaggerated vision of the role of war in international politics”

Flying Artillery

- Military objective:
 - Reduce Egyptian military pressure in the forward Canal area
 - Deter Egypt from planning a full scale war
 - Bring an end to the War of Attrition
 - Compel Egypt to observe a cease fire
- Psychological & Political objectives
 - Break Egyptian morale
 - Bring about downfall of Nasser regime
 - To be replaced by a pro-Western regime

Flying Artillery

- Use IAF rather than increase strength of ground artillery
 - Bad policy in long term. Why?
 - Unmitigated success in the short term
- Raids & artillery barrages by both sides continue, and
 - IDF mounts coordinated air, tank and frogmen attack , destroying PT boats, a military camp and several radar installations
 - Another attack results in the capture of Russian radar equipment
 - IAF raids continue resulting in the destruction of a considerable part of the Russian supplied air defense system
 - Israel flies 1,000 sorties compared to 100 Egyptian sorties
 - Dog fights result in loss of 26 Egyptian planes and 3 Israeli planes in July & August of 1969
 - IAF flies over pyramids

Flying Artillery

- Negative effect on Egyptian public primarily because of attacks on military installations in and near Cairo - Herzog
- Stability of Nasser regime becomes a concern
- But Shlaim says the bombing reinforced the will to resist and rallied the people behind Nasser
- Kremlin is concerned because Western planes flown by Israeli pilots operated with virtual impunity against a similar air defense system that protected Communist bloc countries

Russia and SAMs

- Russia sends
 - 1,500 advisors (totaling 15,000 troops) with
 - The latest SAM 3 system
 - And assumed responsibility for protection by taking over operation of the missiles and flying the planes
- Soviet strategic aim
 - By establishing forces along the Suez, Russia controls the main link between the Mediterranean & the Indian Ocean
- Israeli air attacks into Egypt virtually cease in April , 1970 in order to avoid direct confrontation with Soviets.
- Why didn't Israel want a direct confrontation?
- Now MiGs fly over Sinai

But There Were Direct Confrontations

Soviet aircraft were shot down for no loss on the part of Israel. According to Moshe Dayan,* the Israeli pilots thought the Soviet pilots lacked experience and flexibility: they behaved in battle as they had been taught in training exercises, and stuck to the book, flying in pairs, close together, and not breaking off fast enough. The five pilots bailed out and landed on

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- “This episode illustrated the difficulty of being a foreign minister in a cabinet that had an exaggerated vision of the role of war in international politics”

Eban Disliked in Israel?

to a public opinion poll conducted for *Haaretz* in July 1967, Eban's approval ratings as foreign minister were higher than Dayan's as defense minister and Eshkol's as prime minister: 47 percent endorsed Eshkol and 81 percent supported Dayan the war hero but, remarkably, Eban enjoyed 82 percent approval. Together with Dayan, Eban was by some distance the most popular politician in Israel, but with one caveat—his arena was clearly foreign affairs. His approval ratings for the premiership were pathetically low, at 4 percent, trailing behind Eshkol, Dayan, Allon, and even the octogenarian David Ben-Gurion and the eternal opposer Menachem Begin. For some Israelis Eban was a *foreign* foreign minister. Only weeks after the Six-Day War had ended, a newspaper caricature depicted an impeccably attired Eban strolling into the UN General Assembly building, only to be blocked by one of his compatriots. Wearing khaki shorts, sandals, and a soiled open shirt, this “typical” Israeli—a sabra—blocks Eban's way and suggests that he change into similar attire before he enters the building. The message to Eban was clear: you are not one of us. As one of Eban's colleagues remarked, “he is our attorney, not our representative.”²⁴

And

... 10 to 20 percent. When asked to rank Israel's leaders according to seven leadership traits, Dayan came out on top, scoring 6.5 points. Right behind him, with a score of 5.7 was Eban, followed by Eshkol and Allon. Among the party voters the gap between Dayan and Eban was reduced further, with Dayan scoring 6.4 and Eban scoring 6.1. Both were also the most popular leaders among Israeli Arabs. Such results, which remained consistent in the postwar period, seemed to dispel the myth in Israel at the time that Eban was more popular abroad than in his own country, though at least within the political system he was charged with unwarranted deference to the UN and a ready acquiescence to international demands.²⁵ Eban's main weakness vis-à-vis Dayan was his lack of security and military kudos, a shortcoming he tried to deflect, not very convincingly, by dismissing his public image as the chief dove in government. "I don't know what my ornithological definition is," he said in February 1969. "I don't see military power as the answer to every situation, but I recognize situations when there is no other answer." Whether he liked the typology or not, Eban certainly considered himself a political dove: "Usually the dove is nicer than the hawk, and Noah had a good use for it. I haven't found any reference in the Bible to a useful mission performed by a hawk."²⁶

Prelude To Cease Fire

It became clear that, in addition to a policy of achieving air parity with Israel, the anti-aircraft capability of the Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal had become a vital element in developing future Egyptian offensive strategy. The increased reach of the missile system would bring the airspace over the Israeli front-line within range of Egyptian missiles. This stage would be set, as far as the anti-aircraft phase was concerned, for the ultimate crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians.

And Dogfight Results in 5 Of 8 Mig21's Being Shot down with No Israeli Losses Over Northern Sector of Gulf of Suez

indeed did the Egyptians or Russians mention a word of it in public. There was considerable consternation in the Soviet Union, but the Egyptians openly rejoiced at the Soviet discomfiture: they heartily disliked their Soviet allies, whose crude, gauche behaviour had created bitter antagonism, and whose officers looked down on the Egyptian officers, treating them with faintly-concealed disdain. The commander of the Soviet Air Defences and the commander of the Soviet Air Force rushed to Egypt on that very day.

So

The War of Attrition continued to rage across the Suez Canal after the bombing of the Egyptian interior had ceased. Nearly all the assumptions that prompted the deep-penetration bombing turned out to be mistaken. Nasser's regime did not collapse under the blows inflicted by the IAF; the Soviet Union intervened physically and not only verbally to parry the blows; and the United States evinced none of the enthusiasm for the bombing that Ambassador Rabin had predicted. Israel had seriously misjudged both the Soviet and the American reactions. It now had to turn to its superpower patron as the only possible source of deterrence against the other superpower. Israel's dependence for strategic support and arms supplies on the United States increased sharply, and with it the susceptibility to American political pressure. Thus, by pressing too far its military advantage against Egypt, Israel helped to defeat its own important postwar objective of keeping the superpowers out of the Middle East as far as possible.

War of Attrition

Cease Fire

- Rogers Plan-12/69
 - Peace treaty between Israel, Egypt & Jordan
 - Almost complete withdrawal from occupied territories
 - Status of Gaza & Sharm el-Shek left open
 - Israel & Egypt immediately rejects .
 - Why?
 - Rabin reports U.S. encouragement of Israeli efforts to destroy Egypt's military & indirectly humiliate Soviets
 - Israeli cabinet insists on direct talks with Arabs
 - Eban adamant that an independent state in the West Bank was a non starter
 - Nasser insists on unconditional withdrawal & refuses to negotiate free passage of Suez
 - Soviets support Nasser
 - Kissinger & Nixon undermine State Department

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

- New York Times Editorial 12/69

U.S. policy as it is now unfolding comes close to the advocacy and development of an imposed settlement. While this may not be deliberate, the mechanics and dynamics are moving in that direction. Israel will resist this. By addressing itself in detail to matters of substance, the U.S. proposals do more than undermine the principle of negotiation; they preempt its very prospect. If the United States has already determined what the “secure and recognized boundaries” are there is no point in Israel taking part in any negotiations with anybody at all. Why should the Arabs consent to give Israel more than what America is recommending publicly?

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

- Globalism vs. Regionalism
- Kissinger-diplomacy should wait until the U.S. could dominate the negotiating process & exclude the Soviets
 - “The longer Israel holds its conquered Arab territory the longer the Soviets cannot deliver what the Arabs want.”
- Rogers-cooperation with the Soviets had merit if each power could bring its satellite to the bargaining table
- Nixon establishes a special channel between Kissinger & Rabin to sidestep the State Department & Eban

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

“This is a snippet of an exchange between Kissinger and Rogers a few days ago,” he said. “It took place the day after a meeting I had with Kissinger. It speaks for itself. Please don’t ask me how I got hold of it.”

Peering over Begin’s shoulder I read what he was reading:

Rogers: The meeting you had last night with Rabin screwed it up badly.

Kissinger: Don’t be ridiculous.

Rogers: I’m not being ridiculous.

Kissinger (shouting): You are being absurd. If you have any complaint, talk to the president. I’m sick and tired of this.

Rogers: You and I don’t see eye-to-eye on these things. The Israelis have the impression that they have two channels to the president, and they exploit them differently.

Kissinger: There is no separate channel.

Rogers: Why do you think they go to you?

Kissinger: To try to end-run you and to get the president to overrule you.

Rogers: That’s right!

Kissinger: But that has never happened.

Rogers: But why give them the impression that it might? I don’t think you should see those people.¹⁹

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

Begin handed back the page, and with a twinkle in the eye, said, “How enlightening! I take it that Dr. Kissinger is here telling a – how did Churchill define a lie in Parliament? – a ‘terminological inexactitude.’ Tell me, how big a terminological inexactitude is Kissinger’s assertion that there is no separate channel to the president?”

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

- Rabin tells Kissinger they are embarking on a full scale public relations campaign against the Rogers Plan
- Kissinger tells Rabin-Ok. But don't attack the President. And
- Kissinger asks Rabin. "Would you like to meet the President."

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

- Nixon tells Rabin
 - “I promise that we will not only provide for Israel’s defense needs, but for her economic needs as well.”
 - “In all matters connected with arms supplies, don’t hesitate to approach Laird or Kissinger. Actually it would be better if you approached Kissinger”
 - Rabin has a direct line to Kissinger
 - “You always know what he (Rabin) wants. He wants more” Kissinger
- Rabin doesn’t know if Nixon is trying:
 - to drive a wedge between Kissinger & Rogers or
 - to ensure no criticism of White House
 - political benefit
- And the Rogers Plan dies.
- Why?

Because

The Rogers plan was effectively dead on arrival. William Quandt cites three reasons. First, he argues, it was based on the mistaken assumption that the United States and Soviet Union could “deliver” their respective clients. Second was the marginal involvement of the White House. Lastly, Quandt writes, was that Rogers underestimated Israel’s “will and ability to resist American pressure.”²⁸

And Nixon Says

Of the Rogers Plan, Nixon wrote in his memoirs:

I knew that the Rogers Plan could never be implemented, but I believed that it was important to let the Arab world know that the United States did not automatically dismiss its case regarding the occupied territories or rule out a compromise settlement of the conflicting claims. With the Rogers Plan on the record, I thought it would be easier for the Arab leaders to propose reopening relations with the United States without coming under attack from the hawks and pro-Soviet elements in their own countries.²⁹

Nixon Memo to Kissinger 3/70

They must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. We are *for* Israel because Israel in our view is the only state in the Mideast which is *pro*-freedom and an effective opponent to Soviet expansion.... This is the kind of friend that Israel needs and will continue to need, particularly when the going gets very tough in the next five years....³⁹

Meir & Nixon

the U.S.S.R. was virtually inevitable in case of an Arab-Israeli war.” As a result, he had a “tendency to oversimplify, if not actually to distort” complexities in the region by accepting the idea that “the Soviets are the main cause of Middle East tensions.”⁴¹ Nixon was encouraged in this view by Israeli prime minister Golda Meir, who, for example, told him on September 18, 1970, that “Israel’s problems were not caused primarily by the Arabs. They were the direct result of the Soviet presence and Soviet military equipment.”⁴²

Nixon & Meir

evangelical movement,” he writes, “Israel’s public support for the Administration’s approach in Vietnam and for Nixon’s reelection campaign won appreciation and sympathy in the White House, and fostered a sense of common purpose that went well beyond a strict strategic calculus.”⁴³ However, Kochavi contends that Israel’s discreet backing for the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which linked U.S.-Soviet relations to the issue of Jewish emigration and thereby threatened the Administration’s efforts to achieve détente, “undermined Nixon’s and Kissinger’s perception of Israel as a trusted, like-minded ally, since they both strongly opposed the amendment and placed great stock in the unswerving loyalty of friends.” Though Nixon squarely put Israel in the category of “friend,” the basic “DNA” of the U.S.-Israeli relationship under Nixon’s tenure could best be characterized as cooperation with bouts of friction.⁴⁴

War of Attrition

U.S. Policy

- Rogers Plan B-June, 1970
 - 3 month cease fire along Egyptian front
 - Acceptance of UN Resolution 242, specifically withdrawal from occupied territories
 - Undertaking from Israel to negotiate with Egypt & Jordan under Dr. Jarring's auspices
 - Standstill-neither Egypt nor Israel can move missiles closer to the Canal
- Egypt & Jordan accept proposal.
- Why?

War of Attrition

Cease fire

- Nasser is sick
- Realizes political cost, i.e., what he has to give up to Russia
- Cease fire could advance his military plans
- Kissinger thinks Nasser feared another Israeli pre-emptive strike
- Nasser afraid of U.S. involvement
- Israel also accepts
- Why?

War of Attrition

Cease fire

- Nixon sends letter to Meir stating:
 - Final boundaries must be agreed between parties
 - U.S. would not exert pressure on Israel to accept a solution to the refugee problem
 - No withdrawal until a peace agreement reached.
- Reiterated promise of military & economic assistance
- Begin resigns. Why?
- Nasser dies
- But Egypt immediately violates standstill agreement by moving missiles to Canal
- And Israel suspends talks
- But cease fire remains in place

War Of Attrition

Negotiation Attempt

- 12/70 Israel agrees to peace talks “...after protracted negotiations with the Nixon administration”
- Gunnar Jarring on 2/8/71 proposes:
 - Egypt agree to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and
 - Simultaneously Israel to withdraw to former Egypt-Palestinian border

War Of Attrition

Negotiation Attempt

- Egypt agrees, to enter an agreement with Israel pursuant to 242, and also demands
 - Israel not only to withdraw from Gaza as well as Sinai
 - A commitment to settle the refugee problem
 - Establishment of a UN peace force
- First time an Egyptian Government declared publicly its readiness to sign a peace treaty with Israel
- Similar to decision by Eshkol cabinet on 6/19/67

War Of Attrition

Negotiation Attempt

- Israeli Response

lating to a peace agreement. The problem arose over the pledge for complete territorial withdrawal requested by Jarring. Initially, the cabinet was inclined to accept Eban's noncommittal formulation: "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the cease-fire line with Egypt to secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement." But Yisrael Galili, with help from Moshe Dayan, succeeded in persuading the cabinet not to leave any doubt about the boundary issue. The cabinet opted for a categorical refusal to restore the previous boundary, and this gave its reply a peremptory and negative tone. To Eban's withdrawal clause it added a short but highly significant sentence: "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines."¹⁹

War Of Attrition

Negotiation Attempt

- Rabin agrees

reply a milestone: “For the first time in the chronicles of the Middle East conflict, an Arab country—indeed, the largest Arab country and the leader of the Arab world—had issued an official document expressing its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel!” He recommended to the cabinet a similar reply: an expression of readiness to sign a peace treaty followed by a detailed exposition of Israel’s views on the issues of borders and refugees. The cabinet’s reply was no less disappointing to him than to his American colleagues. It “turned out to be a rambling document whose long-windedness was exceeded only by its vagueness. Worst of all, it failed in its main task: presenting Israel’s demands in return for peace.”²¹

War Of Attrition

Negotiation Attempt

Kissinger Analysis

Israel is dependent on the U.S. as no other country is on a friendly power. Increasingly, Washington is the sole capital to stand by Israel in international forums. We are its exclusive military supplier, its only military ally (though no formal obligation exists)... It takes a special brand of heroism to turn total dependence into defiance, to insist on support as a matter of right rather than as a favor; to turn every American deviation from an Israeli cabinet consensus into a betrayal to be punished rather than a disagreement to be negotiated. And yet Israel's obstinacy, maddening as it can be, serves the purposes of both our countries best. A subservient client would soon face an accumulation of ever-growing pressures. It would tempt Israel's neighbors to escalate their demands. It would saddle us with opprobrium for every deadlock.... Our relationship with Israel is exhilarating and frustrating, ennobled by the devotion and faith that contain a lesson for an age of cynicism; exasperating because the interests of a superpower and of a regional ministate are not always easy to reconcile, and are on occasion unbridgeable. Israel affects our decisions through inspiration, persistence, and a judicious, not always subtle or discreet influence on our domestic policy.²⁶

War Of Attrition Negotiation Attempt

- Failure
- Whose fault?
- Some cabinet members said Jarring
- What do you think?

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

- 2/4/71 Sadat proposes
 - opening the Canal
 - a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops in Sinai
 - U.S. mediation instead of U.N.
 - an interim instead of an overall settlement
- 3/71 Sadat visits Russia and says in radio speech:
 - “The Soviet Union’s viewpoint was that peaceful solution was the only solution”
- Coup attempted by, Ali Sabry, (a V.P.) a Soviet favorite
- Rogers thinks Sadat will cut ties to Russia
- But by now Kissinger is “Secretary of State in everything , but title.”
Senator Stuart Symington

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

- 5/71 Rogers visits Sadat; then visits Israel
- According to Shlaim
 - Sadat understood Israel's need for security
- Dayan proposes withdrawal of 30 km & destruction of Bar-Lev line
 - Dayan believes danger of war would decline if Israel pulled back
- Rabin & Eban counsel acceptance, but Meir rejects.
- Why?

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

-
-
-
-
-

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

- Rabin meets with Kissinger first & Rabin proposes in addition to Egypt renouncing a state of belligerency in exchange for partial undefined withdrawal that
 - Canal opening includes Israeli shipping
 - Unlimited duration of cease fire
 - No Egyptian forces in the area evacuated by Israel
 - Thinning out of Egyptian forces on west side of canal
 - Release of all prisoners of war
- Kissinger goes nuts

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

- U.S. feels Israeli position is main stumbling block to an interim settlement & suspends delivery of Phantom jets
- Meir tells U.S., we won't consider any more proposals until you resume delivery of jets

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

Russian Involvement

- Kissinger advises Rabin that Brezhnev has sent a secret 2 stage peace proposal to Nixon
 - Interim agreement now for reopening canal
 - Overall agreement after the 1972 presidential elections
- Israeli Cabinet rejects & Kissinger says Israel can't go on rejecting without stating acceptable terms
- Kissinger believes central weakness with Israel's approach is that Egypt waive her military option & reject link between partial & overall settlement

War Of Attrition

New Negotiation Attempt

Meir & Nixon Meet

- Meir's Objectives
 - Kill Rogers Plan
 - Resume delivery of jets
- Both achieved and Nixon
 - assures her no U.S. –Soviet deal at Israel's expense, and

defined withdrawal to passes; cease fire limited to 18-24 months; link between interim settlement & final; small number of Egyptian soldiers would be allowed to cross canal

Sadat's position hardened & Kissinger never transmits Meir's proposal. Why not?

Way to agreement was thru Moscow

War of Attrition Consequences

- Ended in a draw?
- Eban thinks the psychological & international balance changed to Egypt's advantage
- Ezer Weizman feels Israel lost air superiority because
 - Russia developed SAM-6
 - which are now deployed along Canal
- Mordechai Gur claims the wrong reading of War of Attrition lulled Israel to sleep

War of Attrition Consequences

- Continued to cling to a defensive military doctrine
 - Initially added to the Bar-Lev line
 - Then cost constraints and cloudy purpose resulted in dismantling
- Intransigent negotiating policy; 2 alternatives offered to Arabs :
 - Full contractual peace without full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, or
 - Continuation of status quo

War of Attrition

Consequences

Nuclear Policy

- Israel refuses to sign Non-Proliferation Treaty that was signed in 1968
- Rabin tells U.S. that Israel would not be the 1st to test such weapons or to reveal their existence publicly.
- Dayan principally responsible for decision to produce nuclear weapons. Why?
 - He was afraid Israel couldn't maintain conventional arms superiority forever
 - More dependent on U.S. arms
 - More Russian involvement
 - The “bomb in the basement”

War of Attrition

Consequences

Nuclear Policy

- Bomb in the basement means no testing and no declaring its existence
- Doesn't require Israel to adopt an open nuclear policy and
- Signals to the Arabs & rest of world that Israel has a nuclear arsenal

THE UNTOLD TRUE STORY

I was there, really,
but I'm not in the war.

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A STORY OF COURAGE AND SACRIFICE
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
ISBN 978-0-520-27111-1

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14F

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF ISRAEL
 Around the time of SAUL AND DAVID
EDOM Vassals and defeated peoples





British Mandate 1920



British Mandate Adjustment Transjordan Separation-1923



Palestinian Identity

gious identity. On the other hand, as Haim Gerber has shown, sources dating from the seventeenth century, and possibly earlier, indicate that educated Palestinians were conscious of living in a region called “Palestine” that was distinct from, even if a part of, a larger territory called “Syria.”¹⁴ This awareness cannot be called nationalism in the European sense of the term, which defined the bonds linking a people to a specific piece of land as the source of their primary identity. Nationalism was a secular concept, although it could be justified by a religious legacy, as Zionism did for secular Jewish nationalism. Nationalism would not have defined a Palestinian’s primary awareness of himself as an Ottoman subject of Muslim, Christian, or Jewish religious persuasion, who nonetheless lived in that part of the empire known as Palestine. This new scholarship does suggest, however, that educated Palestinian Arabs considered themselves to live in Palestine, establishing an identity with a region defined by boundaries. This identification was not simply the result of their encounter with Jewish nationalism in the form of Zionism, as has often been assumed.¹⁵

Hussein's Federal Plan, 3/72

- United Arab Kingdom comprised of:
 - Region of Jordan on East Bank of Jordan
 - Region of Palestine made up of West Bank & Gaza
- Rejected by PLO, Egypt & Israel.
- Why?



A Contradiction From Her 1968 Views?

For Golda the only realistic solution to the Palestinian problem, from the demographic and the geographic point of view, was to place them under Jordan's jurisdiction. An attempt to deal with the Palestinian question without linking it to Jordan, in other words, an attempt to create an additional state between Israel and Jordan, would not succeed, because such a state would not have an adequate geographic or demographic base. This was the foundation of her thinking. Consequently, in order to arrive at a solution to the Palestinian problem, a

link with Jordan had to be forged. Hence all the meetings and discussions with Hussein.

And

Meir's strident rejection of King Hussein's federal plan was music to the ears of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO. Arafat and his colleagues regarded the king's plan as "an attempt to put the PLO out of business." Arafat told his biographer that if Israel had agreed to withdraw from the West Bank, King Hussein would have made peace with her immediately "and the PLO would have been finished. Absolutely finished. Sometimes I think we are lucky to have the Israelis as our enemies. They have saved us many times!"⁴³

President Sadat broke off diplomatic relations with Jordan in

Prelude to War

- Israeli military intelligence acknowledged the possibility of war,
 - but believed that would not occur until 1975
 - when Egypt had an adequate number of the type of planes to strike deep into Israel to neutralize the IAF
- Sadat felt he had to act earlier because of internal political problems
- Russia presents an alternative when Minister of War visits Moscow 2/72
 - Create a missile wall over the field of battle and
 - Provide SCUD missiles that could strike populated areas within Israel that would deter Israel from deep raiding

Preparation for War

- Decision made sometime in 1972
- Plan of deception developed on 7/12/72 according to Sadat's biographer
 - Sadat leaked information that the Egyptians had not been able to use the Soviet's sophisticated weaponry
- Jordan & Egypt resume diplomatic relations.12/72
- Sadat tells Hussein that the only way to regain lost territory is to start a war with Israel

Nixon –Brezhnev Meet

5/72

- Only mention of Middle East in joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement called for “military relaxation”
- Egypt never receives promised weapons
- U.S. is supplying Israel
- Sadat orders immediate withdrawal of all 15,000 military advisers in July
- And all equipment either withdrawn or sold by Egypt
- Why?

Because

One of the reasons behind my decision was the Soviet attitude to me; but another important reason was that within the strategy I had laid down, no war could be fought while Soviet experts worked in Egypt. The Soviet Union, the West, and Israel misinterpreted my decision to expel the military experts and reached an erroneous conclusion, which in fact served my strategy, as I had expected—that it was an indication that I had finally decided not to fight my own battle. That interpretation made me happy; it was precisely what I wanted them to think....

Yet another reason for my decision was the Soviet attitude to me; but another important reason was that within the strategy I had laid down, no war could be fought while Soviet experts worked in Egypt. The Soviet Union, the West, and Israel misinterpreted my decision to expel the military experts and reached an erroneous conclusion, which in fact served my strategy, as I had expected—that it was an indication that I had finally decided not to fight my own battle. That interpretation made me happy; it was precisely what I wanted them to think....

And Because

Yet another reason for my decision was that I wanted to put the Soviet Union in its place—in its natural position as a friendly country, no more, no less. The Soviets had thought at one time that they had Egypt in their back pocket, and the world had come to think that the Soviet Union was our guardian. I wanted to tell the Russians that the will of Egypt was entirely Egyptian; I wanted to tell the whole world that we are always our own masters. Whoever wished to talk to us should come over and do it, rather than approach the Soviet Union.⁶²

Israel's Reaction

- “Sadat had obtained an emotional satisfaction at the expense of his strategic and political power. The disruption of the military organization in which the Soviet officers had played would surely weaken the Egyptian order of battle along the Suez canal. Egypt deprived of the Soviet presence , also appeared less formidable as a political adversary.” Abba Eban
- Gideon Rafael , Director General of Foreign Ministry thought Sadat regarded the Soviets as an inhibiting factor. Soviets expelled to get more freedom.
- But Eban did not agree with the decision to stop diplomatic activity. Why?

Meanwhile in the U.S.

- Nixon & Kissinger meet with Hussein 2/73
- Kissinger meets with Sadat's national security adviser in series of meetings from 2/73-5/73
- Kissinger says the tragedy for the peace process in the Middle East was the personal distrust between Sadat & Hussein
- Kissinger wants to “stand back”, but Nixon says no “... I totally disagree. This thing is getting ready to blow.”
- Meir meets with Nixon & Kissinger on 3/1/73
 - Agrees to supply Phantom jets
 - Agrees to co-production of Super Mirage aircraft in Israel

Meanwhile in the U.S.

- 4/73- Sadat says in Newsweek “the time has come for a shock”
- CIA tells Kissinger that Egypt has moved missiles to within 20 miles of Suez & Mirage jets have been moved from Libya to Egypt
- But unlikely that Sadat would initiate military action in the near future
- U.S. Economy suffering from inflation
- Palestinians viewed as terrorists
- Saudi oil minister threatens Kissinger and Saudi King Faisal threatens president of Arabian American Oil Company with an oil embargo if the U.S. continues to support status quo.
- All ignored by administration

And in Israel

- Meir returns home after talks fail, convinced that the Arab's had no military option, Israel's military superiority guaranteed and the status quo could continue indefinitely.
- "Our American friends offer us money, arms & advice. We take the money, we take the arms and we decline the advice." Moshe Dayan
- Dayan wants territorial expansion. Create large scale settlements on the West Bank. Why?
- Pinchas Sapir, Finance Minister, thinks prolonged occupation would destroy the moral fabric of Israeli society

But in Egypt

- First delivery of SCUD missiles arrive in April, 1973
- Then a crash program to deliver the various types of SAM missiles was instituted
- Including missile batteries to protect Damascus
- And various types of anti-tank weapons
- And even though Israeli Intelligence observed this they still believed nothing would happen, but
- Chief of Staff Elezar orders a partial mobilization
 - Nothing happens
 - Confirms Intelligence estimates

Egyptian Plans

- Interviews and press leaks played on Israeli belief that there was not going to be war
- Examples;
 - London Daily Mail describes poor maintenance of Egyptian equipment and lack of preparedness
 - Movement of troops and tanks were described as war games, exercises.
 - In fact, plans were so secret that 95% of the officers who were later taken as prisoners by Israel did not know until 10/6
- Russia was to use the Security Council to bring about a cease fire if attack went badly
- Sadat tells Faisal that war is essential to activate oil weapon
 - So oil was not used because of war
 - Sadat's intention was to use it to guarantee Arab unity

May, 1973

- 5/7: Brezhnev meets with Kissinger in Moscow: “But the mistake of the U.S.—and obviously ourselves too—may lie in the fact that neither side can count on its influence being effective if the sides there don’t see prospects for a peace settlement.”
- 5/15: Sadat encourages other Arab states to use oil to pressure U.S. to abandon its support of Israel
- 5/20: Kissinger meets with Egyptian Foreign Minister who tells him status quo is intolerable
- 5/31: State Department memo to Rogers: A resumption of hostilities by autumn will become better than an even bet.

June, 1973

- Russia continues arms shipments to Egypt
- CIA says :
 - “Designed to maintain Cairo’s arms inventory rather than introduce new weapons systems.”
 - But also noted Egyptians viewed “...the present stalemate with Israel as intolerable...”
- At Nixon-Brezhnev summit in San Clemente, Brezhnev wakes Nixon to discuss Middle East
 - He wants to settle Middle East conflict based on Arab demands
 - Demonstrates Brezhnev thought situation would spiral out of control
 - Coupled with intelligence reports suggesting Syria & Egypt were preparing for war

Ross's Take

during their summit on June 23, 1973. In the minutes of his meeting at San Clemente, Nixon told the Soviet leader, "I want you to know I consider the Arab-Israeli dispute a matter of highest urgency." And when Brezhnev still pressed for agreement on principles, Nixon said, "We can't abstractly beat the issue to death. We don't owe anything to the Israelis. That means I am interested in a settlement. We will work on it. We can make some progress in moving this problem off dead center . . . I am prepared to move towards a settlement."⁷¹

- Why wasn't anything done?

And Ross Also Says

Nixon was much more eager than Kissinger to change the dynamic in the Middle East. This had been true at the outset of his presidency in 1969 and remained true early in his second term. He wrote in his diary on February 3, 1973, of his desire for Kissinger to be much more active on Middle East peace and the reasons for his hesitancy:

Henry has constantly put off moving on it [the Middle East], each time suggesting that the political problems were too difficult. This is a matter which, of course, [I] will have to judge. He agreed that the problem with the Israelis in Israel was not nearly as difficult as the Jewish community here, but I am determined to bite this bullet . . . He just doesn't want to bite, I am sure because of the enormous pressure he's going to get from the Jewish groups in this country.⁶⁹

Eban's Answer

the wilderness. As he himself recalled, “By 1973 the diplomatic deadlock, the failure of the Jarring mission, the strong support given by the Nixon-Kissinger administration to an attrition policy, all created a climate of exuberant self-confidence that began to border on fantasy. There was an obsession with the physical frontiers of the country without regard to its political or moral frontiers. The rhetoric of 1973 is almost inconceivable. Opinion passed from sobriety to self-confidence and from self-confidence to fantasy, reaching a somewhat absurd level in 1973.”⁵⁵

And

to break the political deadlock. The intelligence chiefs were confident that the Arabs would not risk such an attack, which they knew would be suicidal; and even if they did, they would be flung back so swiftly and violently that Israel's deterrent power would become even greater than before.⁵⁶ A low opinion of the Arabs' ability to wage modern war contributed to this sanguine outlook. As one former director of military intelligence later confessed, "a mixture of conceit and complacency tended to colour the evaluation of future developments in the area."⁵⁷

Galili Document

- Individuals can buy land in West Bank
- Reinforce existing Jewish Settlements
- Create new settlements
- Expand settlements around Jerusalem
- To be settled primarily by Russian emigres
- Gives incentives to industrialists to build factories
- Build a new city called Yamit in the northeast sector of Sinai
- Partition Sinai to gain control of oil fields
- Arab reaction?

And at the U.N.

- U.N. resolution calling for a reaffirmation of U.N. resolution 242 and the safeguarding of the Palestinians rights is vetoed by U.S.
- Secretary-General Waldheim travels to meet with Sadat and Meir
 - Sadat critical of U.N.'s inability to help
 - Meir tells him: “Dr. Waldheim, we know you are always saying the situation in the Middle East is dangerous and explosive, but we don't believe you. The Arabs will get used to our existence and in a few years they will recognize us and we shall have peace. So don't worry. It is a disagreeable situation, but we do not believe there is a real danger for us.”

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
Greater Jerusalem 2015




- Green Line
- Municipal Boundary
- Old City of Jerusalem
- Route of Barrier - Built
- Route of Barrier - Planned
- Checkpoint
- Israeli Built-up Area
- Israeli Future Building Project
- Palestinian Built-up Area



Jerusalem Boundaries- 2000



Jerusalem Boundaries-2007



- Arab areas in green
- Jewish areas in blue

East Jerusalem

- On 6/27/67 East Jerusalem was integrated by extension of its municipal borders and was placed under the law, jurisdiction & administration of the State of Israel.
- In 1980 , the Knesset passed the Jerusalem Law which declared that “...Jerusalem, complete & united is the capital of Israel.”
- Not recognized by international community & declared “null & void” by U.N. Security Council Resolution 478.

East Jerusalem Annexation?

- There are different opinions whether or not it is also annexed in 1967 or in 1980. Some maintain that the application of Israeli laws on East Jerusalem implies annexation. Israel, however, has never formally annexed East Jerusalem, or even claimed sovereignty over it.^[12] Although the Israeli Supreme Court recognized that East Jerusalem had become an integral part of the State of Israel,^{[12][36]} it rejected in 1969 the argument that the imposition by Israel of its laws and administration on East Jerusalem was equivalent to annexation. According to lawyers, annexation of an area would automatically make its inhabitants Israeli citizens.^[12] This circumstance, however, did not hold true. They became permanent residents;^[37]

East Jerusalem Palestinian Rights

- Following the 1967 war, Israel conducted a census in East Jerusalem and granted permanent Israeli residency to those Arab Jerusalemites present at the time of the census. Those not present lost the right to reside in Jerusalem. Jerusalem Palestinians are permitted to apply for Israeli citizenship, provided they meet the requirements for naturalization—such as swearing allegiance to Israel and renouncing all other citizenships—which most of them refuse to do.
- But they were allowed to vote in the 1/25/06 Palestinian Legislative Elections

East Jerusalem Palestinian Rights

- As residents,
 - East Jerusalemites without Israeli citizenship have the right to vote in municipal elections
 - play a role in the administration of the city
 - pay taxes, and
 - following a 1988 Israeli Supreme Court ruling, East Jerusalem residents are guaranteed the right to social security benefits and state health care.
- According to Haaretz, the quality of healthcare centers between Israeli cities and East Jerusalem are almost equal.

East Jerusalem Palestinian Attitudes

- A poll conducted by Palestinian Center for Public Opinion and American Pechter Middle East Polls for the Council on Foreign Relations, among East Jerusalem Arab residents in 2011 revealed that 39% of East Jerusalem Arab residents would prefer Israeli citizenship contrary to 31% who opted for Palestinian citizenship. According to the poll, 40% of Palestinian residents would prefer to leave their neighborhoods if they would be placed under Palestinian rule.^[30]

October, 1973

- 10/4 - Soviets execute airlift of dependents from Cairo & Damascus
- Kissinger misinterprets it as another quarrel between the Arabs & Russia
- 10/5 - Meir sends message to Washington warning:

Syria and Egypt were in a state of alert and poised for battle. The only possible conclusion, Shalev said, was either they felt that Israel intended an offensive military move, or that they themselves were planning an attack. Meir stated that should Syria or Egypt attack, it would be important to make it clear to them that Israel will "react militarily, with firmness and in great strength." She asked Kissinger to convey the information to the Arabs and Soviets.¹²⁸

But

- On Friday, 10/5 Elezar requests a preemptive air attack against Egypt & Syria and general mobilization based on Egyptian & Syrian concentration of forces
- Dayan & Meir turn him down
- Elezar receives information on morning of 10/6 that attack will happen that day
- Simultaneous Syrian & Egyptian attack occurs 10/6 at 2 p.m.
- Reserve call up is facilitated because everyone in synagogue on Yom Kippur

Meir in Her Memoirs

Today I know what I should have done. I should have overcome my hesitations. I knew as well as anyone else what full-scale mobilization meant and how much money it would cost, and I also knew that only a few months before, in May, we had had an alert and the reserves had been called up, but nothing had happened. But I also understood that perhaps there had been no war in May exactly because the reserves had been called up. That Friday morning, I should have listened to the warnings of my own heart and ordered a call-up. For me, that fact cannot and never will be erased, and there can be no consolation in anything that anyone has to say or in all of the common-sense rationalizations with which my colleagues have tried to comfort me.¹³⁰

Meir Not Alone

- Israeli overall defense strategy
 - Intelligence-which would give sufficient warning to mobilize reserves
 - A standing army - which would fight the holding phase
 - The air force- which had a large regular component
- Here intelligence failed, And
 - Decision not to mobilize was based overwhelming Israeli defensive capability
 - Desire to avoid any semblance of Israeli aggression to make sure of U.S. support

Erroneous Intelligence Assumptions

- No attack unless Egypt had superior air power
- Syria would not attack without Egypt
 - But Israeli intelligence did not relate the increased activity along northern & southern borders with Arab intentions
- Underestimated Sadat's resolve to break the status quo;
 - didn't believe Sadat would take such a risk
- "Kissinger's stalling and gradualist approach to the Arab-Israeli impasse became a direct cause of Sadat's decision to launch an attack"
 - David Morse
 - Thought that Egypt would understand that only the U.S. could compel Israel to make concessions
 - Assumed Soviets didn't want war either
- Kissinger says the breakdown was not administrative, but intellectual:

Kissinger

There were questions crying to be asked that would have rapidly reached the heart of the matter. That they occurred to no one, including me, seems inexplicable in retrospect. What crisis could possibly occur in Soviet-Arab relations that involved *both* Egypt and Syria simultaneously? Why would the Soviets evacuate dependents but not advisers if there was a political crisis? Why would they undertake an emergency airlift if they were not working against a deadline? What could that deadline be other than the opening of

hostilities? The Israeli view that the Soviets might fear the outbreak of war should have given us pause. For if we had reflected, it would have been clear that the Soviets could not be fearing an Israeli attack. Had they done so they would have made urgent representations in Washington to get us to dissuade Israel, and perhaps added public threats. If the Soviets evacuated dependents because they feared a war, they must have had a very good idea that it would be started by the Arabs.¹⁴³

Meir Distracted

Munich Massacre

September 5,6,1972

- 1972 Olympic Games
- 11 Olympic Team members killed after being taken hostage
- 1 German Police officer killed
- Carried out by “Black September”
- Black September’s Objective:
 - Draw international attention to plight of Arabs living under “Israeli Occupation”
 - Secular nationalism not Muslim Ideologues
 - Leader of Black September movement had a Jewish mother & Christian father

Munich Massacre

- 5 of 8 Black September members killed by German Police
- 3 captured by eventually released
- Mossad response:
 - Operation Spring of Youth
 - Operation Wrath of God

Munich Massacre-Prelude

- No German security-Athletes could come and go as they wanted
- Team housed in ground floor; close to a gate; which made the team particularly vulnerable to an assault according to head of Israeli delegation
- German forensic psychologist forecasted manner of attack
- Olympic Organizers refused to take precautions because it would ruin care free nature of games

Munich Massacre

Preexisting Knowledge

- According to a 2012 article in *Der Spiegel* German authorities had a tip off from a Palestinian informer
- Covered up for 40 years in addition to other items
- One of the Black September members had worked in various capacities in the Olympic Village scouting out potential targets

Munich Massacre

International reaction

- On 5 September, Golda Meir, then Prime Minister of Israel, appealed to other countries to "save our citizens and condemn the unspeakable criminal acts committed." She also stated that "if we [Israel] should give in, then no Israeli anywhere in the world shall feel that his life is safe ... it's blackmail of the worst kind."
- King Hussein of Jordan—the only leader of an Arab country to denounce the attack publicly—called it a "savage crime against civilization ... perpetrated by sick minds."
- U.S. President Richard Nixon privately discussed a number of possible American responses, such as declaring a national day of mourning (favored by Secretary of State William P. Rogers), or having Nixon fly to the athletes' funerals. Nixon and Henry Kissinger decided instead to press the United Nations to take steps against international terrorism.

Munich Massacre

Negotiations

- Israel's official policy at time was to refuse to negotiate with terrorists
- Germany rejected Israel's offer to send Israeli special forces to Germany
- 38 German policeman sent to Olympic Village
- With no experience in combat or hostage rescue
- German TV filmed everything live so terrorists knew exactly what was going on
- Terrorists demanded transportation to Cairo

Munich Massacre

Failed Rescue

- Buses took terrorists & hostages from Olympic Village to helicopters & then flew to airport
- Police set to ambush in Olympic Village garage made too much noise that resulted in terrorists requesting buses
- 5 Snipers deployed at airport; but
 - None had any sniper training
 - Nor any special weapons
 - No optics or night vision
 - They only shot competitively on weekends
 - “I am of the opinion I am not a sharpshooter” Sniper #2
- Head of Mossad & his assistant were there , but never consulted

Munich Massacre

Failed Rescue

- Originally Germans thought there were only 3 terrorists, but on transfer from bus to helicopter realized there were 8
- German police aboard the plane decided to abandon their mission without consulting central command.
- This left only 5 “sharpshooters” around the airport to try to overpower a larger and heavier armed group.
- Snipers open fire

Munich Massacre

Failed Rescue

- Germans had not arranged for an armored personnel carrier ahead of time and
- Didn't arrive on time because the roads to the airport had not been cleared
- All of the hostages were killed either by machine gun fire or hand grenade
- One of the snipers and a few of the hostages may have been shot by German police
- At 4:30 a.m. on September 5 hostages were taken and by 1:30 a.m. On September 6 the battle was over

Munich Massacre

Post Mortem

- Lack of preparation by Germans
- German constitution prohibited use of army domestically
- Led to founding of German police counter-terrorism branch GSG 9
- It is a basic tenet of sniping operations that there are enough snipers –at least 2 for each target; in this case 16 instead of 5
- Helicopters landed at wrong angles to the snipers

Munich Massacre

Post Mortem

- Decision makers were Bavarian Interior Minister, German Interior Minister & Munich's Chief of Police Manfred Schreiber.
- A year before the Games, Schreiber had participated in another hostage crisis (a failed bank robbery) in which he ordered a marksman to shoot one of the perpetrators, managing only to wound the robber. As a result, the robbers shot an innocent woman dead. Schreiber was consequently charged with involuntary manslaughter. An investigation ultimately cleared him of any wrongdoing, but this incident suggested that the prior incident affected his judgment in the subsequent Olympic hostage crisis.

Jordan & the Palestinians

- Arafat becomes Supreme Commander of PLA
- 9/21/70 at Arab Summit, Nasser negotiates a cease fire between PLA & Jordan
- Nasser dies the next day and cease fire falls apart
- Jordan army achieves dominance
- Both sides violate it
- Arafat calls for overthrow of Hussein
- Hussein ousts PLO
- Escape to Syria, but Assad forces them to go to Lebanon

Black September

- Derives its name from the 9/1970 Jordanian civil war.
- Began as a small Fatah cell.
- Recruits from other groups joined later.
- Who controlled Black September?

Black September

- In his book *Stateless*, Salah Khalaf, Arafat's chief of security and a founding member of Fatah, wrote that: "Black September was not a terrorist organization, but was rather an auxiliary unit of the resistance movement, at a time when the latter was unable to fully realize its military and political potential. The members of the organization always denied any ties between their organization and Fatah or the PLO."

But

- According to American journalist Charlie Cranston Black September represented a "total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the *fedayeen*. Its members operated in air-tight cells of four or more men and women. Each cell's members were kept purposely ignorant of other cells. Leadership was exercised from outside by intermediaries and 'cut-offs' [*sic*]", though there was no centralized leadership

And

- Fatah needed Black September, according to Benny Morris. He writes that there was a "problem of internal PLO or Fatah cohesion, with extremists constantly demanding greater militancy. The moderates apparently acquiesced in the creation of Black September in order to survive".^[6] As a result of pressure from militants, writes Morris, a Fatah congress in Damascus in August–September 1971 agreed to establish Black September. The new organization was based on Fatah's existing special intelligence and security apparatus, and on the PLO offices and representatives in various European capitals, and from very early on, there was cooperation between Black September and the PFLP.^[6]

So

- The PLO closed Black September down in September 1973, on the anniversary it was created by the "political calculation that no more good would come of terrorism abroad" according to Morris.^[7] In 1974 Arafat ordered the PLO to withdraw from acts of violence outside the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel.

Munich Massacre

Post Mortem

- The five German snipers at the airport did not have radio contact with one another (nor with the German authorities conducting the rescue operation) and therefore were unable to coordinate their fire.
- The two snipers at ground level had been given vague instructions to shoot when the other snipers began shooting, and were basically left to fend for themselves.
- One sniper was in directly in line of fire of one of his fellow snipers & was wounded

Munich Massacre

Effect on Games

- Competition was eventually suspended for the first time in modern Olympic history, after public criticism of the Olympic Committee's decision to continue the games
- IOC President Avery Brundage made little reference to the murdered athletes during a speech praising the strength of the Olympic movement
- During the memorial service, the Olympic Flag was flown at half-staff, along with the flags of most of the other competing nations at the request of Willy Brandt. Ten Arab nations objected to their flags being lowered to honor murdered Israelis; their flags were restored to the tops of their flagpoles almost immediately.
- Brundage stated "The Games must go on, and we must ... and we must continue our efforts to keep them clean, pure and honest." The decision was endorsed by the Israeli government and Israeli Olympic team chief of mission Shmuel Lalkin.

Munich Massacre

Aftermath

- On 8 September, Israeli planes bombed ten PLO bases in Syria and Lebanon in response to the massacre. Up to 200 people were killed.
- The three surviving Black September gunmen had been arrested after the airport gunfight, and were being held in a Munich prison for trial. On 29 October, Lufthansa Flight 615 was hijacked and threatened to be blown up if the Munich attackers were not released. Safady and the Al-Gasheys were immediately released by West Germany, receiving a tumultuous welcome when they touched down in Libya
- Further international investigations into the Lufthansa Flight 615 incident have produced theories of a secret agreement between the German government and Black September- release of the surviving terrorists in exchange for assurances of no further attacks on Germany.

Munich Massacre

Israeli Response

Operation Wrath of God

- Golda Meir and the Israeli Defense Committee secretly authorized the Mossad to track down and kill those allegedly responsible for the Munich massacre.
- Operation allegedly went on for 20 years
- The accusation that this was motivated by a desire for vengeance was disputed by Zvi Zamir, who described the mission as "putting an end to the type of terror that was perpetrated" (in Europe). To this end the Mossad set up a number of special teams to locate and kill these fedayeen, aided by the agency's stations in Europe.¹

Munich Massacre

Israeli Response

- In a February 2006 interview, former Mossad chief Zvi Zamir answered direct questions:
- *Was there no element of vengeance in the decision to take action against the terrorists?*

"No. We were not engaged in vengeance. We are accused of having been guided by a desire for vengeance. That is nonsense. What we did was to concretely prevent in the future. We acted against those who thought that they would continue to perpetrate acts of terror. I am not saying that those who were involved in Munich were not marked for death. They definitely deserved to die. But we were not dealing with the past; we concentrated on the future."
- *Did you not receive a directive from Golda Meir along the lines of 'take revenge on those responsible for Munich?'*

"Golda abhorred the necessity that was imposed on us to carry out the operations. Golda never told me to 'take revenge on those who were responsible for Munich.' No one told me that."

Munich Massacre

Operation Wrath of God

- We had no choice. We had to make them stop, and there was no other way ... we are not very proud about it. But it was a question of sheer necessity. We went back to the old biblical rule of an eye for an eye ... I approach these problems not from a moral point of view, but, hard as it may sound, from a cost-benefit point of view. If I'm very hard-headed, I can say, what is the political benefit in killing this person? Will it bring us nearer to peace? Will it bring us nearer to an understanding with the Palestinians or not? In most cases I don't think it will. But in the case of Black September we had no other choice and it worked. Is it morally acceptable? One can debate that question. Is it politically vital? It was.¹

Definition of VENGEANCE

- : punishment inflicted in retaliation for an injury or offense : RETRIBUTION
- **with a vengeance**
- **1:** with great force or vehemence <undertook reform *with a vengeance*>
- **2:** to an extreme or excessive degree <the tourists are back—*with a vengeance*>

Definition of JUSTICE

- **1a**: the maintenance or administration of what is just especially by the impartial adjustment of conflicting claims or the assignment of merited rewards or punishments **b**: JUDGE **c**: the administration of law; *especially*: the establishment or determination of rights according to the rules of law or equity
- **2a**: the quality of being just, impartial, or fair **b (1)**: the principle or ideal of just dealing or right action **(2)**: conformity to this principle or ideal: RIGHTEOUSNESS **c**: the quality of conforming to law
- **3**: conformity to truth, fact, or reason

Munich Massacre

Operation Spring of Youth

- On 9 April 1973, Israel launched Operation "Spring of Youth", a joint Mossad-IDF operation in Beirut.
- The leader of the commando team that conducted the operations was Ehud Barak
- But some were mistakenly killed.
- 3 high ranking PLO members killed
- 12-100 PLO & PFLP members killed
- Shocked the Arab world because it contributed to the belief that Israel was capable of striking anywhere anytime

Lillehammer Affair

- 7/21/73--Team of Mossad Agents shot & killed a Moroccan waiter in this small Norwegian town, who had been misidentified by an informant as being involved
- 6 Mossad agents arrested by Norwegian police
- 5 convicted & imprisoned, but returned to Israel in 1975

Lillehammer Affair

- In the aftermath of the Lillehammer affair, international outrage prompted Golda Meir to order the suspension of Operation "Wrath of God".^[33] The ensuing Norwegian investigation and revelations by the captured agents compromised Mossad assets across Europe, including safe houses, agents, and operational methods.^[34] Five years later, it was decided to recommence the operation under new Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and find those on the list still at large.^[35]
- Suspected leader Ali Hassan Salameh assassinated in Beirut in 1978 by blowing up his car
 - 4 innocent victims killed
 - 18 others injured

Other Mossad Actions

- Letter bombs to Palestinian officials across Europe
- Psychological warfare
 - Ran obituaries of still living militants
 - Sent families of each militant who was about to be killed flowers with a note "A reminder that we do not forget"

Black September Responds

- Attacks and letter bomb campaigns to Israeli diplomatic posts around the world.
- 1 attack killed an Agricultural Counselor in Britain
- Israeli Embassy in Bangkok attacked in 1/73
- To divert attention from attempted assassination attempt of Meir, when she planned to visit Vatican
- Mossad finds out about it and at last minute in cooperation with Italian authorities, thwarts the attempt

Meir Assassination Thwarted

- A Mossad *katsa* spotted a Fiat van parked in a field close to the flight path. The agent ordered the driver to step out. The back door then flew open, and two militants opened fire. The agent returned fire, severely wounding both of them. The van was found to contain six missiles. The driver escaped on foot, and was pursued by the agent. He was captured as he tried to hijack a car driven by another patrolling Mossad operative. The driver was bundled into the car and taken to the truck that served as Mossad's mobile command post, where he revealed the whereabouts of the second missile team after being severely beaten. The truck then sped off, heading north. A cafe-van with three missile launchers protruding from the roof was spotted. The truck then rammed the van, turning it over, trapping the launch team inside and half-crushing them beneath the weight of the missiles, and turning the van's fixed launchers away from the sky. The unconscious driver was pulled from the van and tossed to the side of the road, and DIGOS was alerted that there had been "an interesting accident they should look into". Zamir briefly considered killing the Palestinian terrorists, but felt that their deaths would serve as an embarrassment to Golda Meir's audience with the pope. The terrorists, who had been involved in the Munich massacre, were taken to the hospital and eventually allowed to fly to Libya, but within months, all were killed by Mossad. ^{[19][55][56]}

Munich Massacre

Effect on Future Games

- The families of some victims have asked the IOC to establish a permanent memorial to the athletes. The IOC has declined, saying that to introduce a specific reference to the victims could "alienate other members of the Olympic community," according to the BBC
- The IOC rejected an international campaign in support of a minute of silence at the Opening Ceremony of the 2012 London Olympics in honor of the Israeli victims on the 40th anniversary of the massacre. Jacques Rogge, the IOC President, said it would be "inappropriate".

Memorial panel for the victims of the attack on the site of the Munich Olympic Park



Memorial plaque in front of the Israeli athletes' quarters. The inscription, in German and Hebrew, translates as : "The team of the State of Israel stayed in this building during the 20th Olympic Summer Games from 21 August to 5 September 1972. On 5 September, [list of victims] died a violent death. Honor to their memory."



Munich Massacre

• Alleged German Cover UP

In 2012 *Der Spiegel* :

- the government had been hiding 3,808 files, which contained tens of thousands of documents; secret reports by authorities, embassy cables, and minutes of cabinet meetings that demonstrate the lack of professionalism of the German officials in handling the massacre.
- Germany began secret meetings with Black September, at the behest of the West German government, due to the fear that Black September would carry out other terrorist attacks in Germany. The government proposed a clandestine meeting between German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and a member of Black September to create a "new basis of trust." In return for an exchange of the political status of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the PLO would stop terrorist attacks on German soil. When French police arrested Abu Daoud, one of the chief organizers of the Munich massacre, and inquired about extraditing him to Germany, Germany's justice secretary Alfred Seidl(de) recommended that Germany should not take any action, causing the French to release Abu Daoud and the Assad regime to shelter him until he died at a Damascus hospital in 2010.

AND

- Abu Daoud wrote that funds for Munich were provided by Mahmoud Abbas, Chairman of the PLO since 11 November 2004 and President of the Palestinian National Authority since 15 January 2005.
- Though he claims he didn't know what the money was being spent for, longtime Fatah official Mahmoud Abbas, aka Abu Mazen, was responsible for the financing of the Munich attack.
- Abu Daoud believes that if the Israelis knew that Mahmoud Abbas was the financier of the operation, the 1993 Oslo Accords would not have been achieved,

And Finally

- After a lengthy court fight, in 2004 the families of the Munich victims reached a settlement of €3 million with the German government

- Pew video on Israel's religious views
- [http://www.pewforum.org/2016/10/13/video-israels-religiously-divided-society/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=47174df391-Latino Voters 2016 Election Landscape 10 13 2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-47174df391-399660273](http://www.pewforum.org/2016/10/13/video-israels-religiously-divided-society/?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=47174df391-Latino+Voters+2016+Election+Landscape+10+13+2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-47174df391-399660273)
- <http://northshoreflashpoints.blogspot.com/>

Meir Distracted-Austria?

- 9/29/73-Palestinian Gunmen hold up a train carrying Russian Jews from Moscow to Vienna
- 5 Jews & an Austrian official taken hostage
- Austrian transit center (Schönau) closed by Austrian Jewish chancellor, Bruno Kreisky
- Meir flies to Vienna to confront him unsuccessfully
- Returns to Israel 10/3
- Was terrorist attack part of Yom Kippur War plan?

Meir – Kreisky Meeting

She was ushered into the presence of the Austrian chancellor, an affluently dressed, bespectacled, heavy-set man in his mid-sixties whom she knew to be the son of a Jewish clothing manufacturer from Vienna. She extended her hand, which he shook while rising with the merest sketch of a bow, not emerging from behind the solid protection of his desk. "Please take a seat, Prime Minister Meir," he said formally.



www.alamy.com - BX531J

Meir – Kreisky Meeting

“Thank you, Chancellor Kreisky,” said Golda, settling into the chair opposite him, placing her copious black leather handbag on the floor. “I presume you know why I am here.”

“I believe I do,” answered Kreisky, whose body language bore all the signs of one who was not relishing this appointment.

“You and I have known each other for a long time,” said Golda softly.

“We have,” said the Chancellor.

“And I know that, as a Jew, you have never displayed any interest in the Jewish State. Is that not correct?”

“That is correct. I have never made any secret of my belief that Zionism is not the solution to whatever problems the Jewish people might face.”

“Which is all the more reason why we are grateful to your government for all that it has done to enable thousands of Jews to transit through Austria from the Soviet Union to Israel,” said Golda diplomatically.

“But the Schoenau transit camp has been a problem to us for some time,” said Kreisky stonily.

“What sort of a problem?”

“For a start, it has always been an obvious terrorist target – ”

Golda cut him off, and with a strong suggestion of reproach, said, “Herr Kreisky, if you close down Schoenau it will never end. Wherever Jews gather in Europe for transit to Israel they will be held to ransom by the terrorists.”

Meir – Kreisky Meeting

“But why should Austria have to carry this burden alone?” countered Kreisky with bite. “Why not others?”

“Such as whom?”

“Such as the Dutch. Fly the immigrants to Holland. After all, the Dutch represent you in Russia.”

It was true. Ever since the Russians had broken off diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1967 Six-Day War the Dutch Embassy in Moscow had represented Israel’s interests there.

“Oh, I’m sure the Dutch would be prepared to share the burden if they could,” responded Golda, trying to sound even-tempered. “But they can’t. It doesn’t depend on them. It depends entirely on the Russians. And the Russians have made it clear that they will not allow the Jews to fly out of Moscow. If they could we would fly them directly to Israel. The only way they can leave is by train, and the only country they will allow Jews to transit through is yours.”

“So let them be picked up by your own people immediately upon arrival in Vienna, and flown straight to Israel,” argued the Chancellor, holding his own.

Meir – Kreisky Meeting

“That’s not practicable. You know and I know that it takes guts for a Jew to even apply for an exit permit to leave Russia to come to us. They lose their jobs, they lose their citizenship, and they are kept waiting for years. And once a permit is granted most are given hardly more than a week’s notice to pack up, say their goodbyes, and leave. They come out to freedom in dribs and drabs, and we never know how many there are on any given train arriving in Vienna. So we need a collecting point, a transit camp. We need Schoenau.”

The Chancellor settled his elbows on the desk, steepled his fingers, looked Golda Meir directly in the eye, and said sanctimoniously, “Mrs. Meir, it is Austria’s humanitarian duty to aid refugees from whatever country they come, but not when it puts Austria at risk. I shall never be responsible for any bloodshed on the soil of Austria.”

“And is it also not a humanitarian duty not to succumb to terrorist blackmail, Herr Chancellor?”

What had begun as conflicting views between opponents was now becoming a nasty cut and thrust duel between antagonists.

Kreisky shot back: “Austria is a small country, and unlike major powers, small countries have few options in dealing with the blackmail of terrorists.”

Meir – Kreisky Meeting

"I disagree," seethed Golda. "There can be no deals with terrorism whatever the circumstances. What you have done is certain to encourage more hostage-taking. You have betrayed the Jewish émigrés."

The man's brows drew together in an affronted frown. "I cannot accept such language, Mrs. Meir. I cannot –"

"You have opened the door to terrorism, Herr Chancellor," the prime minister spat, undeterred. "You have brought renewed shame on Austria. I've just come from the Council of Europe. They condemn your act almost to a man. Only the Arab world proclaims you their hero."

"Well, there is nothing I can do about that," said the Austrian in an expressionless voice, looking uncomfortably still. And then, with a hint of a shrug, "You and I belong to two different worlds."

"Indeed we do, Herr Kreisky," said Golda Meir, in a voice cracked with derisive Jewish weariness. "You and I belong to two *very very* different worlds," and she rose, picked up her handbag, and made for the door. As she did so, an aide to the Chancellor entered to say the press were gathered in an adjacent room, awaiting a joint press conference.

Golda shook her head. She asked herself, what was the point? Nothing she could say to the media could make any difference. Kreisky wanted

Meir – Kreisky Meeting Conclusion

to stay in the good books of the Arabs – it was as simple as that. So, she turned and hissed in Hebrew to her aides, “I have no intention of sharing a platform with that man. He can tell them what he wants. I’m going to the airport.” To him she said contemptuously, “I shall forego the pleasure of a press conference. I have nothing to say to them. I’m going home,” and she exited through a back stairway.

Five hours later she told the waiting Israeli press at Ben-Gurion Airport, “I think the best way of summing up the nature of my meeting with Chancellor Kreisky is to say this: he didn’t even offer me a glass of water.”

Meir – Kreisky Meeting Results

As feared, Schoenau was shut down, and for days the Kreisky crisis made international headlines, focusing interest on the question of how the rights of Russian Jewish émigrés could be protected against the outrages of Arab terrorists. Golda Meir's remonstrations had triggered such an international whirl of protest, however, that the Austrian Chancellor had no choice but to offer alternative arrangements. These were more discreetly administered than the previous ones, and the intermittent exodus of Jews from communist Russia via Austria continued. But the prime minister

Yom Kippur War

Arab Objectives

- Break political deadlock , provoke international crisis that would force superpowers to put pressure on Israel
- Capture territory on east bank before negotiations begin
- Capture parts of Golan Heights
- Destroy large part of Israeli air force

Arab Strategy

- Defeat IAF air supremacy
 - Even though Arab air forces had a 3-1 advantage in planes ; IAF much better
- Allowing Arab preponderance of artillery troops & armour to succeed
- Missiles supplied by Russia
 - SAMs with various ranges (24,000 -55,000 yds.) to support troops
 - FROGs- with range of 55 miles that could reach Israeli urban centers, as a deterrent against Israel attacking inside Egypt

But Before That

- In early 1971 Sadat made overtures to Israel
 - Withdraw to a distance of 40 kilometers from Suez
 - And we can come to an interim agreement
- Meir's response?
 - No.
 - Because confident in Israel's security and didn't think Sadat was serious
- In early 1973 Kissinger & Egyptian Diplomat Hafez Ismail met twice
 - The purpose being that if Israel would be willing to withdraw from the territories it captured in 1967 the conflict would end
 - What happened?
 - Proposal went no where?
 - Why?
 - Unclear

And

- The Angel.
- Egypt puts military on high alert in May,1973
- Israel partially mobilizes
- Nothing happens and Economic conditions require a stand down
- At end of September ,1973 Meir and Hussein in secret meeting where she is told of imminent attack
- Elizar wants preemptive attack, but Meir refuses because Rabin had promised U.s.. Israel would not attack first

Kissinger

- Kissinger notified early morning of 10/6
 - Meir tells U.S. ambassador to Israel Arabs are about to attack
 - Asks U.S. to convey message to Egypt, Syria & Russia that Israel under no circumstances will attack either Syria or Egypt
 - Asks Dobrynin to have Moscow use their influence to stop attack

But In Russia

asked Kuznetsov, “If we and the Americans just go ahead and get a cease-fire favorable to the Arabs, how could that seem to be a blow to proletarian internationalism?” Kuznetsov replied, “Can you imagine what would happen if some of the Arabs oppose our joint step with the Americans, and the Chinese consequently veto the resolution? Do you want the Chinese to become leaders of the national liberation, anti-imperialist forces?” That was it. For the first time during the October War, the “Chinese Syndrome” came up and influenced Soviet decision-making.”⁴⁶

Egypt & Syria Attack

- 2 P.M. October 6, 1973. Yom Kippur
 - Also anniversary of Muhammad's 1st victory over Mecca adversaries (624 CE)
- Equivalent of total forces of NATO in Europe
- Bar-Lev line overrun
 - Purpose of line unclear
 - Defensive?
 - Observation?
 - Herzog thinks it makes no difference.
 - By midday 10/7 Egypt in control of east bank of Suez Canal in the north
 - Meir asks Kissinger to postpone any move in the UN for a cease fire because she believes situation will improve
 - By evening of 10/8 Egypt in control of east bank in the south

The Big Picture

By the end of the first day, American strategy was set. The U.S., which expected a quick Israeli victory, would maintain a low profile during the crisis. Kissinger would maintain close diplomatic contact with the Soviets, Egyptians, and Israelis. He would push for a return to the *status quo ante*, though such a proposition had virtually no likelihood of being accepted. Given that Israel had been attacked, it was a defensible position. Once Israel turned the tables, the United States would then acquiesce to a cease-fire in place.

- But according to Ross: "In Nixon's mind Israel could not be allowed to win decisively."
- And both countries want to maintain détente
- While "...preserving the U.S.- - U.S.S.R. duopoly of power and facilitating the evolution of the Soviet Union from a revolutionary power intent on destabilizing the global system into a supporter of the status quo"

The Big Powers

- Israel asks Kissinger for Sidewinder missiles
- Defense Department refuses
- Haig says Nixon agrees with Kissinger
- And Dobrynin delivers vague response to Kissinger because
 - Moscow under strong pressure from Cairo & Damascus to keep out of U.N. even tho
 - Russia against the war in general & did not believe Arabs could win
- But U.S. decides to go to U.N.

And

- Nixon tells Kissinger that U.N. won't do anything
- Nixon's orders for aggressive airlift eventually is what turns the tide
- But William Quandt Senior Director of NSC for the Middle East says :
“ The resupply of arms to Israel had been deliberately delayed as a form of pressure on Israel and in order not to reduce the chance's of Sadat's acceptance of a ceasefire proposal.”
- After-things go from bad to worse for Israel
- Even though CIA estimates that Israel will turn the tide the 3rd day
- Herzog only mentions the resupply once

Kissinger Memoirs

estimated that Israel would begin to reverse its losses the following day and would win the war by the end of the week. Kissinger summed up the U.S. strategy:

S

Egypt doesn't want a confrontation with us at the U.N. and the Soviets don't want a confrontation with us. Period. Our general position will be a restoration of the ceasefire lines. The Arabs will scream that they are being deprived of their birthright, but by Thursday they will be on their knees begging us for a ceasefire. ... We're trying to get this over with a limited amount of damage to our relations with the Arabs and the Soviets. If we can also put some money in the bank with the Israelis to draw on in later negotiations, well and good.⁶³

Sadat did not intend to widen the confrontation

3rd Day

- 10/8 Israeli counterattack fails
- Ariel Sharon ignores order to halt attack & head of Southern Command requests Chief of Staff relieve Sharon
- Dayan supports Sharon
- Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. Dinitz gives “...intimations (to Kissinger) if they didn’t get military equipment & quickly they might go nuclear”
- But
 - CIA (Director Colby) thinks Israel doesn’t need it
 - And Defense Secretary Schlesinger concern was that if the U.S. turned a losing battle around for Israel it would be nearly impossible to obtain Arab support after the war
 - Nixon sides with Kissinger and orders support

And War Continues

- On 10/8 decision to give priority to northern border with Syria
- By 10/9 Israeli forces succeed in stabilizing the Egyptian line
- 10/10 Soviet airlift to Syria begins
- 10/11 IDF on outskirts of Damascus & IAF bombs Syrian Defense ministry
- Schlesinger continues to stall by canceling a meeting with Dinitz
- U.N. Security Council does nothing
- And Agnew resigns

October 12 in the U.S.

- Alarm about potential oil embargo
 - At press conference Kissinger asked if the Arab threat to cut off oil effects the decision to resupply Israel
 - “...we have to pursue what we consider to be the right course, we will take the consequences”
- But Dinitz complains to Schlesinger about the unbelievably slow response
 - And then Schlesinger says there will be only 16 Phantom jets sent to Israel
 - Because U.S. has to maintain a low profile so as not to antagonize the Arabs

Dinitz Replies

Mr. Secretary, in the recent period, we have undergone two crises in the Middle East. One, the Syrian and Jordanian crisis of 1970, and the other one, we are going through now. In 1970, your country needed something from us. Now we need something from you. I must humbly say that we acted differently at the time of that crisis than you do now.¹³⁴

And tells Kissinger:

in two or three days.¹⁴¹ He added that if a “massive American airlift” did not start immediately, it would be a signal that the U.S was reneging on its promises, and that “we will have to draw very serious conclusions from all this.”¹⁴²

So

Kissinger, note the Kalbs, not unaware of domestic considerations, understood that the Israelis might soon “go public,” which would provoke an upsurge of pro-Israeli sentiment, and provoke another blow to a weakened administration. They quote an NSC insider: “The Congress was behind the Israelis. The press was behind them. And to judge from the polls, the public was behind them. If the Israelis had gone public at that time, it could have been the end of the Nixon Administration.” A high State Department source told them:

There were enough people in the country just looking for a breach of confidence in *foreign* affairs, above and beyond Watergate. We had always told the Israelis, “When the chips are down, we’re with you.” Well, the chips were down, and it looked as though we were not with them. They had taken a terrible beating from the Arabs. They were the victims of aggression. No doubt about that. They held their hand, because Kissinger told them not to strike first. After all that, we reneged. We didn’t come through. That’s all Jackson needed. If Dinitz had gone public with everything he knew, it could have toppled the Administration.¹⁴³

Side

Was Kissinger Responsible for the Delay?

I remember Kissinger saying to Schlesinger in one of the meetings, "You are going to have to bear the responsibility for whatever delay there is because I have to deal with the Israelis on the diplomatic front. Nixon and I cannot be viewed as the problem; right now is not the time" ... It wasn't Schlesinger, he was doing what he was told: "get ready to do it but don't do it!" and so he had to take the fall.¹⁴⁹

One of the most scathing critiques of Kissinger's conduct during the war is that of Italian historian Mario Del Pero, who accuses him of being at the "zenith" of his "unscrupulousness" at that time. According to Del Pero, Kissinger "worked to delay the airlift ... in the hope of trading U.S. military aid for help from the Israeli government and the American Jewish community in stopping [the] Jackson-Vanik [amendment]." He accuses Kissinger of contacting Dinitz "to ask him to intercede" with Jackson to withdraw the bill, which was under discussion in Congress.¹⁵²

Or Nixon?

For instance, Edward Sheehan claims that “Nixon told the Pentagon to ‘play tough,’ to appear to impede major deliveries to Israel until such time as he and Kissinger determined otherwise. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger intended to be rushed by the Israelis, and both of them coveted the credit amongst American Jews should later circumstances constrain them to unleash an airlift.”¹⁵¹

But Haig Claims:

Schlesinger had his own policy priorities. It soon became evident that he feared that U.S. intervention on the scale mandated by the president would alienate the Arab nations and might lead to an oil embargo against the West. He found reasons to delay shipments to Israel, citing the military and diplomatic dangers of a massive airlift by U.S. military aircraft and the legal difficulties in using civilian aircraft to transport arms into a war zone.... Kissinger repeatedly complained to me about what he described as “Schlesinger’s sabotage.”¹⁵³

And Schlesinger Explains

Here is where we stood: The Israelis were increasingly desperate. They were running short of some supplies and were beginning to economize on consumption rates. We at DOD were under conflicting pressures. First, we were now being urged to get substantial supplies to Israel quickly—or, it was hinted not too obliquely, the DOD would be at fault if Israel were defeated. Second, we were not supposed to show the U.S. hand. The DOD or the Department of Transportation (not the White House) was supposed to find aircraft to be chartered. Such charters were largely unavailable though it was a prevalent, if unrealistic, belief at the Department of State that airlines could readily be persuaded to allow their aircraft to be chartered.

Under those circumstances, I decided that the constraint was simply irreconcilable with the demand. In early evening on Friday, I called the

White House with this essential message: There is simply no halfway house. If the United States wanted supplies to be delivered to Israel in time, it would have to be the MAC (Military Airlift Command) aircraft all the way into Israel.¹⁵⁴

Nixon Moves

- Nixon appoints Ford as V.P.
- 10/12 Nixon proposes cease fire
 - Meir accepts
 - Sadat refuses
- And on 10/14-Egyptian forces launch an attack across Sinai that fails
 - Because beyond range of Egyptian missile cover
 - One of largest tank battles in history
 - Major turning point

October 13 Meeting

now!” he ordered.¹⁵⁹ According to Kalb and Kalb, at 10:30 a.m., Nixon summoned Kissinger, Schlesinger, Moorer, Haig and Colby to an emergency meeting at the White House. The authors write:

They heard the president ask one key question: Why had there been a delay in implementing his previous orders about supplies for Israel? Schlesinger tried to explain his difficulty in chartering civilian transport planes. “To hell with the charters,” Nixon exploded, according to one eyewitness. “Get the supplies there with American military planes! Forget the Azores! Get moving! I want no further delays.”¹⁶⁰

October 14 Meeting

... strategy.

Should the Israelis clobber the Egyptians that will turn out to be a pretty good position. Then we move to a simple ceasefire. The Egyptians may have been ready to accept that before the Israelis got into Syria. Now the Egyptians are demanding a return to 67 borders; now that's absolutely out of the question, short of a huge defeat as a result of the war.... So now what we are trying to do is, I've talked to Dobrynin about that last night after you and I talked, is to see whether we can find a formula that links the ceasefire to the peace settlement.²

Nixon's Concern is Israeli Intransigence

...that the U.S. could step things up even more. Yet Kissinger stuck to his strategy. The Israelis needed to win, but not in the stunning fashion of 1967, which had left Egypt humiliated and alienated, and Israel doggedly refusing to enter into any negotiations over the territory it had acquired. Rather, ever with his eye on Cold War geopolitics, Kissinger's goal was to extricate the Soviets from any subsequent peace negotiations. A battered, but victorious Israel would best fit his plan. "Ideally, he said, "Israel would win without exorbitant costs and quickly. But we don't want Israel totally intractable."

- Nixon's Message to Brezhnev: "The peace of not only this area, but the whole future relationship is at stake here and we are prepared to stop if you are and we are prepared"

Resupply

- At the end of the 1st week Israel had lost
 - 70 planes
 - 40 more grounded
 - 800 tanks out of commission
- U.S provides:
 - \$2.2 million aid package thru Congress
 - 550 flights airlifting material
 - More than Russians were providing Egyptian, Syrians & Iranians combined

Egyptian Politics

- Egypt had decided on major offensive to relieve pressure on the Syrians
- Egyptian Chief of Staff General Shazli wants to retreat to west bank of Canal
- But Minister of War Ismail opposes
- Because Sadat is to give a major speech to Parliament & wants to speak from a position of strength

So

- Sadat's refusal to accept cease fire on 10/12 prompts Nixon to agree to resupply Israel
- By 10/15 U.S. Airlift is working in stunning fashion
- Israel counterattacks on 10/15 & on 10/16 the first wave of Israeli troops cross the Canal
- Egypt dismisses the crossing as a "television operation" (Sadat's words)
- Why?
- Various levels of command were so blinded by "self adulation of their initial success" Herzog
- And Israel advance on the West bank destroys missile positions and equipment giving Israel air superiority
- Chief of Staff Shazli wants a retreat from east bank of Canal, but Sadat refuses

U.S. 10/15 Discussions

limit beyond which they can't push us without losing their NATO relationship ... they can't afford to go into open opposition to us." Kissinger summed up his plan. "Our strategy is to convince the Arabs and the Soviets that they will be pushed against the wall and that time is on our side. What the Israelis want is less important." He added, "The only way we can wind this up is if the Soviets see we won't quit and won't panic; if the Europeans see that they are pushed between losing their NATO relationship and lining up with us."¹² At a State Department meeting at 3:15 p.m. Kissinger said, "The conditions that existed between 1967 and 1973 cannot be permitted to be repeated. But for us to have an influence ... we must be perceived by the Israelis to be the source of their survival, by the Arabs as strong enough to be a major factor, and yet open-minded enough not [to] have gone beyond what was imposed on us."¹³

Arab Threat Carried Out

- On 10/16 OAPEC cuts production by 5%
- And to continue to reduce it by an additional 5% until:
 - Israel withdraws from all “occupied territories”
 - “Legal Rights” of the Palestinians are restored.
- In addition 6 Persian Gulf members of OPEC increase the price of oil by 70% from \$3.01 to \$5.12 a barrel
- Kissinger & CIA believe effect on U.S. was minimal and brunt of cutback would fall on Europe & Japan.
- Do you agree?

Russia Gets Involved

- Russia realizes the Arabs are once again facing a complete military collapse
- Kosigin assures Sadat that Russia will unilaterally guarantee a cease fire. How?
- Brezhnev in letter to Nixon on 10/16:
 - “The opinion is being formed that the U.S supports only 1 policy of Israel , the policy of expansion & annexation of foreign lands”

Arabs Complain to Nixon

and the United States' overt support of Israel. The Saudi foreign minister Haqqaf expressed the Arab concerns:

Israel is now being helped by the United States by force. Israel is not being threatened by the Arabs with annihilation. Your help to Israel is seen as hostile to the Arab world. We want no more than a return to the 1967 borders and respect for the rights of refugees to return to their lands or be compensated for what they have lost. This would be enough to guarantee the stability and integrity of Israel.

Nixon Replies

My decision will not be affected by U.S. political considerations—ever! My decisions will be affected by my knowledge of the area and my commitment to the independence and integrity of all the states there.... I will work for a ceasefire, not in order to trick you into stopping at the ceasefire lines, but to use it as a basis to go on from there for a settlement on the basis of Resolution 242. I make this commitment to you.... We will use restraint, and we hope you will.

Cabinet Meeting 10/18

- Nixon & Kissinger now believe Israel must negotiate.
- “Soviet behavior is ambiguous . We are not trying to confront them ; we believe they will be working something out”
- “The major problem now is to get the parties into a negotiation with a formula so vague that each party can save face”

And Furthermore

At the president's very first Cabinet meeting, he said that the greatest danger in the Middle East would be that local powers would draw the super powers in, as happened in World War I. We have resisted letting the local clients dictate the pace of events. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have friends to support. The test is whether we can support them and still retain our balance with each other.

We could have grandstanded. A Security Council resolution would just have lined people up and brought acrimony. We are trying to get a consensus before we move. When you ask whether the Soviet Union is snookering us, you have to ask what we haven't done which we would otherwise have done. In practice we have been extremely tough—in massing a great airlift, with no bases except for the Azores from the Portuguese—whom we have kicked around.

Cease Fire?

- Egyptian 3rd Army on West bank of Canal surrounded and in danger of complete destruction
- Disorderly retreat
- Attempt to break out
- Egyptian 2nd Army on East Bank continues fighting
- Russia ready's its airborne divisions

So

- Russia sees destruction of Egyptian 3rd Army would hurt Russia's prestige
- Kissinger believes rescuing the 3rd Army would be an important bargaining chip with the Soviets and believes each side (Israel & Egypt) get a bargaining chip
 - Israel has territory on west bank
 - Egypt has territory on East bank & 3rd army saved
- 10/19- Brezhnev, thru Ambassador Dobrynin asks Kissinger to fly to Moscow for urgent consultations
- 10/19 Nixon Asks Congress for \$2.2 billion in Emergency aid for Israel
- They agree to Resolution 338 which passes on morning of 10/22 to take effect that evening
- And immediately before cease fire to take effect Egypt for first time launches a SCUD that lands harmlessly in the Sinai

Kissinger on Events of 10/19

Kissinger wrote in his memoirs:

We had achieved our fundamental objectives: We had created the conditions for a diplomatic breakthrough. We had vindicated the security of our friends. We had prevented a victory of Soviet arms. We had maintained a relationship with key Arab countries and laid the basis for a dominant role in postwar diplomacy. And we had done all this in the midst of the gravest Constitutional domestic crisis of a century.⁵⁷

... the Soviet Union, he felt

Morse's Conclusion

Constitutional domestic crisis

As Kissinger prepared to embark on his trip to the Soviet Union, he felt confident and secure in the conviction that he had played his cards right. The Israelis were making significant military advances, a direct result of the airlift. The Soviets were cooperating. The Saudis, despite threats, had yet to impose an embargo. It was difficult to anticipate that within a week, the entire situation would unravel, and the United States and Soviet Union would be headed toward a major confrontation.

Kissinger's Moscow Negotiations

The results of Kissinger's visit to Moscow, and of his subsequent visit to Israel, have been oft debated because of their questionable efficacy and the dubious shadow they cast on Kissinger's character. Within two days of arriving in Moscow, Kissinger and Brezhnev came to agree on terms of what would be Resolution 338 of the United Nations Security Council, which called for an immediate ceasefire to the war. However, Kissinger deliberately subordinated the wishes of Nixon, who wanted an overall settlement in the Middle East, imposed by the Soviet Union and United States. Significantly, the ceasefire broke down just as quickly as it began, when Israel resumed its military initiative and nearly devastated the Egyptian Third Army, the pride of the Egyptian forces. There is much to suggest that the Israelis were bolstered by signals from Kissinger, who in essence gave them a "green light" during his visit, indicating that a slippage on the terms of the ceasefire would be acceptable to the United States. Given the ensuing direct confrontation between the superpowers, a direct result of Israeli ceasefire breaches, Kissinger's meeting with the Israelis, the content of which was largely unknown to Nixon, had deleterious consequences.

Mr. Kissinger Goes to Moscow

BUT

cluded, after speaking with DODY...
oint U.S.-Soviet Security Council resolution and peace negotiations.²
While Kissinger was in-flight, Nixon sent a message to Brezhnev
which Kissinger would later claim nearly sabotaged the negotiations. The
message from Nixon stated, "Dr. Kissinger speaks with my full authority
and that the commitments that he may make in the course of your dis-
cussions have my complete support."³ Kissinger, who was unaware of the
contents of the letter to Brezhnev until after he returned from his first
session with the Soviets, was outraged. He intended to use ostensive con-
sultations with Nixon as a ploy to stall and buy more time. He dispatched

Why Didn't Kissinger Want a Comprehensive Peace Settlement?

- He thought Israeli's would never accept it
- Basis of his strategy was to assure U.S. dominance, and
- Soviet exclusion from a Middle East peace plan
- While the Russians wanted to maximize involvement

Gromyko's Analysis of Kissinger

- "...his extraordinary ability to switch positions."

For almost the entire period of his tenure as secretary of state, Kissinger practiced the technique of applying pressure on the Soviet Union wherever possible, whether in Asia, Africa, the Middle East or anywhere else, as a way of forcing us to make concessions. Clearly this was a straight transfer to international affairs of the sort of wheeling and dealing that goes on throughout American domestic politics, and for as long as Washington employed this approach nothing useful could be achieved in talks with us. It was only when realism triumphed and the U.S.A. learned to take account of the interests of both sides that things improved.¹⁷

10/22 Agreement

- Oil embargo under way
- Kissinger doesn't know how close Israeli's are to surrounding Egyptian 3rd Army
- Private Agreement leading to resolution U.N. 338 that get's passed on 10/22:
 - Under appropriate auspices intending to mean active participation of U.S. & U.S.S.R
 - Use maximum influence to ensure all POS's released within 72 hours
 - Incorporate U.N. Resolution 242
- Kissinger tells Gromyko Israeli's have agreed and goes to Israel

Dinitz

inconclusively. The last thing she expected, particularly after Kissinger's reassurances to Eban and Dinitz, was that he would put his own signature on an agreement without even consulting her. Mrs. Meir never said flatly that Kissinger had betrayed Israel, but this idea was obviously uppermost in her thoughts. At no time, however, did she suggest rejection of the agreement.

As if to pour salt on her wounds, at a few minutes past midnight she received an urgent phone call from the British ambassador. She took the call during the cabinet meeting. The ambassador told her that a very urgent telegram from Sir Alec Douglas-Home had just arrived in which the British foreign minister implored the prime minister to consent to the Moscow agreement. Mrs. Meir said, "Thanks," making it sound more like a curse, and slammed down the receiver. She and the other ministers now realized that not only did Kissinger not consult her, but he informed her of the agreement after he told the British foreign minister—a conclusion simply reached by simply allowing for the time necessary for the British to route the message to Israel.²⁸

Meir & Kissinger

Oil & Water

She never had much patience with intellectuals and she worried, too that that the American secretary of state was a bit of a self-hating Jew. While he'd been raised in an observant home, Kissinger had been sworn into office on a Saturday, thus forcing his Orthodox parents to walk to the White House, and used Nixon's personal copy of the King James version of the Bible rather than the Old Testament published in his hometown in Germany that his parents had brought with them.... "There's no greater expert on American policy than Kissinger," she once reported after he's issued yet another treatise on how Israel should conduct itself. "But on Israeli policy, I have my PhD."³³

And

- For the first time in history SCUD missiles fired by Egypt at Israeli targets
- One account says Russians gave go ahead without consulting Gromyko
- Sadat claims he ordered it on his own so Israelis realized they had such a weapon and would use it

Kissinger In Israel

- Tried to ingratiate himself with Israelis
- Left them with the impression that he would turn a blind eye to any infractions of the cease fire Agreement
- Israeli's come close to devastating the Egyptian 3rd Army
- Brought 2 superpowers close to a major confrontation
- According to David Morse this would be a gaffe Kissinger would long regret, but Kissinger denies it

And on the Syrian Front

- 10/7 Syrian tanks within 10 minutes of River Jordan & Sea of Galilee
- 10/9 Syrian tanks had broken through the Israeli lines & were everywhere
- 10/10 Soviet airlift to Syria begins
- Assad wants a cease fire to consolidate the gains, but Sadat refuses
- 10/14 Egyptian offensive was in response to Assad's request
- Israel counterattacks and by 10/15 destroys or immobilizes over 1,100 tanks

And

- IAF in control of skys-had discovered the way to defeat surface to air missiles
- IDF advancing to Damascus
- 10/11 Dobrynin tells Kissinger that that Soviet airborne forces are on alert to defend Damascus
- U.S.6th fleet strengthened
- Soviet warships move to protect Syrian ports
- Israel decides not to capture Damascus.
- Why not?

Because

- Effect on Arab world very serious
- Military value is dubious
- Cost in lives of taking a city of 1 million would be high
- Forces spread to thin
- Soviet threat
- There were some airstrikes on Damascus, but only after Syria launched missile strikes against Israeli towns

Jordan & Iraq in Syria

- War had caught Hussein by surprise
- His initial reaction was to only defend his border
- On 10/11 Hussein calls British P.M. Heath who calls Kissinger and asks if the U.S. will intervene with the Israelis to allow him “to do this as a minimum’ and not attack...”if he moves a tank brigade into Syria
- “Only in the Middle East is it conceivable that a belligerent would ask its adversary’s approval for engaging in a war against it”

Jordan & Iraq in Syria

- 10/13 Jordanian tanks enter Syria to help defend Damascus
- Ironic?
- Same tank brigade that repulsed Syrian tanks in 9/70
- Iraqi's launch a series of uncoordinated attacks
 - Leadership hesitant
 - Movement slow
 - Performance disappointing
- 10/22 Syria accepts U.N. initial cease fire resolution-338
- 10/24 second Security Council cease fire resolution passes which holds- sort of

Cease Fire?

- 10/22 Israel does not agree to a cease fire on Syrian front
- Syria doesn't agree to U.N. Resolution
- Iraq & Libya had rejected it outright
- PLO announces it will continue to fight Israel

Potential Superpower Confrontation

- Even though Israel accepts cease fire Israel had ordered it's troops to continue fighting unless the Egyptians stop
- Russia wants withdrawal to 1967 lines
- Kissinger refuses - only return to point when cease fire agreed
- 10/23- Sadat in back channel message to Nixon wants U.S. to intervene militarily
- Kissinger Tells Dinitz : “If you wind up tonight capturing 20,000 Egyptians you won't be able to tell us they started the fighting”
- Kissinger tells Moscow “We made an agreement and now it is going to be enforced”

WSAG Meeting 10/23

I think we have come out in the catbird seat. Everyone has come to us since we are the only ones who can deliver. I think this will be true in the diplomacy, too.... We have made some real gains in the last few weeks, since everyone has learned that the U.S. is the essential ingredient. Israel has learned that they can't fight a war without an open American supply line—they can't stockpile enough to do it. That is the lesson they have learned. Their casualties are enormous.

The Arabs may despise us, or hate us, or loathe us, but they have learned that if they want a settlement, they have to come to us. No one else can deliver. Three times they have relied on Russian equipment, and three times they have lost it. So, strategically, we have a very good hand if we know how to play it. All the Arabs have approached us, from the most radical to the most conservative.

Our strategy is to hold these cards and to get a settlement. We cannot tolerate continuation of the status quo. On the other hand, we want to keep the supplies going in until we have a concrete proposal to put before the Israelis. It would be premature to start nit-picking them now, although we were brutal today with the Israelis in stopping the military activity...

I'd like to arrange a meeting between [Vietnam's] Thieu and Golda and Duc and Dayan. They deserve each other.³⁵

Morse Analysis

“... and Dayan. They deserve each other.”

Given the severity with which events were unfolding, Kissinger's self-confidence is striking. In continuing to supply the Israelis while they continued to devastate the Egyptian Third Army, he was taking a big gamble that the Arabs would trust the U.S. in future negotiations. Remarkably, Kissinger, throughout the course of events, significantly underplays the potentially crippling effect of Arab ire, as would become manifest in the oil crisis of 1973 and 1974, which had a serious, though debated effect on the American economy. Importantly, when viewed in retrospect, Kissinger seems heedless to the great blow that unrelenting U.S. support would wield to American standing in the Middle East for decades, by setting the stage for an antipathy that would be nurtured by years of uncritical U.S. support despite Israel's systematic violations of United Nations resolutions.

— SEEMS TO ASSUME ISA

Madman Strategy?

- Kissinger boasts “I think this is the best run crisis we ever had”
- But Russians threaten to support a Security Council resolution calling for the dispatch of a U.S. and Soviet troops if someone else introduced it
- And, Dobrynin tells Kissinger we will consider “...taking the appropriate steps unilaterally.”
- WSAG decided to issue a DEFCON 3 alert
- “Middle East is worst place in the World for us to engage in a war”
Admiral Thomas Moorer
- Big issue is Nixon’s knowledge
 - Conflicting reports
 - Preoccupation with Watergate
- Kissinger & Schlesinger believed that Watergate required a show of strength & determination

News Conferences

- 10/25 Kissinger news conference warns Soviets not to send troops & not expect U.S. to join them
- 10/26 Nixon news conference

... and anger, as described by reporter John F. Kennedy, began the press conference with a statement on the Middle East crisis: "We obtained information," Nixon said, "which led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force into the Middle East—a military force."⁹⁹ He also suggested that no other leader could have dealt as successfully with the Russians as he did in bringing about a ceasefire. "It's because he [Brezhnev] and I know each other and it's because we have had this personal contact that ... result in a settlement rather than a confrontation," he boasted.¹⁰⁰

Escalation

- Dobrynin tells Kissinger Russia is sending 70 representatives to supervise cease fire
- And expects U.S. to send representatives to meet with them
- But Dobrynin backs down after Kissinger relates press conferences
- Because of both navies' ships in the Med. this was probably closest to "hot war" since Cuban Missile crises

Territory Held After Yom Kippur War



Losses

	Dead	Wounded	Aircraft	Tanks
Arabs	8,528	19,549	392	2,554
Israel	2,838	8,800	103	840

Disengagement Agreements

- 1/18/74 with Egypt–Israel must withdraw from all area on western

side of the Suez Canal. An area thirty kilometers wide on the eastern side of the canal was divided into three zones. Egypt received a zone by the canal, equivalent to its bridgehead, in which it was allowed to keep up to 7,000 soldiers, thirty tanks, and thirty-six artillery pieces. The middle zone was a buffer zone under UN control. In the eastern zone, which extended to the Sinai passes, Israel was allowed to keep the same level of forces as Egypt in its zone.

Disengagement Agreements

- 5/21/71 with Syria

The Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement followed the same general outline, but it took Kissinger thirty-two days to broker it. Israel had to withdraw from the Syrian territory it captured during the war. The Golan Heights were divided into three zones: Syrian and Israeli zones with limited forces, and a narrow UN buffer zone between them. The town of Kuneitra was returned to Syria, but Israel retained control of the adjacent hills.

- Assad also agreed in a private memo to prevent Palestinian groups from undertaking attacks and terrorist activities from Syrian territory

War Effects

- Egypt's political purpose was to break the negotiating log jam which was successful even though Israel was militarily victorious
- Sadat establishes direct relationship with U.S.
- U.S. pressures Israel initially to allow supplies to go to 3rd Army & then to pull back from west bank of Suez
- U.S. improves position in Egypt at expense of Russia

Aftermath

- Illusions of Israeli vulnerability vanished
 - And would not ensure stability; despite the result that Israeli military position was overwhelming
- Sadat emerges as leader on world stage
- Kissinger cements his reputation as diplomat in chief
- Détente with Russia will not minimize regional conflicts
- View of Arab ineptitude changed
- U.S. policy shifts from maintaining status quo to strategy aimed at bringing about substantial change, including closer ties with Arabs

Aftermath in Israel

- Confidence in allies damaged because
- Delayed arms shipments
- French supply of arms to Arabs
- Britain abandoned Israel after war and moved closer to Arabs because of boycott
- Britain began training Egyptian helicopter pilots
- 3rd world countries cut off ties, even tho Israel had invested money with them

Israeli Soul Shattered

It was also more than many of the kibbutz members could bear. The absolute rejection of religion and the utter commitment to secularism of the founding generation began to give way. It was too early to tell then, but Israel was going to move away from its early image of the new Jew—secular, confident, dismissive of religion—and would begin to search for meaning in places that previous generations would have dismissed out of hand.

And in Song

- Naomi Shemer (Jerusalem of Gold) writes all “All We Pray For” originally to the tune Beatles Song “Let It Be”


All that we long for, let it be

Please, let it be, let it be


All that we long for, let it be

- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xJoZ9R4i-N0&list=RDxJoZ9R4i-N0#t=9>

All We Pray For



Winter of '73



Children of Winter'73

- We are the children of winter 1973.
You dreamt us first at dawn at the end of the battles,
You were tired men that thanked their good luck,
You were worried young women and you wanted so much to love,
When you conceived us with love in winter 1973,
You wanted to your bodies to be full with that which the war had destroyed.
- And when we were born the country was wounded and sad,
You looked at us you hugged us you were trying to find comfort,
When we were born the elders blessed with tears in their eyes,
They said:" we wish those kids will not have to go to the army",
And your faces in the old picture prove,
That you said it from the bottom of your hearts,
When you promised to do every thing for us,
To turn a foe into a friend.
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iSsBYH98-ng&index=5&list=RDxJoZ9R4i-N0>

- You promised a dove,
an olive tree leaf,
you promised peace
You promised spring at home and blossoms
You promised to fulfill promises, you promised a dove
- We are the children of winter 1973
We grew up, and are now in the army, holding our rifle,
- Helmet on our heads
We know how to make love to laugh and cry,
We are men we are women,
and we too dream about babies.
- This is why we will not pressure nor will we demand,
And we will not threaten!
When we were young you said "promises need to be kept".
If strength is what you need, we will give it,
We will not hold back
We just wanted to whisper
We are the children of that winter in the year 1973

You promised a dove,
an olive tree leaf,
you promised peace
You promised spring at home and blossoms
You promised to fulfill promises,
you promised a dove

Who to Blame?

- Agranat Commission reported its findings on 4/1/74
 - Headed by Shimon Agranat, Chief Justice of Israel's Supreme Court. Its other members were Justice Moshe Landau, State Comptroller Yitzchak Nebenzahl, and former Chiefs of Staff Yigael Yadin and Chaim Laskov.
- IDF responsible & 3 stripped of positions
 - David Elezar-Chief of Staff
 - Died 4/76 at 51
 - Elia Zeira-Head of Intelligence Branch
 - Shmuel Gonen-Chief of Southern Command
 - Immediately went to Africa where he died at 61 in 1991
 - Meir & Dayan basically given a pass, which angers public

Meir in Her Memoirs

Today I know what I should have done. I should have overcome my hesitations. I knew as well as anyone else what full-scale mobilization meant and how much money it would cost, and I also knew that only a few months before, in May, we had had an alert and the reserves had been called up, but nothing had happened. But I also understood that perhaps there had been no war in May exactly because the reserves had been called up. That Friday morning, I should have listened to the warnings of my own heart and ordered a call-up. For me, that fact cannot and never will be erased, and there can be no consolation in anything that anyone has to say or in all of the common-sense rationalizations with which my colleagues have tried to comfort me.¹³⁰

Oil Crisis

- Severest effect were on 3rd world countries
 - India, Pakistan, Bangladesh & poorer countries of Latin America
 - But one historian calls it one of the 70's seismic events because it "...shifted the balance of power in the world economy away from the importing nations and toward the oil exporters"

Oil Embargo Lifted

5/74

- Saudis abandoned oil embargo on their own accord according to Ross
- Looked to U.S. as guarantor of their security
- Did not want arms sales to stop
- Increased trade (up 700% between 1972 & 1976)
 - Joint commission on Economic Cooperation with the Saudis established
 - U.S. built infrastructure

But Ross Says

- Nixon tells governors visiting Washington:” The only way we ‘re going to solve the crisis and to end the oil embargo is to get the Israelis to act reasonable... I hate to use the word blackmail, but we’ve got to do some things to get them {the Israelis]to behave.”
- According to Ross “that the Saudis had abandoned the oil weapon of their own accord, simply based on their interests and their desire for a strong relationship with the U.S . , simply did not penetrate the collective psyche of the administration.”

Ross Further States

The Saudis had both economic and national security reasons for lifting the embargo when they did—and these had nothing to do with Israel. The Saudis had to worry about the effect of the price hike on the health of the global economy. An economic slowdown could lead to a decrease in demand for oil—which did in fact happen with the global recession of 1974–1975. Saudi oil ministers from 1974 until today have preached about the need for “balance” in the oil market, declaring that their own well-being depends on not driving the price so high that demand for their principal resource dampens and alternatives to oil begin to look more attractive.*

In Addition, According to Ross

But there were also profound security reasons for Saudi behavior. The Saudis looked to the United States as the guarantor of their security. So long as the oil embargo continued, they ran the risk that we would not engage in defense cooperation; we certainly could not have politically justified selling arms to the Saudis as long as they refused to sell us oil—and the Congress needed to approve such arms sales. Just as the Saudis and the other Arabs who were acquiring arms from us prior to and after the 1967 war did not want our arms sales to them to stop, so, too, would the Saudis after the 1973 war not want any disruption in the supply of U.S. weapons to the kingdom. Indeed, with their newfound revenues, their appetite for arms went up. So once again, their own interests trumped concerns about the Israelis, and the Saudis and the other Arab oil-producing states dropped the boycott.

And Finally Ross Says

the boycott.


Even more to the point, the Saudis actually increased the scope of their cooperation with us. With their vast new monies, they set about building a civilian infrastructure. Whom did they want building their highways, pipelines, petrochemical industry? The United States. We, of course, were eager to recycle the petrodollars and set up a Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation with the Saudis in June 1974. Our trade with Saudi Arabia went up by 700 percent between 1972 and 1976. True, they could use Kissinger's active diplomacy, which would produce three disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975 to justify increased cooperation, but none of these agreements came close to meeting their initial demand of Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines.

And Furthermore in Israel

- 12/73 Ben Gurion dies
- 12/31/73 Election results in Labor Alignment falling from 56 to 51 seats
- Sharon engineers the formation of Likud led by Begin
- Meir resigns as P.M. in May, 1974
- Rabin becomes P.M.
- At the time 3 out of 4 Israelis were willing to trade all or part of occupied territories for peace
- Which ultimately paved the way for peace between Israel & Egypt according to Simcha Dinitz

Yitzhak Rabin

- 1 March 1922 – 4 November 1995)
- fifth Prime Minister of Israel, serving two terms in office, 1974–77 and 1992 until his assassination in 1995.
- born in Jerusalem
- As a teenager he joined the Palmach
- chief of operations during Israel's War of Independence.
- helped shape the training doctrine of the IDF, and led the IDF's Operations Directorate from 1959 to 1963.
- Chief of the General Staff in 1964 and oversaw Israel's victory in the 1967 Six-Day War.



And He

- Signs a second agreement with Egypt -9/75 removing Israeli forces beyond the strategic passes and giving Egypt access to some oil fields in Gulf of Suez
- And agrees that any future pact with Egypt would be a final peace accord

Basic Laws

- There is no clear rule determining the precedence of Basic Laws and in many cases the issue is left to interpretation by the judicial system.
- The Israeli Declaration of Independence stated that:
 - "We declare that after the termination of the British Mandate, from the 15 May 1948 and until elected authorities of the state would be established in accordance with a constitution accepted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than October 1, 1948—the Provisional State Council would act as the temporary State Council, and its executive institution, the Provisional government of Israel, would constitute the temporary Government of the Jewish state, which would be named Israel."

Basic Laws

- 14 in total
- Most recent 2014
 - Establishes that if the Israeli government adopts a decision or signs an agreement stipulating that the laws, jurisdiction, and administrative authority of the State of Israel will no longer apply to a certain geographical area, such agreement or decision must either be adopted via a treaty approved by 80 MKs, or by an absolute majority vote in a referendum.[9] This means that Israeli sovereign territory (East Jerusalem, Golan Heights and any land within the 1949 armistice lines), under Israeli law, can only be relinquished either through a treaty approved by over 80 MKs, in which case a referendum is not necessary, or before a treaty is valid, it must be approved by an absolute majority vote in a referendum.[10]

Effect on Jordan

- On 10/74 at an Arab League Summit held in Rabat, Morocco Hussein suffers a major defeat because the summit endorsed the claim of the PLO to be “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”
- PLO granted U.N. Observer status a month later & speaks at U.N.
- Hussein fears that an agreement with Egypt would weaken Jordan’s position in Middle East.
- Rabin has 6 meetings with Hussein

Israel Objectives With Jordan

- Rabin wanted to avoid major issues
- Wanted to concentrate on Egypt


also produced a detailed record of the discussions. Israel had four main aims in these discussions: to explore the possibilities of a deal with Jordan, to solve minor problems that affected both countries, to promote economic cooperation, and to coordinate policy toward the West Bank and the Palestinian guerrilla organizations. Jordan put forward two proposals in these discussions: an interim agreement involving partial Israeli withdrawal on the West Bank, and a full peace agreement in return for complete Israeli withdrawal.⁴

- At final meeting discussions focus on combating terrorist activities by radical Palestinian factions, ecology, water, aviation shipping in Gulf of Aqaba and border demarcation

Sinai 2-9/75

- Israel agrees to withdraw from
 - oil fields
 - passes
 - keep early warning station at Um Hashuba inside the passes
- U.S , agrees to build similar early warning stations for Egyptians
- Stations all manned by American civilian personnel
- U.N. Buffer Zones established
- Limited force Zones on both sides of Buffer Zones
- Shlaim claims Kissinger's purpose was to drive a wedge between Sadat & USSR, Rabin's purpose was to widen rift between Syria & Sadat
- Syria, Iraq & Libya condemn Sinai II

- Sinai II
- Israeli Egyptian Sinai Agreement , 9/5/75
- U.S. Memo of Agreement U.S Pledges
 - Support Israeli military equipment & defense requirements on long term basis
 - Energy requirements
 - Economic support -\$2 billion
 - F-16 Fighters
 - Pershing missiles
 - Not to recognize or negotiate with PLO without prior consultation*
 - Nor diverge from 242 or 338 as sole basis of peace negotiations*
- * Separate secret memo



Resolution 242

Key Points

(i) Withdrawal of Israel[i] armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

But Following Sinai II

- Notwithstanding the pledge not to negotiate with the PLO , Kissinger approved congressional testimony which hinted this could change
- And criticized Israel's settlement policies for the first time (under Ford)- labeling them as illegal & an obstacle to peace

Effect on Superpowers

- Russia gained nothing because it didn't support Palestinian rights
- U.S relations with allies damaged
- Energy crisis
- U.S. effectively excludes Soviets from peace process
- U.S. makes Israel dependent on U.S. arms support
- Israel changes from being a moral obligation & strategic asset into more of an economic one
- Kissinger shuttle diplomacy forms basis of Peace Accords under Carter in 1978

Kissinger—Agree?

was minimal, based on his role in countries such as Cambodia, Chile, and Indonesia. His biographer, Walter Isaacson, writes that “Kissinger’s realpolitik was ill-suited to an open and democratic society, where it is difficult to invoke distant ends to justify unpalatable means.” Yet even Isaacson

submits that “the structure of peace that Kissinger designed places him with Henry Stimson, George Marshall, and Dean Acheson atop the pantheon of American statesmen.”²¹ Others have referred to him as “Super K,” and compared him to Metternich, Talleyrand, Bismarck, Machiavelli, Castlereagh, or a Lonesome Cowboy.²² Former secretary of state George Shultz surely put it best: “There’s only one Henry Kissinger. They broke the mold after they made him.”²³

Kissinger’s conduct during the October War demonstrates the same ambiguity. At time duplicitous, a consummate flatterer, and willing to go to the brink of nuclear war on a gamble, Kissinger’s brilliance and relentless focus on achieving his strategic objectives shine forth in every action, every conversation. In the end, as was often the case, with ruthlessness, Kissinger achieved his stated objectives.

Domestic Reaction

- Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

vealing statement in a public lecture one year after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He stated that if there was war in the Middle East, "You can conjure up a situation where there is another oil embargo and people in this country [the United States] are not only inconvenienced and uncomfortable but suffer and they get tough-minded enough to set down the Jewish influence in this country and break that lobby."¹²⁵ Brown reflected a conviction that our provision of supplies to Israel had resulted from Jewish pressure and not our interests. He saw a clear cost to us. He saw damage to our relations with the Arabs who held the oil threat over our heads. For him, it was domestic political pressures that cost us unnecessarily.

- Israel's supporters became more vocal and their efforts with Congress became more organized and effective according to Ross
- Yet again those Arab countries that felt their interests depended on ties to the U.S. made sure to preserve those relations & security links , regardless of what we

PLO

- Smith says “It seems clear that Arafat from 1973 onward was attracted to the idea of a negotiated settlement that might regain the West Bank and Gaza. But he hesitated to openly advocate this option for fear of losing control of the PLO.”
- Do you agree?
- Some West Bank Palestinians favored a limited settlement
- But Palestinians in refugees camps resisted. Why?

Arafat U.N. Speech 11/74

abling that diplomatic assault to become more effective. In November 1974, Yasser Arafat was invited to speak at the United Nations. In what became known as the "Olive Branch and Gun" speech, he spoke not about peace with Israel, but about the "Jewish invasion of Palestine." Threatening violence as much as he alluded to peace, he said, to great applause, "Today I come bearing an olive branch in one hand, and the freedom fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. I repeat, do not let the olive branch fall from my hand."

Responding to the applause, Arafat clasped his hands above his head, and a holster on his belt came into view. The holster, which Arafat had brought with obvious symbolic intent into the plenum of the General Assembly, was a thinly veiled threat of continuing violence, but it had no impact on the applause. Arafat had declared war on Israel's existence, and the UN responded with adulation and a standing ovation. Merely a year later, the General Assembly granted the PLO observer status at the United Nations.

U.N. Resolution 3379

The UN's assault on Israel continued. In November 1975, the General Assembly approved—by a vote of 72 to 35 (with 32 abstentions)—Resolution 3379, which stated that “Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.” The United States voted against the resolution. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, denounced what he understood was really happening: “The United Nations is about to make anti-Semitism international law.” Moynihan thundered his now famous declaration, “The [United States] . . . does not acknowledge, it will not abide by it, it will never acquiesce in this infamous act. . . . A great evil has been loosed upon the world.”³⁵