

Israeli History

Post 1973

PLO Proposal

- A National Authority
- What does that mean?
 - A state?
 - Include West Bank & Gaza?
- But it's a first step toward liberation of all of Palestine.
- How?
 - Armed struggle?
 - Or peaceful contact leading to integration of Palestinian & Israeli societies

Israeli Reaction

- Israeli leaders said this “National Authority” was just a smoke screen. Not serious. Agree?
- Coupled with continued violence by PFLP & PDFLP
 - Infiltrates Kiryat Shimona. Took hostages & wiped out with some captives
 - Suicide mission in Maalot (northern Israel) killing 24 school children.
- Supports Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO
- And increase settlement activity on West Bank without U.S. protest.
- In 1976 Ford suspends diplomatic activity because of upcoming election for fear of losing Jewish votes

Syria & Lebanon

- For historical reasons Syrian Leaders regarded Lebanon not as an independent sovereign state, but as part of greater Syria.
- Assad's primary fear was that PLO actions might force Syria into a war with Israel.
- Israel could not tolerate the prospect of Syrian troops on 2 of its borders
- 4/75-Civil War erupts in Lebanon between various leftist PLO coalitions (The Rejectionist Front) and various Christian militias.

Syria & Lebanon

- Syria first tries to broker a peace
- Then it sides with Rejectionist Front
- Then switches sides during 1976 because Rejectionist Front is winning and Assad prefers a balance of power among factions.
- Assad sends Syrian regular army into Lebanon to protect Christians led by Maronite Christians


Israeli Reaction

- Various proposals floated
- Red Line proposal adopted
 - No Syrian forces south of Sidon
 - No Syrian air force
 - No ground to air missiles on Lebanon territory
- Why?
 - Reduces risk of a military clash between Israel & Syria in Lebanon
 - Syrian intervention directed at Israel's enemies-the PLO
 - Common policy with U.S.—both viewed Syria as a stabilizing force in Lebanon

In Addition

- Syria accepts this “Good Fence “ policy
- Syrian stated objective is to disarm PLO
- U.S. supplies Maronites with arms
- Israel invests \$150 million in building up Maronite militias in Lebanon.
- Syria drives PLO into southern Lebanon
- Rabin estimates that the Syrians killed more Palestinians than the guerilla organizations had lost in all their operations against Israel over the preceding 30 years.
- Israel still opposes Syrians moving south of the “Red Line, even though Kissinger pointed out that the Syrians were the only ones capable of pacifying the south
- Southern Lebanon becomes a haven for terrorists.
- Thus Israel’s sworn foes, found an asylum under an Israeli deterrent umbrella intended against the Syrians

Lebanon Power Balance 1976



- Dark Green – controlled by Syria;
- Purple – controlled by Maronite groups;
- Light Green – controlled by Palestinian militias

Possible Negotiations

- Spring, 1976: Rabin approaches King of Morocco to ask about being go between with Egypt
- Sadat refuses. Why?
 - Wants U.S. involved
- Beginning of 77 Egypt's VP asks Kriesky to arrange a meeting with Peres
- Rabin refuses. Why?
 - Personal animosity with Peres
 - Meir history with Kriesky

Rabin Resigns 4/77

- Israeli public thought
 - Rabin mishandled U.S. relations
 - Terror attacks continue despite Sinai 2 & giving up territory
 - World blamed Israel
 - Rabin responsible for wife's violation of Israeli currency regulations
- Rabin meets with Carter 3/77; where Carter proposes:
 - Reconvene Geneva Conference
 - Israeli withdrawal (with only slight modifications) to pre-67 borders
 - Recognition of Palestinian rights
 - Homeland for Palestinians

U.S. Mindset

- It was Israel we had to pressure & Arabs we had to embrace

We expected Israeli opposition, for it was our feeling that the Israelis were essentially playing for time, and were more interested in preserving an exclusive relationship with the United States than in moving toward a broader peace in the Middle East. We were determined to retain close links with Israel, but we knew that we had to widen our relations with the more moderate Arab states, to build on what had been achieved by Nixon and Kissinger in Egypt, and to intensify our collaboration with Saudi Arabia.¹⁰

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- Carter never accepted Israeli mantra “ security was best guarantee of peace”

Other Carter Comments

- Carter administration looked at the Jewish state as more of a liability than an asset
- “It seems to me the Israelis, at least Rabin, don’t trust our Government or any of their neighbors. I guess there is some justification for that distrust.”
- Carter meets with Sadat and Hussein after he meets with Rabin and Sadat & Hussein meetings go well.
- “My own judgement at this time is that the Arab leaders want to settle it and the Israeli’s don’t”


And More Carter Comments

- Meets with Hafez al Assad:
 - “It was an interesting and enjoyable experience”
 - Assad’s “... Intimate knowledge of the Middle East region ...” helped him to understand the Middle East
 - Ross says he spent many hours negotiating with Assad and he was inflexible and his approach to negotiations was more like attrition
- Meets with Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and has positive meeting

And After Meetings

"After meeting with these key Arab leaders, I was convinced that all of them were ready for a strong move on our part to find solutions to the long-standing disputes and that with such solutions would come their recognition of Israel and the right of Israelis to live in peace. I agreed with their most important premise—that the Palestinian question would have to be addressed."³⁰

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Result of Rabin Resignation

- Peres takes over 4/77
- Likud gets plurality 5/77 and combines with the National Religious Party (which really holds balance in Knesset) and 2 smaller religious parties and
- Menachem Begin is P.M.

Lesson?

- Shlaim calls this the biggest upheaval in Israeli political history
- Do you think so?
- “ The real lesson from his premiership, as from that of his two predecessors, was that time was not Israel’s friend unless used for active diplomacy in pursuit of peace with the Arabs. It was a lesson Rabin acted upon when he returned to power 15 years later.” Shlaim
- What do you think?

But Zvi Hurwitz Says 9 Reasons Begin Won

1. People of Israel had become weary of their lackluster leaders
2. Wave of strikes produced Labor anarchy & economic hardship
3. Labor Party internal dissension & open conflict
4. Defection of some prominent Labor personalities
5. Public scandals
6. Blunder of Yom Kippur War
7. Likud's campaign was better organized
8. Begin's personal integrity
9. Likud's program had more appeal

But Not Everyone Liked Him

- Ben-Gurion called him a fascist
- As did Albert Einstein and Hannah Arendt in a letter to New York Times noting that Begin “preached an admixture of ultra nationalism, religious mysticism and racial superiority”

BUT

Throughout his years as head of the opposition, Begin had cul-

tivated a relationship with Mizrachi Jews. He reminded them, time and again, that when he ran the Irgun, his fighters came from Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Argentina, South Africa, Iraq, Persia, and other non-European Jewish communities:

[I]n all the divisions of the Irgun we had members who came from all Jewish communities and of all classes. . . . We were the melting-pot of the Jewish nation in miniature. We never asked about origins: we demanded only loyalty and ability. Our comrades from the eastern communities felt happy and at home in the Irgun. Nobody ever displayed stupid airs of superiority toward them and they were thus helped to free themselves of any unjustified sense of inferiority they may have harbored.⁷

In the Irgun, unlike the Knesset, he noted, Mizrachi men attained the highest positions of power.

Menachem Begin

- Born Brest Litovsk, Poland 8/16/13
- Died 3/9/92
- Parents were ardent Zionists
- 1929 Joins Betar and becomes head of Czech and Polish branch by 1937
- Graduates Warsaw University Law school in 1935
- Russian Labor Camp in 1940
- Joins Free Polish Army and sent to Palestine in May 1942
- Joins Irgun in December 1942
- Irgun leader 1944
- Parents and brother murdered in Holocaust



Ze'ev Jabotinsky

- 10/18/1880 -8/4/1940
- Born in Odessa
- Originally Vladimir
- Founder of
 - Jewish Self-Defense Organization after 1903 Kishnev pogroms
 - Jewish Legion in WW1
 - Irgun
 - Beitar
 - Hatzohar
- Legacy is the current Likud Party



Ze'ev Jabotinsky

- Jabotinsky was the more captivating speaker and personality;
- Ben Gurion, the superior political tactician.
- Though a highly sociable man, Jabotinsky did not excel at organizational work; generous, sometimes to a fault, in delegating responsibility to those he trusted, he was stingy at sharing it when he thought it should be his own.
- Ben Gurion, the more abrasive personality, was also the more disciplined team player; while devoid of the sense of humor that Jabotinsky possessed in abundance, he had a patience for detail and drudgery that Jabotinsky did not.

Ze'ev Jabotinsky

- Even if Jabotinsky's memorandum was a sincere plan for getting to the "30 plus percent" (of Jews) that would trigger an Arab Jewish war, he was certain that no Jewish state could be established without one. This was publicly stated by him in his 1923 essay "An Iron Wall," in which he wrote that "the Arabs have the same instinctive love and inbred zeal for Palestine that the Aztecs had for Mexico and the Sioux had for the prairies," and that "every native people fights foreign settlers as long as it can hope to get rid of them."
- It would be foolish to think that Arabs of Palestine, would be less willing than others to shed their blood for their country.
- However, Palestine would have to be seized from them by force. He had already concluded as much in 1908

Ze'ev Jabotinsky

- He predicted WW1
- He spoke of “...a devastating war between 2 or more first class powers, with all the grand insanity of modern techniques...with an incredible number of casualties and with such an expenditure of money-direct, indirect and incidental-that there would not be enough digits for accountability.”
- Wanted to align with British , while Ben Gurion initially thought Zionist hopes lay with the Ottomans.

But

- He was slow to appreciate America's importance for Zionism or cultivate a political base there
- It's Jews, he felt had no visceral attachment to Zionism; it was a movement as they saw it , not for them, but for their less fortunate brethren in Europe, whom they were at most under an obligation to help
- Thoroughly Eurocentric in his outlook , he would come to understand only late in the day how badly America was needed.

Begin Ideology

- Begin saw the world as profoundly anti-Semitic and the Arabs were merely an extension of the Holocaust
- Founded Herut Party
- Hurvitz gives Begin the credit for laying the groundwork for friendly relations with France that ultimately results in France supplying weapons.
- Shlaim and Gordis claim it was Peres

Likud Ideology

- Greater Israel
 - Judea and Samaria shall never be relinquished to foreign rule
 - No Palestinian State
 - “the Jewish people have an unchallengeable, eternal historic right to the Land of Israel, the inheritance of their forefathers”
- Not against relinquishing Sinai & Golan Heights
- And no immediate plan to annex the West Bank or Gaza strip

Likud Ideology

On the link between Jabotinsky's thinking and the foreign policy of the new prime minister, we have the testimony of Eliahu Ben Elissar, the director general of the prime minister's office: "The deterrent power, or in Jabotinsky's language 'the iron wall,' was intended to convince the Arabs that they would not be able to get rid of the sovereign Jewish presence in the Land of Israel, even if they could not bring themselves to recognize the justice of the Jewish people's claim to its homeland." Begin believed that the IDF's primary function was not to go to war but to deter the Arabs from going to war. He derived satisfaction from the thought that the very composition of his government might deter the Arabs from attacking Israel, if they had any such thoughts. "The Arabs would not go to war against us," he told his aides, "when in the government sit military leaders like Moshe Dayan, Ezer Weizman, and Ariel Sharon."³ Dayan was the foreign minister, Weizman the defense minister, and Sharon the agriculture minister. The Democratic Movement for Change joined the government four months after it was formed. Among its leaders were two former generals, Yigael Yadin and Meir Amit. This confirmed Begin's belief in the power of his government to deter an Arab attack on Israel.

Foreign Policy

- Build urban and rural settlements on West Bank
- Ready to participate in Geneva convention on basis of UN Resolution 242 and 338
- Israeli law would not be extended to west bank while negotiations were under way
- Jordan reaction:
 - Panic stricken
 - Didn't believe-thought Israel would annex West Bank and expel Palestinians

Two Days after Election on Tour of West Bank

When reporters following the prime minister-elect asked whether Begin's firm commitment to the settlements implied a future annexation of the West Bank, they got a tongue-lashing in return:

We don't use the word "annexation." You annex *foreign* land, not your own country. Besides, what was this term "West Bank"? From now on, the world must get used to the area's real—biblical—name, "Judea and Samaria." . . . [I]s it so difficult for you to use these words?²¹

Gordis Analysis

A different Israeli ethos had come to power. During the course of Begin's tenure as prime minister, the number of settlements doubled. Given that this number would later increase under right-wing Israeli governments and that the Right was always much more unabashed about defending the legitimacy of the settlement movement, the international community would later speak of settlements as the creation of the Israeli political Right, but that was incorrect. When Begin took office, there were already seventy-five settlements—and they had been created under the governments of Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin. Settling land—whether purchased or captured in conflicts that Israel did not seek—was not a policy of the political Right or Left. It was a central pillar of Zionism's ethos from the very outset.

That was how the Jews had built their state. Many Israelis saw no reason to give up on the very ideology that had made their country possible in the first place. What was different about the Right was that it made that claim entirely unapologetically.

Carter Meets with Begin 7/19/77

- U.S. proposal after meeting
 - Geneva negotiation was to reach peace agreement
 - Basis for conference was 242 and 338
 - Establish normal relations, not just peace
 - Israeli withdrawal from all fronts
 - Self determination for the Palestinians in their future status
- Begin's reaction?
 - OK with first, last 2 unacceptable

Dayan /Hussein Meeting

7/22/77

- Palestinian Issue
- Hussein rejects Dayan's proposal to split the West Bank between Israel & Jordan
- Why?
 - He would be accused of selling out
- Begin concludes he will just concentrate on Egypt

Back Channels

- Biggest problem is that no country would make a separate peace with Israel, but it was impossible to make a simultaneous peace with all Arab countries
- Begin visits Romanian President Ceausescu a good friend of Sadat (8/25/77)
- Begin asks Ceausescu to tell Sadat his first goal was peace with Egypt
- Dayan meets with King Hassan of Morocco on 9/4/77 to arrange a meeting between Israeli & Egyptian representatives
- Meanwhile Egyptian VP Hassan Tuhami had asked Ceausescu to arrange a meeting
- At Dayan /Tuhami meeting understanding that Sadat was willing to negotiate, but only after Begin agreed to the principle of complete withdrawal from Sinai (9/16/77)

Carter Vance Dayan Meeting

In the private part of their meeting, Carter vented on Israeli settlements and told Dayan, “You are more stubborn than the Arabs, and you put more obstacles on the path to peace.” Dayan countered that it was not Israeli settlement activity that prevented peace: “The Arabs had been refusing to reconcile themselves to Israel’s existence for thirty years, even when we had lived within the pre-1967 boundaries.”⁴¹ Carter was not persuaded by this argument, and, according to Dayan, when he and the president joined others in a larger meeting, Carter went on the offensive:

Israel was taking an obdurate line whereas the Arabs were flexible; Israel did not really want peace . . . our deeds . . . made it difficult to convene the Geneva conference and impossible to fulfill the ‘principal element’ of Resolution 242—Israeli withdrawal and peace. My associates were astounded. After four wars and thirty years of Arab refusal to sit with us to discuss peace . . . the Arabs were the “flexible” ones who yearned for peace, and we were the rejectionists.⁴²

Carter, Vance, Dayan meeting

Vance and Carter. His meetings in Washington revealed very clearly Carter's view that the Israelis were the obstacle to peace. Carter pressed the Israeli foreign minister hard to stop building settlements. Though he said that was not possible, Dayan promised to recommend a reduction of settlement activity in size and scope—with the six additional settlements that Israel planned to build limited to being “carried out within the framework of military camps.”⁴⁰ After initially resisting Dayan's proposal, Carter reluctantly accepted this plan, believing that construction would be circumscribed within existing military areas. However, a week later, Vance told Dayan that we could not agree to Israel building even in the military camps. Consequently, Dayan felt it was pointless to try to persuade Begin to scale back the settlement effort in this fashion.*

* Carter would later say, when this did not happen, that Begin was “breaking his word of honor” on limiting the settlements. Carter, *White House Diary*, pp. 167–68.

Backstabbing?

- US and Russia issue a joint statement on reconvening Geneva convention!!!
- Sadat: “ We kicked the Russians out the door and now Mr. Carter is bringing them back through the window”
- Begin furious because statement contained a reference to”... the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”

American-Israeli Working Paper “Suggestions for Resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference”

- Dayan, Carter and Vance create it with most controversial sections being:
 - Unified delegation to include Palestinian Arabs
 - West Bank & Gaza issues will be discussed in a working group to consist of Israel, Jordan, Egypt & Palestinian Arabs
- Knesset approves
- Jordan accepts under condition no PLO representatives
- Syria (after 1st accepting) and PLO reject

Sadat's Reaction

- To Sadat, Syria's opposition was last straw
- “ I am prepared to go to the ends of the earth for peace, even to the Knesset itself
 - In address to Egyptian parliament
 - Had not previously informed U.S. or Israel
- Ross states: “Our focus on Israel tended to blind us to the implications of the inter-Arab rivalry much as it had in previous administrations.” Do you agree?

More Background

- The years following the Yom Kippur War were marked by growing Egyptian public debate over the price being paid in the ongoing conflict with the Zionist state. The argument that gained currency was that, while the struggle was pan-Arab, the sacrifices were mainly being made by Egypt.
- Egypt's educated class was aware of the analyses – disseminated via journals and books in the Arab world – according to which Egypt was highly vulnerable to a nuclear strike. The population's dense concentration in the Nile Valley, its total dependence on the Nile for water, and the huge collection of reservoirs beyond the Aswan Dam, expose Egypt not only to the possibility of harsh blows, but to annihilation.

And Even More

- The Arab public was generally convinced that Israel would be ready to use weapons of mass destruction should it find itself in a desperate situation, and it had little doubt Israel possessed such weapons. Arab experts on Israel explained, via the media, that escalating the confrontation with Israel to the nuclear level could potentially lead to a different outcome from that of escalation of the cold war:
- In the superpower arena, the arms race had already led to a balance of terror and had curbed the powers' willingness to provoke each other, out of concern that someone might "press the button." In the local conflict, however, Israel might fear potential annihilation in the event of an Arab victory, even in a conventional war. It was therefore necessary to assume that Israel would not be deterred from escalation, even to the nuclear level.

Sadat's Thoughts

- Weizman related that on the first evening of Sadat's historic November 1977 visit to Israel, the Egyptian president himself mentioned to Weizman that Israel's nuclear capability was one of the factors behind his decision to make peace with Israel.
- . Awareness was dawning among some Arab leaders that Israel must not be pushed against a wall and induced – in desperation and perhaps against its will – to use nuclear arms.
- Yadin asked Sadat: “Why, in the early days of the Yom Kippur War, didn't you proceed toward the Sinai passes?” Sadat's answer, according to Peres, was: “You have nuclear arms. Haven't you heard?”

Israeli Reaction

- Begin extends invitation
 - First verbal
 - Than official through U.S. embassy
- But there were “concerns”:
 - Chief of Staff says this might be a cover for war
 - Deputy PM suggests a partial mobilization
 - Defense minister Weizman publicly reprimands Gur & Yadin

Sadat's Intention

- Break down the psychological barrier that made up a large part of the Arab-Israeli conflict
- Shlaim says he succeeded brilliantly
- Coined the slogan “No More War”
- Arrives in Israel Saturday 11/19—*after Shabbat*
- Speaks to the Knesset on Sunday where he receives prolonged applause.
- Calls for an overall peace – in order to satisfy Arab world
- Visits Haifa where he is amazed & touched to find Jewish & Arab citizens intermingling as they lined the streets to welcome him

But

- Overall peace based on justice would involve full Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders
- And the right of the Palestinians to their own state
- In addition , he acknowledged Israel's right to exist
 - As a sovereign state
 - With recognition by Arab states
 - And a guarantee of security

However

- Begin's speech that followed Sadat's was not optimistic
- But in a private meeting that night, according to Dayan, they agreed to:
 - No more war between the 2 countries
 - Egypt's full sovereignty over Sinai
 - Demilitarization of Sinai except for limited Egyptian forces next to the Suez Canal
- Joint statement after meeting mentions none of this except "No more war"

Detailed Negotiations

- Dayan's paper
 - Full peace treaty between 2 countries
 - Complete normalization between them
 - Treaty concluded quickly
 - Not conditional upon peace treaties with other Arab countries
- But Sadat wanted:
 - Resolution of conflict with all Arab states
 - Including Palestinian right of national Self Determination
 - Egyptian claim to all of Sinai
 - Not a unilateral agreement
- Sadat convenes a conference in Cairo on 12/14/77
 - No Arab States attend
 - Only Egypt, Israel, U.S. & U.N.

Results of Conference

- Agreement was not reached on a single issue
- Dayan says; “Both sides knew they were only going through the motions of conferring , and the game they were playing was like a dialogue between two deaf people who could not yet lip read.”
- But at another conference of rejectionist states in Tripoli
 - Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and Libya denounced Sadat for “grand treason”
 - These states were then joined by the PLO in declaring an economic and diplomatic boycott of Egypt

Begin's Plan

- Palestinian autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza
- Nonterritorial
- Autonomy applies to the people who lived on the land , not to the land
- Based on Jabotinsky's recognition that rights had to be conceded to the Palestinian Arabs after erection of an "iron wall"

Begin's Principles

- No sovereignty on the West Bank
- Neither party had to renounce their claims
 - It kicked the can down the road
- Begin's aims
 - Preservation of the homeland
 - Peace

So What was the Plan?

- 26 Articles
- Abolition of Israeli Military Government on West Bank
- Election of 11 member Palestinian administrative council
- With Authority over all civil matters
- Security & public order were Israel's responsibility
- Arab West Bank residents would be given a choice between Israeli or Jordanian citizenship, which would determine where they would vote
- Joint committee of Israel, Jordan and the council would review and amend existing legislation

BUT

- “Israel stands by its right of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open” article 24
- What do you think?

Mr. Begin Goes to Washington

- And then London to gain international legitimacy for the plan
- Begin felt if Carter accepted the proposals it would be harder for Sadat to turn them down
- But Carter has reservations about the plan
- Even though at a press conference Begin comes close to saying Carter endorsed plan,
- But Washington says it's for Arabs and Israeli's to decide

Internal Israeli Disagreement

Jerusalem. But there were serious differences between Weizman and the other ministers, especially Dayan, on the extent to which Sadat considered himself bound to a solution of the Palestinian problem. Weizman argued that the faster they understood Sadat's problems and responded to his demands, the less would be required to satisfy him. In the deliberations that preceded the trip to Ismailia, Weizman took the view that all Sadat wanted on the Palestinian issue was a general declaration of principles, which would scarcely be binding on anyone. "He wants a fig leaf," Weizman repeated over and over again. "If we don't give it to him now, the Palestinian problem will become a branch, and then it will grow into a tree." The other ministers may have enjoyed Weizman's botanical imagery, but they did not heed his advice. Dayan contended that Sadat would want something far more concrete. Weizman thought that Sadat would be satisfied with an autonomy scheme, provided it was proper autonomy. But Weizman did not regard the scheme they were proposing as proper autonomy: "By the restrictions and qualifications they had imposed, Begin and the others had reduced the autonomy plan to a caricature of genuine self-rule."¹⁸

December Timeline

- 12/14/77- Cairo conference where only Egypt, U.S., Israel and U.N. are only attendees
- 12/16/77- Begin Meets with Carter to discuss his plan and then goes to London
- 12/22/77-Israeli cabinet meeting to discuss Begin's plan
- 12/25/77-Meeting with Sadat to discuss plan
- 12/28/77- Speech and debate in Knessett.

Begin's Autonomy Plan

Self-rule for Palestinian Arabs, Residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District, which will be instituted upon the Establishment of Peace:

1. The administration of the military government in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be abolished.
2. In Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district administrative autonomy of the residents, by and for them, will be established.
3. The residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will elect an Administrative Council composed of 11 members. The Administrative Council will operate in accordance with the principles laid down in this paper.
4. Any resident 18 years old or over, without distinction of citizenship, including stateless residents, is entitled to vote in the elections to the Administrative Council.
5. Any resident whose name is included in the list of candidates for the Administrative Council and who, on the day the list is submitted, is 25 years old or over, is eligible to be elected to the council.
6. The Administrative Council will be elected by general, direct, personal, equal, and secret ballot.
7. The period of office of the Administrative Council will be four years from the day of its election.
8. The Administrative Council will sit in Bethlehem.
9. All the administrative affairs relating to the Arab residents of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be under the direction and within the competence of the Administrative Council.

Begin's Autonomy Plan

10. The Administrative Council will operate the following departments: education; religious affairs; finance; transportation; construction and housing; industry, commerce, and tourism; agriculture; health; labour and social welfare; rehabilitation of refugees; and the department for the administration of justice and the supervision of the local police forces. It will also promulgate regulations relating to the operation of these departments.
11. Security and public order in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be the responsibility of the Israeli authorities.
12. The Administrative Council will elect its own chairman.
13. The first session of the Administrative Council will be convened 30 days after the publication of the election results.
14. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, without distinction of citizenship, including stateless residents, will be granted free choice of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship.
15. A resident of the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who requests Israeli citizenship will be granted such citizenship in accordance with the citizenship law of the state.
16. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who, in accordance with the right of free option, choose Israeli citizenship, will be entitled to vote for, and be elected to, the Knesset in accordance with the election law.
17. Residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district who are citizens of Jordan or who, in accordance with the right of free option, become citizens of Jordan, will elect and be eligible for election to the Parliament of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in accordance with the election law of that country.
18. Questions arising from the vote to the Jordanian Parliament by residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be clarified in negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

Begin's Autonomy Plan

19. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the Administrative Council to examine existing legislation in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district; and to determine which legislation will continue in force, which will be abolished, and what will be the competence of the Administrative Council to promulgate regulations. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.

20. Residents of Israel will be entitled to acquire land and settle in the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Arabs, residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district, who, in accordance with the free option granted them, become Israeli citizens, will be entitled to acquire land and settle in Israel.

21. A committee will be established of representatives of Israel, Jordan, and the Administrative Council to determine norms of immigration to the areas of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. The committee will determine the norms whereby Arab refugees residing outside Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be permitted to immigrate to these areas in reasonable numbers. The rulings of the committee will be adopted by unanimous decision.

22. Residents of Israel and residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured freedom of movement and freedom of economic activity in Israel, Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district.

23. The Administrative Council will appoint one of its members to represent the council before the government of Israel for deliberation on matters of common interest, and one of its members to represent the council before the government of Jordan for deliberation on matters of common interest.

24. Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open.

25. With regard to the administration of the holy places of the three religions in Jerusalem, a special proposal will be drawn up and submitted that will include the guarantee of freedom of access to members of all faiths to the shrines holy to them.

26. These principles will be subject to review after a five-year period.

Begin's Speech to the Knesset

- We do not even dream of the possibility---if we are given the chalice to withdraw our military forces from Judea, Samaria and Gaza--of abandoning those areas to the control of the murderous organization that is called the PLO. . . . This is history's meanest murder organization. except for the armed Nazi organizations. It also bragged two days ago about the minder of Hamdi al-Qadi. deputy director of the Education Bureau in Ramallah.
- It is a frightening proposition that someone's solution to the problems in the Middle East might be a single bullet dispatched to the heart of Egyptian President as-Sadat as the PLO's predecessors did at Al-Aqsa Mosque to King Abdallah. One single bullet. No wonder that the Egyptian Government has declared that should such a single shot be fired, Egypt would retaliate with a million shots. We wish to say that under no condition will that organization be allowed to take control over Judea, Samaria and Gaza. If we withdraw our army, this is exactly what would happen. Hence, let it be known that whoever desires an agreement with us should please accept our announcement that the IDF will be deployed in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. And there will also be other security arrangements, so that we can give to all the residents, Jews and Arabs alike, in Eretz Yisrael a secure life that is to say, security for all....
- ... We have a right and a demand for sovereignty over these areas of Eretz Yisrael. This is our land and it belongs to the Jewish nation rightfully. We desire an agreement and peace. We know that there are at least two other demands for sovereignty over these areas. If there is a mutual desire to reach an agreement and to promote peace-what is the way?
- Should these contradictory demands remain, and should there be no answer to the collision course between them, an agreement between the parties would be impossible. And for this reason, in order to facilitate an agreement and make peace, there is only one possible way. One way and no other: to agree to decide that the question of sovereignty remain open and to deal with people, with nations. That is to say, administrative autonomy for the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael; and for the Jews of Eretz Yisrael-genuine security. This is the fairness that is inherent in the content of the proposal. And in that spirit the proposal was also accepted abroad....

Begin's Speech to the Knesset

- The second part - namely, the principles for the settlement of the relations between Egypt and Israel in the context of a peace treaty - are:
- * Demilitarization - The Egyptian army shall not cross the Gidi-Mitla line. Between the Suez Canal and this line the agreement for the thinning out of forces shall remain in force.
- * Jewish settlements shall remain in place. These settlements will be linked with Israel's administration and courts. They will be protected by an Israeli force - and I repeat this sentence for a reason well known to all the members of the House - they will be protected by an Israeli force.
- * A transition period of a number of years, during which IDF forces will be stationed on a defensive line in central Sinai, and airfields and early-warning installations will be maintained, until the withdrawal of our forces to the international boundary.
- * Guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, which will be recognized by both countries in a special declaration as an international waterway which must be open to all passage of all ships under any flag; either by a UN force which cannot be withdrawn except with the agreement of both countries and by unanimous decision of the Security Council, or by joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols.
- Plan approved 64 to 8 with 40 abstentions

Reactions

- Mr. Begin's autonomy plan has been worrying a number of Israelis, including extreme nationalists and some members of the Labor Party opposition. They fear that the idea of civil home rule may lead eventually to establishment of a separate Palestinian state, an idea that many Israelis have long opposed as a security threat.
- In the past, the Labor Party has proposed that any Palestinian state on the West Bank be linked with Jordan in a federation. Similarly, Mr. Dayan has favored what he calls a “functional” plan for the West Bank that includes Jordanian participation.
- During the Cabinet meeting, about 25 members of the extreme-nationalist Gush Emunim, or Faith Bloc, picketed in a driving rain. The Gush Emunim, which has received the staunch backing of Mr. Begin in the past, contends that Jews have an inalienable right to settle on the West Bank because of the territory's association with the Biblical Jewish homeland. The pickets were concerned that Mr. Begin's plan would lead to abandonment of that tenet. New

York Times 12/23/77

Internal Israeli Disagreement

Jerusalem. But there were serious differences between Weizman and the other ministers, especially Dayan, on the extent to which Sadat considered himself bound to a solution of the Palestinian problem. Weizman argued that the faster they understood Sadat's problems and responded to his demands, the less would be required to satisfy him. In the deliberations that preceded the trip to Ismailia, Weizman took the view that all Sadat wanted on the Palestinian issue was a general declaration of principles, which would scarcely be binding on anyone. "He wants a fig leaf," Weizman repeated over and over again. "If we don't give it to him now, the Palestinian problem will become a branch, and then it will grow into a tree." The other ministers may have enjoyed Weizman's botanical imagery, but they did not heed his advice. Dayan contended that Sadat would want something far more concrete. Weizman thought that Sadat would be satisfied with an autonomy scheme, provided it was proper autonomy. But Weizman did not regard the scheme they were proposing as proper autonomy: "By the restrictions and qualifications they had imposed, Begin and the others had reduced the autonomy plan to a caricature of genuine self-rule."¹⁸

Ismalia Summit Not Congenial

- Egyptian incensed by settlements being built in Rafah
- Existing settlements in Sinai not discussed
- Egyptians viewed proposal as a *faits accomplis*
- Egyptians saw Begin as the main obstacle to progress

According to Egyptian Foreign Minister

Begin's stony personality was apparent in every word he uttered and every movement he made. This man, who was a statesman and a diplomat, was bellicose and struck me as a danger to peace and the peace process. On the other hand,

Weizman, who was a great military man, charmed us with his lighthearted style, and his presence eased the atmosphere. Dayan was unpredictable. One moment he would be arrogant and bitter; the next he would propose creative solutions and move the process forward.¹⁹

No Overall Agreement

2 Separate Press Statements

But there was One Agreement

statements were given at the press conference. One read, "The position of Egypt is that a Palestinian State should be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." The other, "The Israeli position is that the Palestinian Arabs residing in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District should enjoy self-rule."²⁰

The only achievement of the Ismailia summit was Sadat's agreement to Begin's proposal to set up two working parties—one for political and civil affairs, the other for military affairs. The political committee was to convene in Jerusalem, with the Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers alternating as chairmen, while the military committee was to meet in Cairo, with the defense ministers alternating as chairmen.

But in Speech to the Knesset

- Mr. Speaker, that was a successful meeting. Its success came with its opening. We held a personal talk, President Sadat and myself; and within the first five minutes of that talk, the decisive result was attained: continuation of the negotiations between the two countries for the signing of a peace treaty - as was decided, instead of the expression "peace agreement," in the meeting between the two delegations in Ismailiya.
- It may be said that at the Ismailiya meeting the two sides also agreed on a joint declaration. But its publication was prevented because the two delegations did not arrive at an agreed and, joint formula for the problem which we term -and justly so - the question of the Palestinian Arabs, while the Egyptians call it, in their terminology - and it is their right to use their terminology - the question of the Palestinian people. We tried, we made an effort, to arrive at a joint formula; but it emerged that we could not accept one or another wording - whether proposed to the Egyptian delegation by us, or whether proposed to the Israeli delegation by the Egyptians. On Sunday, between 10 and 10.30 p.m., we therefore postponed the meeting until Monday morning, on the assumption that, with an effort by both sides, a way out would be found. And, indeed, it was found.

Carter in Iran

gotiate starting in mid-January 1978. Prior to those meetings, Carter flew to Iran to see the shah; he stopped in Saudi Arabia to talk about oil production and pricing decisions—as well as the peace issue—and then saw Sadat briefly in Aswan as his plane refueled on its way back to Washington.

The shah was strongly supportive of Sadat's initiative but told Carter not to expect any backing from the Saudis. He proved prophetic. Carter, nonetheless, sang the Saudis' praises in the pages of his diary: "Although sometimes they make public statements of concern, their private commitment is absolute to what Sadat is attempting to do. They're deeply worried about a possible conflict in the Middle East that might spill over into Saudi Arabia, strongly anti-Communist, and eager to accommodate us on almost anything I request."⁵⁶ That, unfortunately, did not prove prophetic.

Then to Egypt

After seeing Sadat, Carter in his diary refers to his “strong friendship” with the Egyptian leader and reflects his view that “Sadat and I have no differences between us. Now the main problem is the Palestinian question. We agreed with the Arab position: that Israel ought to withdraw completely from the occupied territories with minor adjustments in the western part, that there should be self-determination of the Palestinians short of an independent nation, and genuine peaceful relations between Israel and each of her neighbors.”⁵⁷ The last point of “genuine peaceful relations” might have been Sadat’s position, but it was not the Arab position at the time.

At the conclusion of their meeting, Carter, seeking to publicly shore up Sadat’s position and give a direction to the Egyptian-Israeli talks, laid out three principles: true peace required normal relations between the parties; withdrawal must be from the territories occupied in 1967 to secure and recognized borders; and the Palestinian problem needed to be resolved in all its aspects, requiring recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their participation in the determination of their own future.⁵⁸

The Israelis were not consulted on this language, and they saw a clear U.S. effort to lean forward on the Palestinians. The words did not include “self-determination,” but they were meant to get as close to that meaning as possible.

Carter Mindset

policy adviser at the White House, if he could elucidate. Eizenstat, who is Jewish, offered an interesting explanation. According to him, Carter came to the issue of the Middle East with few preconceived ideas. He was, in Eizenstat's words, heavily influenced by Brzezinski, whose attitudes toward Israel were clear. He considered Israel largely an impediment to U.S. interests in the region; we needed to cultivate the Saudis, we needed to compete with the Soviets, and the Israelis made those objectives difficult. Peace was necessary to cement our relations with the Arabs and deny the Soviets a role—and Israel would make peace only if it was forced to do so by U.S. pressure. Vance and those key aides working on the issue—Saunders, Alfred Ather-ton, and Quandt—might have been a little softer in their approach to the Israelis, but basically they shared those attitudes. There was, according to Eizenstat, no one on the national security side whose views toward the area were different.

BUT

rate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.¹⁰⁸ Even though Brzezinski had feared that a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement would alienate the other Arabs, it obviously had very little effect on the Saudis' perception of their need for a relationship with us. Once again, their own needs, their own priorities on security, trumped other considerations.

In truth, we needed each other. We wanted the Saudis to increase oil production to reduce the surge in prices, and they needed us to ensure their security. But we acted as if we needed them and they did not need us. Schlesinger would say that Carter did not know how to deal with the Saudis, lamenting that we would ask for Saudi permission to fill our Strategic Petroleum Reserve instead of simply doing it. He quoted a "high-level Saudi" who came to see him and asked, "Can't you get your government never to ask us [for] permission in the kingdom? We are a little country, we are weak, we are dependent on you for our survival, the great power of the free world, and when you . . . ask us permission to do something that you can do . . . we get alarmed about our security."¹⁰⁹

• This mind-set was alien to Carter and those around him. Pressing the

Israel's nation-state law



Israel is the historic homeland of the Jewish people, who have the unique right of national self-determination



The flag and the menorah are national symbols The national anthem is 'Hatikva'



Jerusalem is the united capital of Israel



Official language is Hebrew. Arabic has special status



Israel will be open to Jewish aliyah



Israel will work in the Diaspora to preserve the affinity between Israel and Jewish people



Israel will ensure the safety of the Jewish people and work to preserve the cultural, historical and religious heritage of Jews in the Diaspora



The state places national value on development of Jewish settlement and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation



The Hebrew calendar is the official calendar of the state. The Gregorian calendar will also have official status



Independence Day is an official national holiday. Holocaust Remembrance Day and Memorial Day are official remembrance days



The Sabbath and Israeli holidays are days of rest. Non-Jews have a right to days of rest on their holidays



Changes to the law can only be made with a Basic Law passed by a majority of Knesset members

Declaration Of Independence

- THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
- WE APPEAL - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.

Same Sex Marriage in Israel

- Israel became the first country in Asia to recognize unregistered cohabitation between same-sex couples, making it the first country in Asia to recognize any same-sex union.
- Although same-sex marriages are not performed in the country, Israel recognizes same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. (Sort of)
- According to Supreme Court case homosexual couples married abroad can be registered as married (and their identity cards will so state), but it is up to Knesset to decide if they are recognized as married.
- Spousal benefits to same sex couples include: taxation, inheritance, property tax transfers, pension benefits, medical rights, national insurance and adoption.
- Jews in same sex relationships married abroad wishing to immigrate to Israel can do so-even if their partners are not Jewish – and both them and their partners will receive Israeli citizenship.

LGBT Rights in Israel

- Discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was prohibited in 1992 (including the military)
- This prohibition of discrimination supersedes any argument of inability to provide the service on religious grounds. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that a banquet hall managed by religious parties is not allowed not to provide services to lesbian couples.
- But new legislation loosened surrogacy regulations in Israel, giving single women and women unable to become pregnant for medical reasons the right to apply for state support for surrogacy. An additional clause that would have granted the same rights to single fathers – and, by extension, gay couples – was nixed.

Druze

- Arabic ethno-religious group that self identify as unitarians
- The Druze faith is a monotheistic and Abrahamic religion based on the teachings of high Islamic figures and Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle.
- The Druze faith incorporates elements of Islam, Gnosticism, Neoplatonism, Pythagoreanism, Hinduism and other philosophies and beliefs, creating a distinct and secretive theology known to interpret esoterically religious scriptures, and to highlight the role of the mind and truthfulness. The Druze follow theophany, and believe in reincarnation.
- Egypt views them as Muslims

So

- Political Committee meets 1/17/78 in Jerusalem and gets no where because Begin in a dinner speech says:

“The foreign minister of Egypt was still very young when the Holocaust was inflicted on the Jews by the Nazis, so he does not realize how badly they needed the return to the safety of their historical home.” His tone then became more truculent: “The Arabs have enjoyed self-determination in twenty-one Arab countries for a very long time. Is it too much for Israel to have one country among twenty-one? NO, I declare in my loudest voice, NO to withdrawal to the 1967 lines, NO to self-determination for the terrorists.”²¹ Later that night Kamel called Sadat and reported that

- Ross says real reason was that Sadat thought the Israelis were haggling over details instead of dealing with the big issues

But In Cairo

... from Cairo and return home. The military committee continued its discussions in Cairo under the leadership of Ezer Weizman and his opposite number, General Abdel Ghani Gamassi. The atmosphere in Cairo was much more calm and cordial than that in Jerusalem. Weizman established warm personal relations with the Egyptian leaders, especially with Sadat. But no real progress could be made after the political negotiations had been suspended. The committees represented the last serious attempt at bilateral negotiations between Egypt and Israel. The Americans subsequently had to step in to prevent the collapse of Sadat's peace initiative.

And Smith's View

Both Sadat and Begin wanted a peace agreement to justify their diametrically opposed stances on the fate of the West Bank Palestinians. Sadat demanded references in the agreement to Israeli recognition of Palestinian rights to self-rule; Begin sought clauses that would guarantee continued Israeli control of the West Bank, ensuring denial of any semblance of an independent Palestinian entity. The potential for stalemate emerged soon after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. On January 18, 1978, he summarily recalled his negotiating team from that city.

And Smith Continues

During their exchanges, the Egyptians had been angered by Begin's continued references to Palestinians and, by inference, other Arabs, as Nazis. In addition, the Begin cabinet had approved a proposal by Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon to create dummy settlements in the Sinai beyond those already in place west of Gaza. Sharon's aim, accepted by Begin and Dayan, was either to gain more land in the Sinai or to bargain with Sadat by openly abandoning these fake encampments in order to keep the existing Jewish communities. Begin also proposed retaining rights to the oil fields in the Sinai and the air bases built there, even if the Sinai was returned to Egypt. These latter proposals could be seen as bargaining tactics, but the new settlements appeared to be a ploy to gain more land, arousing intense Egyptian hostility which in turn angered the Israelis.

Sadat & Begin go to Washington Separately

- Carter sympathetic to Sadat's exasperation with Begin's "hard line"
- Sadat arouses sympathy with the American public and even some Jewish leaders

Apart from conflating what Begin and Dayan said—and turning Dayan's willingness to make a recommendation on the settlements into a sacred promise—Carter's preoccupation with the settlement issue is unmistakable. When Sadat came in February, Carter wanted him to focus on the settlements in his public statements while he was here. Sadat, however, arrived with something very different in mind. He told Carter that he had offered the Israelis what they had always wanted—"direct negotiations with Arab leaders, recognition as a permanent entity in the Middle East, and to live in peace"—and he wanted to announce upon leaving Camp David that he was ending the talks due to Israeli intransigence. But Carter did not want the process to end after their meeting. Instead, along with Brzezinski and Vance, he persuaded Sadat to embrace a strategy that would end with the U.S. offering a peace plan.⁶²

Shlaim's Analysis

bruary to see what could be done. In the days prior to Sadat's arrival, Carter's diary has four entries on Israel, and every one of them is focused on settlements. He describes a meeting with congressional leaders and their growing support for the Arabs because of the Israeli "insistence on the illegal settlements." And then on three successive days—January 30 and 31, and February 1—he speaks of Begin "breaking his word of honor to me that no new settlements would be permitted in the West Bank." He was "concerned by the Israeli settlements," as his "word of honor is at stake with the Arabs." He noted, "We reviewed the transcripts of my meeting with Dayan, and it was very clear that Dayan said that at the end of a year there would be no more than six settlements, all of which would be within military boundaries."⁶¹

Sadat & Carter Meet

The essence of the strategy was for Sadat to come out with an Egyptian proposal with some manifestly unacceptable items in it to the Israelis, and

then “have the United States step forth with a more moderate compromise solution.” Sadat had long wanted us to present a plan, so he was keen on such an approach. It became more refined in the discussions at Camp David, with Brzezinski spelling out a six-point strategy that would lead to our presenting our plan by the end of March or early April.⁶³

William Quandt, Brzezinski’s aide, described the plan as depending on Sadat making a fairly tough proposal so we could be seen as arguing with both sides before presenting a compromise—this, Quandt said, “would help protect Carter’s flank at home, since one-sided pressure on Israel could not easily be sustained.”⁶⁴ Notwithstanding the Ford-Rabin letter of 1975, the Carter administration was not consulting with the Israelis before presenting a peace initiative; on the contrary, it was colluding with President Sadat both because it trusted his commitment to peace and feared for his political survival if his initiative failed. And, unlike Sadat, Begin was perceived to be unwilling to take the steps necessary for peace

The Strategy

...appears that Carter was being more pro-Arab than Sadat himself.”⁶⁵ However, the bigger impediment to the plan was the administration’s decision to seek congressional approval for the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia and to Israel, and F-5s to Egypt. The administration basically hoped by making it a package deal—Israel would get F-15s provided the Saudis and Egyptians got their planes as well—they would defuse the opposition in the Congress.

But Carter and his team in the White House misjudged Congress’s reaction and were quickly embroiled in a deep controversy over the planes for the Saudis. It would take them until May 15, 1978, to gain congressional approval of the sale, and that sidetracked them from the plan worked

Why Not?

If peace was the preoccupation, why would the administration announce the sale on February 14, immediately on the heels of working out a plan with Sadat? The answer, as Brzezinski explains, is that the Saudis were insisting. The Saudis' priority was F-15s and their security, not peace or Carter's requests—and we were going to be responsive to Saudi Arabia. Though the need to gain consensus...

Begins Trip Delayed

- But Palestinian terrorists kill 35 bus passengers & wound 71 others on 3/11/78
- IDF invades southern Lebanon, but instead of killing the PLO terrorists the civilian population bore the brunt of the invasion
- U.S regarded this as an overreaction
- U.S. also sponsored a Security Council resolution demanding Israeli withdrawal & creation of a U.N. force in Lebanon to monitor the area Israel would vacate

Carter Diary

Carter, of course, could not know that UNIFIL would be ineffectual. But his special revulsion over the Israeli attack into Lebanon—less so the PLO terror attack into Israel—is unmistakable. His diary entries on March 16 and 21 reveal his views: “I notified the Israelis that we would introduce a resolution in the United Nations calling for their withdrawal, and for UN forces to keep the peace in Lebanon. They’re using our equipment illegally to invade a foreign country.” He continued: “The response was excellent regarding our resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon . . . The Israelis did their best to prevent our sponsorship of the resolution. They grossly overreacted in Lebanon to the terrorist attack on some Israeli citizens, destroying hundreds of villages, killing many people, and making two hundred thousand Lebanese homeless.”⁶⁸

Carter's Diary

Carter's dismissing the terrorist assault as an attack "on some Israeli citizens" shows no understanding of the impact on the Israeli public, or of the enormous pressure on Begin to respond in a way designed to prevent future such attacks. This was at a time when he was trying to press Israel to be far more forthcoming on the Palestinians for Sadat. He was aware of Israeli security needs in the abstract, even noting in a diary entry ten days earlier that it might be "necessary to offer a United States-Israel security treaty to get them to be more flexible on peace."⁶⁹ But his seeming indifference to Israeli casualties was bound to limit the appeal of such offers. Why would the Israelis think that Carter would understand or agree on what they would see as a threat? Indeed, Carter's indifference to Israeli casualties is reflected in another diary entry on November 10, 1977, when he railed against Israeli retaliation over what he referred to as an attack on "some small Israeli village." In this instance, there were three Israelis killed and three wounded in Nahariya—an event that dominated the news in Israel but did not merit mention of Israeli casualties for Carter.

Carer Begin Meet

Previously he had been full of hope, but now he berated Begin for refusing to give up the settlements in Sinai, for refusing to yield political control over the West Bank, and for refusing to give the Palestinians the right to choose, after a five-year period, between joining Jordan, joining Israel, or continuing the status quo. “Though Carter spoke in a dull monotone, there was fury in his cold blue eyes, and his glance was dagger-sharp,” recalled Dayan. “His portrayal of our position was basically correct, but it could not have been expressed in a more hostile form.”²⁴ Begin later admitted to his aides that this was one of the most difficult moments of his life. He returned home in a state of shock, with American accusations ringing in his ears.

July Foreign Ministers Meeting

The meeting of foreign ministers took place in mid-July at Leeds castle in the U.K. Vance and Carter's descriptions of this meeting vary widely. Vance felt that the informal discussion between Dayan and Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel—the Israeli and Egyptian foreign ministers—on the practical arrangements for an interim period of Palestinian self-rule was useful, with Kamel suggesting that the Israelis should negotiate the final outcome with those Palestinians elected in the territories.⁷⁶ By contrast, Carter wrote in his diary, “Cy sent me a report on the meeting in Leeds, where the Israelis

again insisted they would keep the west bank. kamal got emotional about Israeli intransigence.”

Vance Invites Begin & Sdat to Summit in U.S.

mands at Camp David. Sadat urged that Begin and he be empowered not only to discuss but also to take on-the-spot decisions in the name of their governments and that each bring with him his trusted advisers.

Begin, too, accepted the invitation without setting any preconditions. Although he was still under strong attack from the hard-liners in his party for making too many concessions, the mood in the country had shifted in the opposite direction as a result of Sadat's success in breaking down the famous psychological barrier. In early March a group of some 350 reserve officers signed an open letter urging the prime minister to change his priorities and to accept an exchange of territories for peace. In the wake of this letter a new movement emerged that called itself Peace Now. It organized mass demonstrations and rallies to entreat the government not to miss the chance for peace, and it won the endorsement of thirty Knesset members from six parties. The Camp David summit opened on 5 September. On the eve of the departure of the Israeli delegation, Peace Now organized a demonstration in the central square in Tel Aviv with about 100,000 participants. It was the largest political demonstration in Israel's history and a remarkable display of popular yearning for peace.

Camp David

The Camp David summit meeting lasted thirteen days, starting on 5 September 1978 and ending on 17 September. It proved the decisive, most difficult and least pleasant stage in the Egypt-Israel peace negotiations. The differences between the stands taken by Carter, Sadat and Begin were abundant and wide and basic, and all three parties had to resolve agonizing psychological and ideological crises in order to reach an agreed arrangement. It meant abandoning long-held traditional viewpoints and outlooks and taking up new positions.

Begin's Red Lines at Camp David

- Overriding vision-a peace that guaranteed his vision of a Greater Israel
- No compromise on Jerusalem
- Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank
- No full withdrawal from Sinai without peace with Egypt

Dayan's Diary

The deliberations were marked by sharp and often bitter arguments between us and the Egyptians, and even more so with the Americans. To my regret, even the discussions within our own Israeli delegation were not always tranquil. There were times when only by clenching teeth and fists could I stop myself from exploding. No one disputed Begin's right, as Prime Minister and head of our delegation, to be the final and authorized arbiter of Israel's position in all matters under review. But none of us was disposed to accept, as though they were the Sinai Tablets, those of his views which seemed to us extreme and unreasonable. We were not always at odds, and indeed, on most issues we held identical opinions. But on those occasions when I disagreed with him and questioned his proposals, he got angry, and would dismiss any suggestion that did not appeal to him as likely to cause inestimable harm to Israel.²⁶

Shlaim Commentary

NOT READY !!!

On the Israeli side Begin was obstinate, while his delegation was flexible and even indulgent. The pattern of negotiations on the Egyptian side was the reverse: Sadat was flexible, while his delegation was rigid, and he used this as leverage when confronting the Americans and Israelis. The strangest member of the Egyptian delegation was Hassan Tuhami, Sadat's astrologer, court jester, holy man, and morale booster. A former army officer, Tuhami turned into a religious mystic, believing that in dreams he received instructions directly from the Prophet. He saw himself as a sort of Egyptian Saladin, with a special mission to recover Jerusalem and defend Islam. Sadat was at ease with him and enjoyed his company, but the other Egyptian officials thought he was mad. Tuhami distributed pieces of ambergris to his colleagues, telling them to dissolve it in their tea, for it would give them the stamina to confront the Israelis. Some of them used this smelly substance from the bowels of the sperm whale, but Boutros Boutros-Ghali declined the offer.

Camp David Negotiations

presented a counterproposal, but the two other players rejected it. Carter applied intense pressure on Begin to moderate his position at every stage in the negotiations. He left no room for doubt that if the summit failed, Begin would get the blame, with catastrophic consequences for U.S.-Israel relations. Sadat also came under strong pressure—from Carter to show more flexibility and from his advisers to stand his ground. Muhammad Ibrahim Kamel resigned at Camp David because he felt that Sadat surrendered on all the essential points relating to the West Bank and Gaza, leaving Egypt isolated in the Arab world. Kamel was

Main Stumbling Blocks

The two main stumbling blocks in the negotiations were the Israeli settlements in Sinai and Jerusalem. Begin dearly wanted to keep the settlements, including Neot Sinai, where he planned to retire. But the Egyptians were adamant on recovering every square foot of their land, and Begin eventually gave in. The concession was made easier by a telephone call from Ariel Sharon in which the hawkish former general assured the prime minister, at the request of the defense minister, that the evacuation of all the Sinai settlements and bases would not involve unmanageable security risks.

Jerusalem Resolution

East Jerusalem with the West Bank. Begin insisted that unified Jerusalem was the eternal capital of Israel. On 17 September, the last day of the conference, the crisis reached its climax with the Egyptian delegation packing its bags to return home. The crisis was settled at the last minute by an exchange of letters. Sadat and Begin gave letters to Carter presenting their position on Jerusalem while Carter gave Sadat a letter confirming that the United States continued to oppose the annexation of East Jerusalem to Israel.

More Carter Pressure

- Haaretz columnist Yoel Marcus wrote later that, during the Camp David talks, President Jimmy Carter pressured the Israelis with the following threat: “If you don’t sign, you won’t have Dimona.” In effect, Carter was threatening to withdraw U.S. support of Israel’s nuclear posture, which had been granted by President Richard Nixon in 1969, if Prime Minister Menachem Begin refused to sign the agreement.

Signed

The Camp David Accords were signed in an impressive ceremony in the White House on 17 September 1978. The two accords were entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt." The former stated in its preamble, "The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbours is UN Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts." The framework dealt with the West Bank and Gaza and envisaged nothing less than "the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects." Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people were to participate in the negotiations, which were to proceed in three stages. In the first, the ground rules

- So was anything resolved?

The Camp David Accords

“A Framework for Peace in the Middle East” was deliberately ambiguous on many crucial issues in order to make agreement possible. Nevertheless, it contained a number of principles and provisions to which Begin had been firmly opposed in the past. Initially, for example, Begin refused to include the preamble to Resolution 242, because it emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, but in the end he agreed to “Resolution 242 in all its parts.” Each party could interpret this in its own way. The withdrawal of armed forces from the West Bank represented another concession. However, Begin’s greatest departure from the tenets of Revisionist Zionism and from the position of all previous Israeli governments lay in his recognition of “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.” Semantic devices were used to obscure the significance of the change in the Hebrew text of the accord. Thus the English text spoke of the West Bank and Gaza, whereas the Hebrew text spoke of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District. Similarly, the term “Palestinians” appeared in the Hebrew text as “the Arabs of the Land of Israel.” Only the English text of the accord, however, was binding on all the parties.

Three Stages of Future Negotiation For Middle East Peace

- Election and powers of a “self governing authority”
- Once “self governing authority ”established a transitional period of 5 years would begin
 - Israel’s military government and civilian administration would be withdrawn
 - Israel’s armed forces would be withdrawn & remaining forces redeployed into specific security locations
- Not less than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period negotiations would take place to determine the final status of West Bank and Gaza
 - The “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and & their just requirements had to be met”

Smith's Analysis of Palestinian Issue

Here differences of opinion emerged that weakened American credibility in the Arab world. In seeking an accord on the fate of the West Bank and Gaza, Begin had accepted inclusion of the term “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,” because he considered it meaningless in light of the guaranteed Israeli occupation of the region. But he later informed Carter that by “people” he meant the inhabitants of the areas, whereas Carter and Sadat had assumed this meant other Palestinians as well and thus theoretically did not rule out PLO participation. Though left unresolved, Begin’s qualification was later accepted by the Reagan administration, with major implications for American policy in the region.²⁵

What did Begin Give Up?

Aharon Barak, a member of the Israeli delegation who was in the meeting, Begin agreed only to consider a freeze.⁸⁸ On Sunday, Begin conveyed in writing that he agreed to a settlement freeze for ninety days—the time the Egyptian-Israeli framework specified for talks to conclude the bilateral peace treaty. In other words, Begin tied the freeze to the peace treaty, not to the time it would take to negotiate Palestinian autonomy. Carter rejected this draft later that day but proceeded with the White House ceremony with Carter, Begin, and Sadat approving the Camp David Accords that evening. (Begin sent a letter to Carter the next day repeating his commitment to a ninety-day freeze.)

More Smith

In addition, there was the question of Israeli settlements in these areas. Carter had wanted Israel's commitment to freeze implantation of new settlements during the period required to negotiate the autonomy of the areas, which would take at least five years. Carter and other officials believed they had Begin's oral acceptance of this proposal, but Begin then informed Carter in writing that he would accept only a three-month moratorium. This suspension applied to the period envisaged as necessary to conclude the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, not the autonomy talks regarding the West Bank and Gaza. The gap in interpretation resulted from arguments on the final day of the talks that were left unresolved; Begin apparently agreed verbally to the longer moratorium but refused to sign anything. Carter then decided to leave the matter open in order to conclude the talks successfully. He and his aides remained convinced, however, that the context of the original discussion clearly tied Begin's oral agreement to the autonomy negotiations and that he later reneged. With no written document, however, the point remained moot.²⁶

BUT

with ambiguity. Was that the case this time? Carter is adamant that his interpretation is correct, writing, “My notes are clear—that the settlement freeze would continue until all negotiations were completed—and Cy Vance confirms my interpretation.”⁸⁹ Stuart Eizenstat, who was Brzezinski’s counterpart on domestic policy issues in the White House, recounted a conversation he had with Carter in the Oval Office several months after Camp David in which Carter told him that Begin had agreed to a settlement freeze for five years and was now going back on his word. Eizenstat, who typically played no role on national security issues, responded that there “was no way Begin’s politics would permit such a promise.” Carter remained insistent that he was right.⁹⁰

However

Aharon Barak maintains that this was a simple misunderstanding and not willful on either side.⁹¹ Regardless, for Carter it was a breach of faith—and it would color his views of Begin and Israel. He would blame Israel for all the subsequent difficulties in gaining Arab support and turning the Camp David Accords (CDA) into a final Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Again, his diary entries illustrate what he was thinking. On the day after Camp David, he wrote, “It became obvious that Begin was making an ass of himself

with his public statements. Sadat of course was very responsible and moderate.”

“A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt “

- Less complex & convoluted
- Treaty would be concluded within 3 months
- Terms of treaty implemented within 2-3 years after it was signed
- Four Principles
 - Complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai & recognition of Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, only upon approval of Knesset
 - Demilitarization of most of Sinai, with U.N. troops in Sinai to supervise demilitarization
 - Free navigation of Gulf of Suez & Suez Canal
 - Full normalization of relations between Israel & Egypt

And

Begin needed all his skills as a politician and parliamentarian to secure the ratification of the Camp David Accords. He knew that had he sought approval from his own party, he would not have gotten a majority. He therefore refused to hold consultations within his party and arranged a cabinet meeting for 24 September and a Knesset debate to be held the following day, leaving no time to convene a meeting of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The cabinet meeting lasted seven hours. Begin was forthright and forceful in his defense of the accords, turning mercilessly on the critics and the waverers. At the end of the meeting, the cabinet approved Begin's proposal by a large majority. Eleven ministers voted in favor, two against, and one abstained. The religious ministers did not take part in the cabinet vote, because their parties had not had time to formulate their position. The cabinet decision authorized the prime minister to propose to the Knesset a resolution approving the Camp David Accords and authorizing the government to evacuate the Israeli settlers from Sinai.

”

Begin Back In Israel


take place. It was for the Knesset to decide. The leader of the opposition, Shimon Peres, congratulated the prime minister and the government on "the difficult, awesome, but vital decision they had taken to secure peace at a price which had been thought impossible for this government." Peres appealed to his followers to support the agreement as the best current hope for peace. Voting against the government, he said, would be interpreted as spurning the outstretched Egyptian hand as well as America's friendly advice.

In The Knesset

All 120 members of the Knesset voted at the end of a debate that lasted seventeen hours. The result was 84 in favor of the government motion, 19 against, and 17 abstentions. Most Labor members voted for the motion, and without their support the motion would probably have been defeated. Most of the members who opposed the motion, or who abstained, came from the Likud and from the National Religious Party. Of the 84 affirmative votes, only 46 came from the ranks of the coalition, and only 29 from the Likud's 43 members. Prominent members of the Likud abstained in the vote, such as Yitzhak Shamir, the Speaker of the Knesset, and Moshe Arens, the chairman of its Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. With the Knesset vote, the Camp David agreement went into force. In the country at large, support for the agreement was greater and more enthusiastic than in the Knesset. A public opinion poll showed that 82 percent of those questioned were in favor of the agreement.

The Result

Egyptian national pride and Israeli arrogance compounded the difficulty of reaching agreement. Some of the Israeli negotiators were mindful of the need not to give the impression of dictating a victor's terms. Others, however, behaved as though, since they were conceding Sinai, it was up to the Egyptians to yield on all other points. But the Egyptians were not overwhelmed by a sense of gratitude for this Israeli concession. They took the view that Sinai was Egyptian soil, that Israel had taken it by force, and that it was up to Israel to return it in exchange for peace. Furthermore, the Egyptians did not feel that they had come to the negotiating chamber as a defeated nation. For them the October 1973 war was a source of great national pride: they had broken through the Bar-Lev line, crossed to the eastern side of the Suez Canal, and successfully engaged the IDF in battle. The fact that the IDF later turned the tables on them did not change this perception. Indeed, they saw Israel's earlier withdrawals in Sinai, in 1974 and 1975, as political achievements flowing from their military success.²⁹



- Israel after 1973 (Yom Kippur War)

Begin's Feelings

- What forced Begin into Accords?
 - American Pressure?
- Did he regret it?
 - Dayan & Weizman say yes.
 - Arye Naor, Ben Gurion's Cabinet Secretary, says no.
- Did he violate his redlines?
- According to Shlaim “ Begin believed that, in signing the Camp David Accords, he achieved for Israel the two fixed aims of his policy-peace and integrity of the homeland”

Some Results

- Nobel Peace Prize for Begin & Sadat
- Meir says Begin deserved an Oscar not a Nobel
- Sadat reviled in Arab world
- Sadat does not attend; son-in law accepts on his behalf
- Arab Summit Arab League in Baghdad in 1978 ostracizes & expels Egypt
 - Closed headquarters in Cairo
 - Egyptian students expelled from other Arab schools
 - Confirms PLO sole representative of Palestinian people
- Neither Jordan nor PLO attend treaty negotiations

3 Main Obstacles

- Egypt had treaties with other Arab states which required Egypt to join them should they be at war with Israel
- Linkage between normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel and negotiations on Palestinian autonomy
- Simultaneous establishment of diplomatic relations and the exchange of ambassadors

And

- As mentioned before because of “misunderstanding” Begin began building more settlements on West Bank
- Talks break down in 11/78
- 1/79-Shah toppled
 - Egypt feared a treaty would bring them more into conflict with radicals in Arab world
 - Iranian oil to Israel cut off, so relinquishing oil fields was a problem
- Egyptian & Israeli foreign ministers meet again in Washington On 2/21/79 with no progress

Carter Travels to Egypt and Israel

To reach agreement, Carter assured Begin of several things: he pledged additional military equipment; he guaranteed that if there was any problem with oil supplies from Egypt, we would make sure that the gap would be filled; and he would ask the Congress for substantial financial assistance for Israel, which in the end would be \$3 billion a year for Israel and \$2 billion a year for Egypt.⁹⁶

Treaty Negotiations

The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was a detailed implementation of the principles agreed upon at Camp David. The preamble stated that the treaty was an important step in the search for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East and in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects. Article 1 required Israel to withdraw its armed forces and civilians from Sinai to the international border to allow Egypt to resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the peninsula. Full diplomatic relations were to be established upon completion of the first stage of the Israeli withdrawal. Subsequent articles dealt with security arrangements in Sinai, the stationing of UN forces, freedom of navigation, and the various aspects of normalization. The treaty was accompanied by a memorandum of understanding guaranteeing Israel's oil supplies for the next fifteen years, assuring Israel of American support in the event of violations, and a continuing commitment to be "responsive" to Israel's military and economic requirements. Finally, a joint letter from Sadat and Begin to Carter committed them to start negotiations on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza within a month of the peace treaty's ratification. This was intended to conceal the fact that Sadat agreed to a separate peace with Israel. In the final analysis Begin got what he wanted: a peace agreement with Egypt that stood on its own.

Carter Legacy per Ross

Though Carter could not negotiate Palestinian autonomy in his single term in office, I would mediate in the 1990s on a framework that was largely a legacy of his administration. While he did not actually deliver an agreement—or even negotiations—between the Israelis and Palestinians, he was able to produce an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that served as the basis for the regional order for decades. Notwithstanding the mandated ninety-day period to conclude the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, it would take six months to achieve the agreement. Once again, Carter played a central role, this time traveling to Egypt and Israel and taking a week to finalize the agreement in March 1979.

March 26 1979



Interesting Side Note

* Three months into the hostage crisis in Iran, we were meeting in Israel, and Tsipori offered Israeli help if we undertook any kind of rescue mission into Tehran. He told us that the Israelis had some Farsi-speaking units, and they were prepared to put them at our disposal. Tsipori added that Israel had conducted long-range rescue and special operations missions and what they had learned from these experiences might be of use to us. Marshall checked with Brown on his return and was told that we would not take the Israelis up on their offers. After Desert One, the failed rescue attempt in April 1980, Tsipori, expressing the deep regret over the aborted mission—saying any failed use of American power hurt all of America's friends in the region—offered to conduct a lessons-learned study of the mission to avoid similar failures in the future. Brown also declined this offer.

Aftermath

Egypt was expelled from the Arab League following the conclusion of the peace treaty with Israel. The main charge against Egypt was that it had broken ranks and struck a separate deal with the enemy. This was compounded by the fear that behind the treaty lurked a secret alliance between Israel and Egypt, with the backing of the United States. Conspiracy theorists held that Egypt would be the political leader, Israel the technological leader, and the United States the financial backer, and together this triumvirate could dominate the Middle East.³⁰ Despite widespread Arab hostility, the implementation of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt proceeded smoothly and according to plan. On 26 May 1979 El Arish was returned to Egypt; on 15 November the monastery of Saint Catherine was returned ahead of schedule as a goodwill gesture; and on 25 November the oil fields in Alma were turned over to Egypt. On 26 January 1980 the border between Egypt and Israel was opened, after Israel had retreated to the El Arish–Ras Muhammad line, giving Egypt 80 percent of Sinai. On 26 February diplomatic relations were established, ambassadors were exchanged, and the Israeli flag was raised in the Israeli embassy in Cairo. Considerable progress was also made in establishing normal economic relations, lines of communication by land and air, and tourist facilities.

BUT/And

In monetary terms, the peace treaty cost Israel approximately \$12 billion in abandoned and wasted infrastructure, compensation for the residents of Yamit and other settlements, rebuilding and relocating military bases, and oil to replace the supplies coming from the oil fields found and developed by Israel. But Begin considered all this worthwhile and necessary if it would provide his people with a long period of real peace. When he met with Sadat in Ophira (Sharm el-Sheikh) on 4 June 1981, he told the assembled international media with joy and satisfaction: “The Israeli-Egyptian border is the quietest corner in the world.”

Palestinian Autonomy

- Interior Minister Burg , leader of National Religious party appointed lead negotiator
 - Leader of National Religious Party
 - Saw right to Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria as embedded in scripture
- Why didn't he appoint Dayan?
- Shlaim claims Begin didn't want talks to succeed; Dayan did.

And

Another sign that Begin did not want the autonomy talks to succeed was the change he made to his own plan. He had always held that autonomy should be given to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, not to the territory. But when he drew up his autonomy plan, he suggested that the question of sovereignty remain open. The relevant paragraph read, "Israel stands by its right and its claim to sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District. In the knowledge that other claims exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open." However, after the peace treaty with Egypt was signed, Begin did not wish to repeat this text and proposed to the cabinet a new version. This one read, "At the end of the five-year transitional period, Israel will continue to maintain its claim to the right of sovereignty in the Land of Israel territories—Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District." The new version also stated explicitly that Israel would not agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state.³¹ Dayan knew that the Palestinians could not possibly agree to negotiate on this basis, and he left the whole matter in the hands of Begin and Burg. The last straw for Dayan was the government's decision to expropriate private land on the West Bank to make room for new settlements by the religious zealots of Gush Emunim. On 2 October, Dayan wrote to Begin to tender his resignation from the government. Disagreement with the official line on autonomy and with the manner in which the autonomy negotiations were being conducted was given as the reason for the resignation.

*see
the
text*

So

- Sadat did not realize that only Labor could achieve peace with Palestinians
 - He knowingly helped Begin against Labor at Sharm el Shek by posing with him for pictures that Likud used in their election propaganda
- Yitzhak Shamir appointed Foreign Minister
- Former head of Stern Gang
- Self professed hard liner
- Egypt took this as a signal that Israeli concessions were over
- Weizman resigns in May,1980
- Why?
- In protest against the loss of an opportunity for a comprehensive settlement
- New further right Gov't formed 6/30/81

And

- Begin issues foreign policy guidelines to Knesset that state Israel would assert its claim to sovereignty over all the land west of the Jordan at the end of the transition period
- Contradicts “Framework for Peace” signed at Camp David
- Sadat & Begin meet in Alexandria 8/26/81 to renew Palestinian autonomy talks to no avail
- 9/81 Sadat orders mass arrests of his policies critics
- Sadat assassinated 10/6/81 by Islamic fundamentalist officer at parade commemorating the Egyptian crossing of the Suez during the October War
- “Egyptian disillusionment showed itself in the nearly total absence of public remorse at his death.” Smith
- Dayan dies of Cancer 10 days later
- Mubarak succeeds Sadat and assures Begin that he will carry on his predecessor’s commitments

West Bank Policies in the 1970's

Israel's absorption of the West Bank in 1967 did not signal a change of political direction for the region. Like the Hashemites, Israel pursued the practice of political and social fragmentation by dealing with village leaders individually and seeking to prevent the growth of a collective identity as Palestinians. This reflected the Israelis' perception that they were "the only legitimate collective in the land of Israel [including the West Bank] and therefore all Palestinian claims to communal (economic and political) rights are illegitimate and, by definition, subversive."³³ Economic practices developed that were aimed at subverting West Bank Palestinian interests to those of Israel, but their impact also reflected the government's political tactics.

Economic Effects of Policies

Israeli control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip proved economically beneficial to both parties but on different levels. Arab laborers in Israel received social security benefits, but they also paid income taxes. Customs duties were levied on non-Israeli goods entering the territories, but Israeli-owned industries in the West Bank were allowed to “export” their products to Israel duty free, in contrast to the regulations governing Arab agriculture. In many ways the regions paid for themselves until the 1987 uprising, leading one student of the process to conclude that “two-thirds of military government expenditure on the local population has been covered by revenues collected from the population. . . . There are indications that the territories place no fiscal and monetary burden . . . [and] it may well be that the territories are a net source of revenue to the Israeli Treasury.”³⁸

West Bank Political Tactics in the 1970's

- “Israeli Government forbade the sale of some West Bank produce in Israel & placed quotas on others so they would not compete with Israeli products”
- As did Jordan, so Arab West Bank sales remained at pre-1967 levels.
- Arab labor is infused into Israel which subordinates the West Bank economy & labor force to Israeli needs

Israeli Arabs in the Israeli State

As a rule, Israeli policy toward Israeli Arabs sought to “reinforce the internal fragmentation of the Arab population and its isolation from the Jewish majority.”⁴³ This could be done through land expropriation or the imposition of Jewish settlements among the Arabs, but it could be furthered only by stimulating the development of Jewish sectors at a pace unavailable to the Arab inhabitants. Technically, this did not reflect deliberate governmental decision making but, rather, the process of state development aided by the Jewish National Fund. Thus, most Arab villages did not have basic amenities because these would have to be paid for out of taxes levied on the inhabitants, mostly poor farmers. Consequently, little money was available for such services, whereas the Jewish settlements received nearly free electricity, paved roads, sewage systems, and the like.⁴⁴ These practices isolated Arab regions from the national economy and kept them agricultural and dependent on a Jewish industrial and larger agricultural base unless they could finance their own development, usually an impossibility.⁴⁵


Other Significant Issues in the 1970's

- Major terrorist attacks
 - El Al plane in Zurich attacked
 - Olympic Massacre
 - 5/72-Hijacking of Belgian Sabena airliner forced back to Israel's airport , when 24 passengers killed
 - 5/74 School children taken hostage in Maalot in Galilee , where 22 children lost there lives
 - 3/5/75 Terrorists seized Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv. 8 civilians killed
 - 3/78 Coastal Road Massacre- bus hijacking where 30 passengers killed

Note


- By 1975 terrorist attacks in western countries against Jews and Israeli's ended according to Ronan Bergman.
- Why?
- Gave legitimacy on Israel's targeted killing operations
- Others cite the fact that the PLO obtained international legitimacy when Arafat addressed the U.N. in 1974

BDS Effects GDP Per Capita



Data from World Bank Last updated: Jul 6, 2018

BDS Effect- GDP Growth Rate




BDS o

Operation Litani

- Coastal Road Massacre results in Operation Litani
 - invasion of Lebanon up to the Litani River, carried out by the Israel Defense Forces in 1978. The conflict resulted in the deaths of 1,100–2,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, 20 Israelis, the internal displacement of 100,000 to 250,000 people in Lebanon, and the PLO forces retreating north of the Litani River. It led to the creation of the UNIFIL peacekeeping force and an almost complete Israeli withdrawal



Lebanon Power Balance 1976



- Dark Green – controlled by Syria;
- Purple – controlled by Maronite groups;
- Light Green – controlled by Palestinian militias

Other Significant Issues in the 1970's

- 11/79 Fall of the Shah of Iran/Hostage Crises
- Most daring operation?
- Entebbe- June,1976 (for 8 days)

Hijacking Summary

On Sunday 27 June 1976, Air France flight 139, flying from Tel Aviv to Paris via Athens, was hijacked by four PLO terrorists after leaving Athens. Two of them, a man and a woman, were Germans, members of the Baader-Meinhof urban guerrilla organization; and two of them were Arabs, members of the terrorist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In the aircraft were 256 passengers and 12 crew members. Taking advantage of the lax security arrangements at Athens, the terrorists had succeeded in bringing on board guns and hand grenades. After being hijacked, the aircraft landed for refuelling at Benghazi, Libya, and then continued south, landing at Entebbe in Uganda, where the terrorists were joined by additional Palestinian terrorists and by units of the Ugandan Army, who moved the hostages into the old terminal building at the airport.

Mossad Operation Had Backfired

- “Amin, an ex-boxer and Sergeant in the British Army had seized control of Uganda with the assistance of the Mossad and The Israeli Defense Ministry, which maintained secret ties with the country. In exchange for bribes Amin received in suitcases with double bottoms, he awarded Israel large military and civilian contracts and gave the Mossad a free hand in Uganda.”

Hijackers Demands

Uganda Radio made known on 29 June the demands of the hijackers, which included the handing over of 53 convicted terrorists — 40 held in Israel, six in West Germany, five in Kenya, one in Switzerland and one in France. Meanwhile, the Israelis had been separated from the other passengers and, in the course of the week, the non-Israelis were flown back to France. The Israeli Government was faced with the problem of achieving the release of the Israeli hostages, and a negotiating machinery was set up using intermediaries.

In Israel

- 6/28/76-Chief of Staff Gur issues instructions to prepare for a paratroop drop
- Capture the terminal
- Kill the terrorists and protect the hostages until they can negotiate with Ugandan government to release them
- P.M. Rabin rejects
- General attitude of a military operation was negative
- 6/29/79- at cabinet meeting Rabin states that unless he receives a proposal for a military operation agreed to by General Staff, he would advise the Cabinet to accept the ultimatum of the terrorists

The Plan

- Major General Don Shamron , unbeknownst to General Staff comes up with the basic plan on Wednesday
- Biggest problem was refueling
- Solved initially by deciding to refuel at Entebbe
- Then plan changes to refuel at Nairobi, Kenya
- Presents his plan to General Staff on Thursday
- Peres & Gur approve plan to take place at 3:30 P.M. on Saturday

Kenyan Cooperation?

- No official diplomatic recognition
- But close security links
- Because cooperation between Mossad & Kenyan security forces that stopped PFLP from using hand held SAM's provided by Russia to shoot down an El Al jet at Nairobi en route from South Africa to Tel Aviv
- Mossad had given info to Kenyan internal security police
- All 5 terrorists captured and secretly sent back to Israel where they were tried

Kenyan Negotiation

- Kenyan Attorney General Charles Njonjo Led Kenyan Negotiating team
- Ehud Barak (who was initially to have lead the mission – Not Jonathan Netanyahu) led the Israeli team
- Exact terms were kept secret for 4 decades until release by Kenyan AG

The Discussion

'First and foremost,' said the chief Israeli negotiator (probably Barak), 'we need the option to refuel all our planes at Nairobi Airport tomorrow night if we can't get supplies elsewhere. Secondly we want to put a Boeing 707 with medical facilities, but with El Al livery, on the ground at Nairobi before the operation so that we can set up a field hospital, including an emergency room and an operating theatre. The casualties could be heavy, and we need to be able to treat them as quickly as possible. And lastly, if anything goes wrong and the

planes can't take off from Entebbe, we want your help to arrange an overland evacuation of troops and hostages from Uganda.'

Njonjo glanced at Gethi and Hinga who both nodded. 'I think we can help you,' said Njonjo. 'We'll cordon off a section of the airport for the 707 and the other planes. I'll inform the airport director that you're coming under the guise of El Al. When you know the planes are coming, make sure the El Al representative is in the control tower so there are no misunderstandings. The fewer people who know about this the better.'

Discussions Continue

As for the overland option, they would warn the border guards at Malaba that an Israeli military force might want to cross from Uganda and that they were to let it through. 'We're happy to assist you,' continued Njonjo, 'but you must realize that we can never admit publicly that this meeting took place. It would not make us popular with the others members of the OAU who, as you know, have a strong anti-Israel bias. When we're asked if we knew about your plans in advance, we'll deny any knowledge. We'll simply say that you asked permission to refuel at Nairobi at the last minute, and that we agreed out of humanitarian considerations. The fewer people that know about this the better, which is why I haven't even consulted my Cabinet colleagues.'

And are Finalized

'What about President Kenyatta?' asked the Israeli.

'No, we haven't spoken about this yet. He's not well and should not be bothered. That way he can say with complete honesty that he made no deal.'

'I see,' responded the Israeli. 'Well, thank you, Mr Njonjo, you're doing us a great service. Is there anything we can do for you?'

Njonjo paused, the faint trace of a smile on his lips. 'There is one thing you can do for us. If Amin gets wind of what we've done, he might try a revenge attack. But it will have much less chance of success if you've already destroyed his air force.'

'You mean his MiGs?'

'Yes.'

'I think we can manage that.'

'And if, of course, Amin happens to be at the airport and is killed during the operation, that would be a bonus.'

And

In order not to give rise to any suspicion that a military operation was being planned, all the diplomatic negotiations in France and Uganda continued meanwhile, indicating that Israel would give in to the demands of the terrorists and make the necessary arrangements to meet these demands by Sunday 4 July. It therefore became imperative to release the hostages before this date. This consideration left Saturday night as the last possibility.


Intelligence

- IAF had trained Ugandan Air force had taken pictures of the airport
- Israeli contractor had been involved in building airport
- Home movies showed Idi Amin arrived at the airport in a Black Mercedes accompanied by Land Rovers—which gave rise to the deception used
- Interrogators interviewed non-Jewish passengers that had been released
- Mossad operative posing as wealthy, pampered, English hunter living in a Central African country rented a plane in Kenya and circled the Entebbe airport taking pictures. When he landed he pretended he needed assistance of the air traffic controllers, who willingly shared their impressions of what was happening.


The Plan Comes Together

- Six aircraft involved
 - 4 to land carrying 100 commandos
 - 1st of these was to dovetail behind a scheduled British cargo plane to avoid detection
 - 1 to fly overhead to act as an advanced general staff HQ
 - 1 would include a fully equipped field hospital to land at Nairobi
- Aircraft take off at 3:30 p.m., but Cabinet doesn't approve plan until 4

Based on IDF Confidential Map of Operation Thunderbolt



Based on IDF Confidential Map of Operation Thunderbolt



Results

- 102 hostages rescued
- Four hostages did not survive the rescue attempt.
 - Jean-Jacques Mimouni was killed when he jumped up during the rescue and was shot by a rescuing soldier.
 - Pasco Cohen was shot in the pelvis by Israeli fire and died on the operating table in Nairobi.
 - Ida Boruchovich was shot dead during the rescue but it is less clear whose bullet—Israeli or Arab—took her life.

4th Hostage Death

- Dora Bloch, who began to choke on what has been variously described as a piece of meat or a chicken bone on Friday, July 2. She was taken to the hospital in Kampala for treatment. Saul Rubin documents how Idi Amin called Health Minister Henry Kyemba on Saturday to see how Mrs. Bloch was doing, with an eye towards returning her to the others. Kyemba, hoping to spare her what was looking more and more like a bitter fate with her countrymen, lied, saying that she needed another day for her recovery. By the time that day had elapsed, the rescue had taken place without her. In retribution, Idi Amin had her taken from her bed and shot.

Issue Surrounding Netanyahu's Death

- He shot a Ugandan guard further from the Old Terminal than expected
- Did not kill him
- As Netanyahu jumped from jeep and ran toward the terminal the Uganda guard shot him
- Controversy over whether it was necessary to shoot the Ugandan guard
- Terrorists inside terminal had time to shoot the hostages, but didn't
- But considered a hero and name of operation is changed to Operation Jonatan

Summary

- Five Israeli commandos were wounded and one, unit commander, Yonatan Netanyahu, was killed. All the hijackers, and forty-five Ugandan soldiers were killed,
- and thirty Soviet-built MiG-17s and MiG-21s of Uganda's air force were destroyed.
- Kenyan sources supported Israel, and in the aftermath of the operation, Idi Amin issued orders to retaliate and slaughter several hundred
- And U.N. Security Council made an unsuccessful attempt to condemn Israel
- Britain breaks relations with Uganda, a Commonwealth country-Dora Bloch had dual citizenship

Conflict over Netanyahu's Death

- Muki Betzer regarding key issues in the account of the rescue. Muki's written record is a chapter in his autobiographical *Secret Soldier*. He has also been interviewed extensively over the years. He contends that Yoni's error in firing on the sentries threw off the timing and location of the disembarking and raid. Subsequently, while standing outside of the action, Yoni was shot by a Ugandan sniper firing from the imposing control tower.

Another Version

- the third Netanyahu brother, Dr. Iddo Netanyahu, has written three books to advance an alternative narrative. He interviewed numerous soldiers and made his goal the discrediting of Betzer's account. The Netanyahu account maintains that the sentry scenario was foreseen and planned for. The raid was proceeding as anticipated but Muki hesitated on his way to the terminal. Yoni had to personally run forward, rallying the troops, and was shot, not from the control tower by a Ugandan, but from within the terminal by a terrorist.

Yet Another

- Operation Thunderbolt says Netanyahu was shot by the Ugandan guard Netanyahu initially shot
- Official military accounts have generally retold the version of Betzer, as have most newspaper accounts.
- A new book, *Operation Yonatan in the First Person*, based upon the recollections of soldiers, is very sympathetic to the Netanyahu family position.

And

True to his word, Kissinger arranged for the US Seventh Fleet – including the aircraft carrier USS *Ranger* – to sail towards East Africa, a naval frigate to dock at Mombasa in Kenya, and a US naval patrol aircraft to fly to Nairobi's Embakasi Airport. All these moves were designed to discourage a Ugandan attack on Kenya that had seemed imminent after Idi Amin had sent letters to both the Organization of African Unity and the Security Council of the United Nations, accusing Kenya of allowing Israeli planes to land in Nairobi both before and after the operation, and warning that 'Uganda reserves her right to retaliate in whatever way she can to redress the aggression against her.'

Legacy

- Most Western governments conclude the correct response to hostage taking situation was not to negotiate , but to launch a counter-military strike if possible
- France and the U.S. set up special counter terrorism units
 - Not always successful. U.S. Embassy hostages in Teheran in 4/80
- Ehud Barak, instrumental in planning, and Kenyan negotiations enjoys meteoric rise in his career
- Opened up political avenue avenue for Bibi Netanyahu
- Israeli's view this as one of greatest moments in their history

BUT

Most Israelis are understandably proud of what their soldiers achieved at Entebbe. But are they aware of the raid's long-term political consequences? Did it make peace with the Palestinian Arabs *less* likely because it convinced Israel's political leaders – and populace in general – that their intelligence services and soldiers could deal with any security threat? Did it make it harder for Israeli politicians to push through the compromises required for peace? And does the extreme pride or confidence that comes with military success always end in hubris, as it did for the US Army in Vietnam and Iraq, and for the Israelis in Lebanon in 2006?

<u>Party</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Netanyahu</u>	<u>Gantz</u>
Likud	35	35	
Kahol-Lavan	35		35
Shas	8	8	
UTJ	8	8	
Hadash-Ta'al	6		6
Labor	6		6
Yisrael Beiteinu	5	5	
Right-wing Union	5	5	
Balad-UAL	4		4
Kulanu	4	4	
Meretz	4		4
Hayamin Hehdash	0		
Zehut	0		
Gesher	0		
	120	65	55

Operation Babylon

- 6/7/81 –IAF attack on Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak
- 10/28/80- Cabinet approves Begins proposal for the operation 10-6
- Helped Likud win 6/30/81 election and viewed by critics as electoral stunt.
 - Peres leader of Labor said diplomatic means should have been used
- Begin believed that “Nuclear weapons in Iraqi hands raised... the specter of another Holocaust and the destruction of the State of Israel.” Shlaim
- Begin Doctrine: "On no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against the people of Israel."

Reaction

The attack on the Iraqi reactor was greeted by a chorus of condemnation from many countries, including the United States. President Reagan suspended the delivery of aircraft to Israel and announced that he was considering additional sanctions. Begin responded with a personal letter to Reagan, replete with references to the Holocaust: "A million and a half children were poisoned by the Ziklon gas during the Holocaust. Now Israel's children were about to be poisoned by radioactivity. For two years we have lived in the shadow of the danger awaiting Israel from the nuclear reactor in Iraq. This would have been a new Holocaust. It was prevented by the heroism of our pilots to whom we owe so much."

But

later, in 1991, while at war with Iraq in Operation Desert Storm, the United States essentially recanted. U.S. secretary of defense Dick Cheney gave the Israelis a satellite photograph of the Osirak reactor remnants, on which he wrote:

For General David Ivri, with thanks and appreciation for the outstanding job he did on the Iraqi Nuclear Program in 1981, which made our job much easier in Desert Storm!

Dick Cheney, U.S. Sec. Def.²⁸

Sadat's Reaction

started pacing back and forth on the lawn, like a caged lion. When he eventually broke his silence, it was to say that what mattered to him most was the peace process in the region and that the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor set history back to the point that preceded his peace initiative. His aim had been to break down the psychological barrier and to help Israel acquire the image of a country with which the Arabs could live in peace. Now Israel appeared in its old, arrogant image as an invincible power, as a power with a long arm that could reach the remotest corners of the Arab world. "Once again," said Sadat, "we face the same Israel that is completely oblivious to what happens in the Arab world and to what the Arab world thinks of it."

More Sadat

Sasson breathed a sigh of relief when Sadat asked him to tell Begin that he himself would tenaciously cling to what remained of the peace process. Sadat then stopped in his tracks and, as if addressing Begin directly, said, "*Allah yasmahak, ya Menachem!*"—meaning, "May God forgive you, O Menachem!" He repeated this sentence several times, shaking his head as he did so. Sadat explained to the Israeli ambassador that he had repeatedly told Begin, "Menachem, preserve Egypt's friendship. The Egyptian people will always stand by you if you preserve this friendship. . . . If you win the friendship of the Egyptian people, you will, in the course of time, also gain the understanding of the Arab world. The Egyptian people are a noble and good-natured people and when they confer their friendship on someone, they do not revoke it unless something terrible happens." Sadat complained that the attack on the Iraqi reactor provided the Soviet Union and Syria with ammunition against Egypt and the peace process. The personal blow was a grievous one, he concluded, but more serious was the blow to the peace process.⁶

Gaza flare-up in numbers May 6, 2019

690

rockets launched
from the Strip

240

intercepted
by Iron Dome

320

targets struck
in Gaza


4

Israelis
killed

25

Palestinians
killed

Rockets fired from Gaza photo: Adel Hana / AP



Why Start?

- If Islamic Jihad initiated they may have wanted to stop the peace process
- If Hamas initiated they may have wanted to get more out of peace process
- May have felt Israel would not retaliate and continue to fight because of Israeli Memorial Day, Israeli Independence Day and Eurovision contest

Why Stop?

- Israel told mediators that would continue retaliation regardless of holidays and Eurovision contest
- Ramadan was beginning
- Qatar promised an additional \$480 million in aid to Hamas

Other Issues

- Iron Dome was not effective
- Arab rockets did not go as far as previous rocket attacks (previously hit Tel Aviv)
- A jihadist rocket misfired and killed the pregnant woman and her 14 year old son, not an Israeli rocket as originally reported
- Before Israel retaliated IDF took unusual step of blaming Islamic Jihad--- IDF thinks they have become too powerful
- Qatar has provided Hamas with \$1.1 billion in aid since 2012
 - And gave an additional \$50 million to UNRWA when U.S. pulled out in January
 - And has agreed to fund U.N. agencies \$500 million over next 10 years primarily to agencies helping Gaza
- So what does future hold?

Israel Brain Drain

For every Israeli with an academic degree who returned to Israel in 2014, 2.6 Israeli academics emigrated. By 2017, this figure had risen to 4.5 emigrants per returnee.

The number of Israeli physicians practicing in OECD countries other than Israel was 9.8% of all physicians in Israel in 2006. This share rose to 14% by 2016.

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“The problem is when it becomes one-sided and the flow is primarily outward. When 4.5 academics leave Israel for each one that has returned then this becomes a problem. When we stopped building universities at the level of the Technion, Hebrew University and Tel Aviv University, though our population has more than doubled since the 1970s, then we have a problem. When the stock of Israeli doctors abroad continues to increase while the stock of foreign-born doctors in Israel continues to decline, then this no longer a full two-way street.”

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Israel basically has two economies, with one shouldering the burden of the other, posited Ben-David. Because this burden is becoming too heavy, higher-income, higher educated Israelis choose to leave, he further argued.

“There is the high-tech Israel, the university Israel, the medical sector Israel, the Startup Nation Israel,” said Ben-David. “But there is another Israel, and that other Israel is receiving neither the tools nor the conditions to work in a modern economy. And that other Israel is huge. Not only is it big, but its

share of the total is growing — so it is a huge weight on the shoulders of those who are basically maintaining the entire country.”

Israel Brain Drain

Israel's productivity is falling further behind top developed countries, leading to greater wage disparity and poverty. Many, mainly Israel's ultra-Orthodox and Arab populations, have been sidelined by the high-tech boom; the cost of living is rising faster in Israel than in other developed countries; the roads are clogged; the education system is failing its students by not teaching most of them at the levels needed for a tech-based economy; and hospitals are groaning under an acute shortage of beds and doctors.

The Shores study shows that household prices in Israel are 28% higher than in the US and 66% higher than the OECD average. It takes 20.5 years of work to buy a home in Tel Aviv, and 18.5 years of work in Jerusalem, making them among the five most expensive cities in the developed world: Tel Aviv ranks second, just under London, where 22.8 clogged roads. Meanwhile, the high occupancy rates at Israeli hospitals, the highest in the OECD, results in the highest mortality rates from infectious diseases in the developed world.

The Haredim have long opposed providing their children with the core curriculum of studies, including math and English, preferring them to focus on religious texts. Israeli governments, much to the detriment of society, have pandered to their will, Ben-David said.

At the moment one fifth of Israeli children are Haredim who are not taught the core curriculum, he said. And while the Haredim make up only 7% of the country's adults, they account for 19% of the children.

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The money has not gone to education, hospitals and transport, he added, "and these are things that keep people away."

Reagan's Overall Views

I've believed many things in my life, but no conviction I've ever held has been stronger than my belief that the United States must ensure the survival of Israel. The Holocaust, I believe, left America with a moral responsibility to ensure that what had happened to the Jews under Hitler never happens again . . . My dedication to the preservation of Israel was as strong when I left the White House as when I arrived there, even though this tiny ally, with whom we share democracy and many other values, was a source of great concern for me while I was president.³

And Smith Concurs

that confirmed his preconceptions.²⁸ In the Middle East, Reagan saw Israel, following the Shah's departure from Iran, "as perhaps the only remaining strategic asset in the region on which the United States can truly rely. . . . Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow's design on territories vital to our security and our national well-being."²⁹ Reagan also identified with Israel in light of Old Testament prophecies as proclaimed by fundamentalist Christian groups, which lobbied him on behalf of Likud expansion in the territories.³⁰

Ross Comments

There were periods when Israeli behavior was a source of great concern to Reagan. So much so that during the early years of his presidency, there were moments of deep tension in the relationship. The policy of the Carter administration might have been riddled with irony, but “duality” defined the Reagan presidency. Reagan was the first president—indeed, the only president—to suspend aircraft deliveries as a *punishment* for Israeli behavior; yet he was also the first American leader to institutionalize and formalize strategic cooperation with Israel.⁴ The formal undertakings that Reagan established with Israel strategically in the area of military, intelligence, counterterror, and security cooperation would create a baseline for all subsequent American presidents. Indeed, even those subsequent presidents who might not have instinctually viewed Israel as a strategic asset would respect these undertakings and build on them.

Attendees at “Peace for Prosperity Plan Workshop”

- U.S.
- Saudi Arabia
- Bahrain
- United Arab Emirates
- Egypt
- Jordan
- Oman
- International Money fund and World Bank
- Some Palestinian business men
- Some Israeli business men
- Not Palestinian Authority-because
 - Recognition of Israeli occupation of Jerusalem
 - U.S. establishment of embassy
 - U.S. recognition of Golan Heights
- Not Israeli Government (because P.A. isn't coming)

Peace to Prosperity Plan

- Objective
 - Raise \$50 Billion
 - Create 1 million jobs
- Some specifics
 - construction of additional roads across the West Bank and Gaza, but also a new “transportation corridor directly connecting the West Bank and Gaza through a major road and, potentially, a modern rail line.
 - construction of new industrial zones to strengthen the Palestinian economy.
 - removal of Israel’s naval blockade on Gaza, and getting rid of roadblocks and other constraints on freedom of movement.
 - expand Palestinian farming
 - development of a “new flagship liberal arts and sciences university in the West Bank and Gaza” that would cost up to \$500 million
 - encourages support for Palestinian artists.
 - tourism potential in Palestine

Commentary

- By putting economics first while ignoring the end game, a colossal mistake is being repeated, *resuming talks without defining the end goal*. For both Palestinians and Israelis, that goal should be ending the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state alongside Israel within 1967 borders, with necessary land swaps. Unless both parties and the mediating power state this clearly at the outset, the expectations gap will breed mistrust. Thus, sitting down together will be futile. This will lead to further disillusionment—and escalating violence. Unless the goal of the talks is explicitly defined as ending the conflict and establishing a Palestinian state, more lives will be lost.
- Moreover, there will be no Jewish and democratic state without resolving the Palestinian issue.

U.S. Policy

- Shlaim says Haig took a globalist approach as compared to Carter's regionalist approach
- Overriding goal is to create a "strategic consensus" in the Middle East to counter Soviet expansion
- But Weinberger saw only cost –Israel was a problem
- Begin and Sharon embraced the idea more than any Arab leader
- But there were issues:
 - Reagan proposes sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia on 4/21/81
 - To demonstrate credibility to the Arabs and to "be fair"
 - But he perceives Israel attempted to block the sale and states: "It is not the business of other States to make American Foreign policy."
 - In September Begin meets with Reagan and promises not to campaign to bloc the sale, but then Reagan states he almost immediately went to Capital Hill to lobby against it.
 - This contradicts Haig who said our ambassador accompanied Begin to the Hill and only voiced opposition when asked.
 - Finally passes in October

Israel and the “Contra” Scandal

elsewhere. In Central America, rebels called “contras” sought to overthrow the Marxist government of Nicaragua with strong administration backing. Reagan’s support of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia was apparently tied to a private agreement that the Saudis would fund anticommunist movements. Initially conceived to back Afghan resistance against the Soviets, it later included giving \$32 million to the contras. Israel also contributed to the contra effort as a result of its involvement in arms shipments to Iran in collusion with Reagan administration officials, and in violation of U.S. law. The money paid for these arms was then diverted to back the contras against the leftist government in power.³¹

This led to the following situation: Israel sold arms to Iran for use against Iraq, at times with American assistance; Washington intended to use the proceeds to fund anticommunist movements in Central America. At the same time, the Reagan administration was also backing Iraq against Khomeini in Iran, giving it strategic information on Iranian deployments and encouraging military and economic assistance to Baghdad via its European allies. American policy, initially intended to weaken both antagonists, then opted to back Iraq against the perceived Islamic threat from Iran. These friendly relations with Saddam Husayn’s Iraqi regime would continue up to the eve of the Gulf Crisis of 1990.

Cooperation?

Howard Teicher, who worked for McFarlane first at State and later at the NSC, has described well the essence of what Haig had in mind on strategic cooperation with Israel—and where it diverged from what Begin and certainly the Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, sought. Haig wanted “to enhance America’s ability to project power to southwest Asia [the Gulf] and deter Soviet expansionism, while reducing Israel’s tendencies to act unilaterally in order to enhance Arab receptivity to the U.S. regional strategy.” Begin and Sharon desired “a strategic relationship based on greater Israeli freedom of action and independence from the constraints of subordinating Israel’s interests to those of the United States.”²⁹ Sharon was convinced that Israel was the only country in the region that offered the United States any real military capacity to help counter Soviet advances in the Gulf, and the United States should be prepared to cut the Israelis the slack to do what was necessary.³⁰

YES!!!

Despite these different approaches, the April discussions in Israel produced a “detailed agenda for political-military planning,” which included a “framework of ideas for cooperation, including joint military planning, pre-positioning of military equipment, a schedule of exercises, and global political cooperation.”³¹ The foundation for this relationship was the work done in the secret strategic dialogue I had been running for Andrew Marshall during the Carter administration. Weinberger wanted nothing to do with such discussions, but Haig understood their potential value and knew that Reagan shared his view.

MOA

- Memo of Understanding signed 11/30/81
- “United States –Israeli strategic cooperation ... is designed against the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union or Soviet controlled forces from outside the region introduced into the region”
- What doesn't this address?
- Arab states.

MOA Details

the region.”⁹ The memorandum carried a number of advantages for Israel. First, it established channels for closer military and intelligence coordination. Second, it provided for the prepositioning of American military equipment in Israel, this enhanced the confidence of Israelis that they would not be left alone in an emergency. Third, it called for cooperation in defense research and development. Israel, for its part, undertook to cooperate with the United States in emergency situations and to make available its facilities for the speedy deployment of American power.¹⁰ For the first time the Soviet Union was described in an official Israeli document as a confrontation state, and the possibility was raised of using the IDF for missions unrelated to the defense of Israel.

Labor Criticism

- No parliamentary debate or approval
- No U.S. commitment in the event of an Arab attack, beyond it's Guarantor of the Camp David Accords and Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty
- Israel had to support U.S. in any emergency in Middle East and Persian Gulf that involved Soviets or Soviet Proxies
 - E.G. Soviet supported coup in Saudi Arabia

Ethiopian Jewish Community

- The disturbance, however, has highlighted complaints by Ethiopian-Israelis of systematic discrimination, racism and being treated as "second-class citizens" in the country.
- For centuries, Ethiopian Jews were completely isolated from Jewish communities in other parts of the world.
- But with the arrival of former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to power in 1977, the country's policy toward Ethiopian Jews changed.
- Under Begin, Israel started to organize secret operations to relocate Ethiopian Jews to Israel.
- By the end of the 1990s, around 80,000 Ethiopian Jews had arrived to Israel from the Horn of Africa country.
- Now, there are more than 140,000 Ethiopian Jews live in Israel.
- Upon their arrival in Israel, Ethiopian Jews faced racism and discrimination from the Israeli establishment.

Ethiopian Jewish Community

- One of the early incidents that exposed this approach was the revelation in the 1990s that the Israeli national blood bank had routinely destroyed blood donated by Ethiopian Jews for fear of HIV.
- Ethiopian Jews also suffer from the highest poverty rate among the Jews in Israel, and suffer much higher levels of police stop-search, arrests and incarceration.
- Unemployment among Jews of Ethiopian descent is also significantly higher than any other Jews in Israel.
- According to a report by Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, the unemployment rate among Ethiopian women in 2000 was 63%. Although this percentage dropped to 26% in 2016, yet it still does not meet the desired percentage.
- The unemployment rate for Ethiopian Jewish men also reached 20% in 2016, down from 38% in 2000.
- According to the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute, the monthly income per household for Ethiopian Jews is 11,250 shekels, while for other Jews it is 15,575 shekels.
- In 2016, 55% of Ethiopian Jewish children were enrolled in primary and secondary schools while the percent among other Jewish children is 77, and there was a 20% increase in the number of cases filed by the police against Ethiopian Jews in the same period, although there was a 6% drop in the cases filed by the police against all Jews in 2014-2017.
- In addition, 90% of Ethiopian Jewish youth convicted by the court were sentenced to imprisonment, compared to one-third of other Jewish youth.
According to Israeli media, 11 Ethiopians have died since 1997 in clashes with the police.

Ethiopian Discrimination?

- Claims blaming Israeli society are politically biased narratives simply made up to serve the overall accusations that defame the State of Israel.
- The percentage of pupils of Ethiopian origin who dropped out was slightly lower than that of the general population of pupils in Hebrew education: Approximately 1.6% of approximately 35,000 pupils of Ethiopian origin who began to study in grades 1-12 in schools under Ministry of Education supervision in the school year of 2011/12 dropped out during that year or in transition to 2012/13, compared with 1.88% among the general Hebrew education.
- The percentage of women among students of Ethiopian origin who are studying for a first degree was higher than the percentage of women among the general population of students for a first degree – 66.8% versus 56.5%, respectively.
- The average monthly household expenditure in households of Ethiopian origin was NIS 9,539 compared with NIS 14,272 among the general population households.
- As for the I.D.F.; 90% of Ethiopian-Israeli combat soldiers complete their service, as opposed to 70% of other combat soldiers. 30% of Ethiopian-Israeli soldiers serve in combat positions, and are likely to complete their full military service

Ethiopian Discrimination

Another View


- community's situation today as the Ethiopian Israelis living “a cradle-to-grave parallel existence to the rest of Israeli society.”
- Ethiopian Israelis are among the poorest people in Israel. When entering the workforce, they earn up to 40 percent less than Arab-Israeli citizens, who tend to have a lower household income than Jewish Israelis. Immigrants coming to Israel from Ethiopia often arrive with little formal education, and a 2012 report by the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorption found that 41 percent of Ethiopian adults who had moved to Israel since 2002 were jobless, the highest unemployment rate among Israel's immigrant populations.
- Although 89% of teenage boys (higher than the national average of 75%) and 62% of teenage girls of Ethiopian heritage serve in the IDF, one third of them end up in IDF prisons. Soldiers of Ethiopian descent currently make up only 3% of the IDF, but a disproportionate 13% of the military prison population.
- Dishonorable discharge rates for Ethiopian Israeli soldiers, at 22.8 percent for men and 10.6% for women, are also well above the national averages of 16.5% and 7.5% respectively.
- 40% of population of the Ofek Juvenile Prison are youth of Ethiopian heritage.

WHY?

- Racism has commonly been cited as explanation for policies and programs that failed to meet expectations. Racism was alleged regarding delays in admitting Ethiopian Jews to Israel under the Law of Return. The delays in admitting Ethiopians may be attributed to religious motivations rather than racism, since there was debate whether or not Falasha Jews' (Beta Israel) were Jewish



- Area A –Green
- Area B -Brown
- Area C-Gray



But at Same Time

With Begin's narrow electoral victory in June 1981 behind him and Sharon now his minister of defense, he decided to implement his own version of Palestinian autonomy while claiming that it fulfilled the intent of the Camp David Accord. On November 8, 1981, the Begin cabinet announced that it had created a separate civilian administration designed to handle all local concerns except military and security matters on the West Bank and abolished the military government established after the 1967 war. This was a subterfuge. The Israeli military remained in control of affairs on the West Bank and civilian officials remained subordinate to them. The only difference was that the military authority was now situated in Israel rather than centered in the West Bank. This enabled the Begin government to claim that it was fulfilling the clauses requiring that the military government and "its civilian administration" be removed "as soon as a self-governing authority had been freely elected."⁵¹

And

Having “removed” the military government by transferring its headquarters, Israeli officials set about trying to constitute a Palestinian self-governing authority staffed by individuals who would accept their directives. Here, they focused on an arrangement of local village leagues created in 1978 around Hebron and decided to use this structure as a basis for developing an areawide system run by Palestinians. These leagues would be given legislative powers, excluding elected mayors and village officials who rejected the Israeli initiative. Village league heads would control patronage, have the power to issue permits, and have the sole right to carry arms. This authority would presumably enable them to win support either through their control of purse strings or through intimidation. West Bank Palestinians mounted strong resistance to these moves, which were accompanied by an “iron fist” policy of retaliation and harassment encouraged by the chief of staff, Rafael Eitan. As a result, the West Bank became a scene of intensified repression during the first six months of 1982, with military officials tolerating, if not encouraging, settler violence toward Arab residents.⁵²

Israeli Election

- 32 Parties –Down from 47

- Poll results

• Likud		30
• Blue and White	29	
• United Right		11
• Joint Arab List		11
• Israel Beiteinu		11
• Democratic camp	9	
• Labor		6
• Shas		6
• UTJ		7
• Total		120

Coalitions?

• Likud	30	Blue and White	29
• United Right	11	Joint Arab List	11
• Religious Parties <u>13</u>		Democratic Camp	9
• Total	54	Labor	<u>6</u>
		Total	55

So Lieberman is the kingmaker again with 11 seats

Coalition Opinion Poll

- 50% want a unity government between Likud and Blue and White without religious parties
- 23% want a coalition of right wing parties and religious parties
- 13% want a coalition of Likud, Blue and White and religious parties
- 10% want coalition of center left and religious parties

Israel Democracy Institute's Israel Voice Index

- Fully 60 percent of respondents in the survey, released Monday, gave him a high score for “improving Israel’s international standing,” 56% for “strengthening [Israel’s] military power,” and 50.5% for “handling the Iranian challenge.”
- When asked about Netanyahu’s effectiveness “in reducing the gaps between social groups,” just 22% said he was doing a good job, while a majority of 51% said he was doing poorly.
- As for his “personal integrity,” only 23% gave a favorable response, and 49% an unfavorable one.
- His score on the economy was mixed: 45% said he was doing a “good” job, 22% a “medium” job, and 28% a “poor” job.
- There was also a lot of skepticism over his “handling of relations with the Palestinians,” the poll found, with 43% critical and just 27% in favor.

Golan Heights Annexation

- December, 1981
- Begin's justification
 - Historically Golan part of Land of Israel
 - Syria's implacable hostility to Israel
 - Syria's denial of Israel's right to exist
 - Doesn't foreclose the option to negotiate with Syria
- Passes 63-21



Problems with Annexation

- Shlaim claims violates
 - international law
 - U.N. Resolution 242
 - Disengagement of forces agreement with Syria in 1974
 - Camp David Accords
- Doesn't keep options for Syrian negotiation open
- But Begin says:
 - This pacifies Israeli Right
 - This test's Mubarak's commitment to Peace treaty
 - Sends message that there will be no further withdrawals



The Omar, Tlaib Saga

- Bipartisan Congressional group visits Israel
- Representatives Omar and Tlaib don't join them
- Ron Dermer, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S. grants them permission to go on their own. (Now Foreign Minister Israel Katz says it wasn't approved.) Itinerary is for the west bank, East Jerusalem and the Al-Asqa Mosque including meetings with NGO groups (left wing Israeli and Palestinian), UNRWA, U.S. Embassy staff, the western Wall and non specified Knesset members. (according to JTA)
- President Trump tweets: "It would show great weakness if Israel allowed Rep. Omar and Rep. Tlaib to visit."
- Israel bans the visit.
- AIPAC and JUF criticize the ban.
- Talib appeals to Israeli Interior Minister Areyh Deri to see her grandmother
- Deri approves on humanitarian grounds as long as Tlaib doesn't promote BDS
- Talib accepts restrictions (in writing)
- Then Tlaib cancels her trip .
- Dueling press conferences

Questions

- Why didn't the 2 congresswomen join the bipartisan delegation?
- How much influence did the President's tweet have on the reversing Israel's position?
- Do all BDS advocates (including Omar and Tlaib) want the destruction of Israel or are they only want to eliminate the discrimination of Arabs (in their minds at least)?
- Does this create a division among Democrats and help the President?
- Does this incident exacerbate (or create) a division between American and Israeli Jews?
- Does this incident hurt bipartisan support for Israel?
- How does it affect the Prime Minister?
- Should Israel have banned them?

Why?

- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently said he sees the head of the Mossad intelligence agency or Israel's ambassador to the United States as his prospective successor after he bows out of political life, according to a report on Thursday.
- “There are two people I consider fit to lead the State of Israel — Yossi Cohen and Ron Dermer,” Netanyahu was quoted by the Walla news site as telling his associates, in a rare comment on the country's future leadership after his retirement.

Begin's Defense on "Meet the Press" 4/25/82

We gave up Sinai, the Sinai Peninsula, 23,000 square miles, two sophisticated airfields, an oil well from which we already derived two years ago, 24 per cent of our annual consumption, which is 8 million tons, and then we had to evacuate our civilian people, which was a real trauma. You might have seen it on your television. And we carried out our commitment to the dot and to the date.

But there is no comparison with the Golan Heights or with Judea and Samaria. We have in Sinai now 150 kilometers of completely demilitarized desert land, which can be photographed. We can see whether a breach took place. We can control it. You cannot do so on the Golan Heights, neither in Judea and Samaria. So let us not make any comparisons whatsoever.

“Meet the Press” Continued

Now we applied the law and jurisdiction of Israel to the Golan Heights. This law stands.

We want peace with Syria on the basis that on the Golan Heights we apply the law and jurisdiction of the State of Israel.

Q: Mr. Prime Minister, there are people who say that you're moving unmistakably to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

A: Well, first of all, I would like to say a word about the term annex, or annexation. You can annex foreign land. You cannot annex your own country. Judea and Samaria are part of the Land of Israel, or in foreign languages, Palestine, in which our nation was born. There our Kings ruled and our prophets brought forth the vision of eternal peace. How can we annex it?

“He also stressed that he was offering the Palestinian Arabs autonomy , but under no circumstances would there be a Palestinian state in the area between Mediterranean and the Jordan River” according to Hurvitz. Contradictory?

Reactions to Annexation

- This move was condemned by the United Nations Security Council in UN Resolution 497, which stated that "the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect." Israel maintains it has a right to retain the Golan, citing the text of UN Resolution 242, which calls for "safe and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". However, the international community rejects Israeli claims to title to the territory and regards it as sovereign Syrian territory.

Reagan v. Begin

Reagan described Begin's action as a violation of UN Resolution 242, and the administration reacted harshly. It suspended not only the recently concluded MOU on strategic cooperation but also F-16 shipments—again.*

Begin exploded over the twin penalties. He called in Ambassador Sam Lewis and, in a fit of anger, called our effort to convince Congress to permit the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia an “ugly anti-Semitic campaign.” He asked scathingly, “Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic? Are we 14-year-olds who, if we misbehave, we get our wrists slapped?”³⁵ Begin, who was recovering from a broken hip, used his condition to make it clear Israel would not bow to U.S. pressure: “The trouble is, I can't bend my leg. But you know me by now, Sam—a Jew bends his knee to no one but to God.”³⁶ When I read Lewis's cable of his conversation, I wondered if Begin even thought about the impact of such words on President Reagan.

I worried about the consequences for the MOU, a document that for the

Latest Poll Published 9/11

- 32 [35] Blue & White (Gantz, Lapid, Yaalon & Ashkenazi)
- 31 [38] Likud (Netanyahu & Kahlon)
- 11 [10] The Joint List – Hadash-Taal-Raam-Balad (Odeh, Tibi & Abbas)
- 09 [06] Yamina (Shaked, Peretz, Smotrich & Bennett)
- 09 [05] Yisrael Beiteinu (Lieberman)
- 07 [08] United Torah Judaism (Litzman & Gafni)
- 06 [08] Shas (Deri)
- 06 [04] Democratic Union (Horowitz, Shafir & Barak)
- 05 [06] Labor (Peretz & Levy)
- 04 [–] Otzma (Ben Gvir)
- **Under 3.25% Electoral Threshold**
- The other parties are all under 1%

Coalitions?

Likud	31	Blue and White	32
Yamina	9	Joint Arab List	11
Shas	6	Democratic Union	6
UTJ	7	Labor	5
Otzma	4		
Total	57	Total	54

Issues

- Lieberman is Kingmaker with 8 seats? He picked up voters from Likud.
 - Where will he go?
 - Wants Unity Government, but with religious pluralism
- Gantz won't have Unity government with Netanyahu as P.M.-
Corruption
- Netanyahu pre-indictment hearings set for first week in October
- Jewish holidays eat into negotiation time
- Gantz and Lapid have agreed to rotate as Prime Minister
 - If a Unity government, how will that work?
- Rivlin says he will do everything he can to avoid another election.
- With intermittent rocket attacks, how is acting government to respond?

Additional Questions

- **Who is more suited to serve as Prime Minister?**

39% Netanyahu, 30% Gantz, 19% Neither, 8% Don't know, 4% Both

Right: 59% Likud, 18% Neither, 13% Gantz, 5% Both, 5% Don't know

Center-Left: 60% Gantz, 20% Neither, 9% Netanyahu, 8% Don't know, 3%

- **Do you support a unity government without the Haredi parties?**

49% Yes, 39% No, 12% Don't know

Right: 52% No, 40% Yes, 8% Don't know

Center-Left: 70% Yes, 19% No, 11% Don't know

- **If Lapid gives up on his PM rotation demand will it increase the chance you vote for Blue & White?**

53% No, 25% Yes, 11% Decreases chance, 11% Don't know

Right: 57% No, 24% Yes, 10% Decreases chance, 9% Don't know

Center-Left: 49% No, 31% Yes, 11% Decreases chance, 9% Don't know

- **Will cameras influence the behavior of voters on election day?**

51% Yes, 35% No, 14% Don't know

Jews: 52% Yes, 32% No, 16% Don't know

Non-Jews: 51% No, 43% Yes, 6% Don't know

Current Political Issues?

- Netanyahu's bill to allow camera's in polling places is defeated in committee
- Bennett will support immunity for Netanyahu (unless something else happens)—whatever that means
- Tapes of Netanyahu investigation leaked (allegedly by a Likud member)
- Netanyahu and Trump considering mutual defense pact
- Netanyahu schedules meeting with Putin 5 days before election
- Netanyahu disclosed that Iran destroyed a secret nuclear weapons testing facility in January.
- PLA will no longer honor Areas A, B, and C pursuant to the Oslo accords
- In response Netanyahu said he will apply Israeli sovereignty to all of the West Bank and now says he will annex the Jordan Valley

Nablus

Tel Aviv

Annexation

Ramallah

Jerusalem


Hebron

Amman

Jericho

Jordan River

Dead Sea



Begin's Thoughts

- Begin interprets the temporary suspension of the MOA as a cancellation
- He welcomes the opportunity to reassert Israel's freedom of action
- In later meeting at White House he explained the meaning of "protected Jews"
- Protected Jew is one who receives a promise of protection from his landlord
- Zionism, quoting Zaborotinsky put an end to this dubious status. Israelis would deal only on the basis of equals and reciprocity
- Regan waits 6 months to renew the strategic dialogue with Israel
- But in the interim war in Lebanon erupts

Ariel Sharon

- born on February 26, 1928 in Kfar Malal, an agricultural moshav
- Military Service 1948-1974
 - Rose to Major General
 - Commands
 - Southern Command
 - Paratroopers
 - Unit 101
 - Fought in
 - War of Independence
 - Suez
 - Six day War
 - Yom Kippur War
- Rabin has called Sharon “the greatest field Commander in our history”



Sharon's Political Position's

- Initially supported Mapai, predecessor to Labor
- Joined the Liberal Party upon retirement from the military 73
- Helped found Likud in 1973 by merger of Liberal Party and Herut (Begin's party)
- Minister of Agriculture 6/20/77-8/5/81
- Minister of Defense 8/5/81-2/14/83
- Minister of Industry, Trade & Labor 9/13/84—2/20/90
- Minister of Housing & Construction 6/11/90-2/20/92
- Minister of Energy & Water Resources 7/8/96-7/6/99
- Minister of Foreign Affairs 10/13/98- 6/6/99
- Prime Minister 3/7/2001-4/15/2006 Unilateral withdrawal from Gaza
- Forms Kadima 11/2005
- Suffers stroke 1/4/06- Ehud Barak becomes acting P.M. until March when he is elected
- Dies 1/11/14

How Palestinian Israelis Humiliated The BDS Movement

- The BDS movement has three items on its agenda:
 - ending the occupation in the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza;
 - securing equality for Israel's Arab citizens,
 - and ensuring the right of return for all refugees of 1948 and their descendants. In other words, it supports the end of the Jewish state.
- And its method for achieving this goal is to make Israel and its supporters into pariahs.
- So why did Ayman Odeh made the historic announcement that he, as the leader of the Arab bloc in the Knesset, recommend Benny Gantz as Prime Minister?

Because

- an overwhelming number of the country's Arab voters responded to his call for engagement, which was in essence a call for co-existence. Arab Israelis went to the polls in unexpectedly high numbers as a direct result of Odeh saying he would consider joining a Gantz-led government. Arab voter turnout jumped from a meager 49% in April to over 60% in September, thanks to Odeh's stated willingness to play a more active role in government.
- Odeh also reaffirmed his support for a two-state solution, which nearly all Palestinians in Israel support.

Opposite BDS

- This commitment to two states for two peoples, coupled with his newfound eagerness to engage in Israeli politics, put Odeh at odds with the BDS movement. Or, more accurately, it puts the BDS movement at odds with the very oppressed group they purport to represent. The leaders of the BDS movement do not believe in the solution the UN called for in 1947, and do not believe a Palestinian state can live peacefully beside an Israeli one. BDS organizers have claimed since the beginning that Zionism is no better than racism, and Israel is an illegitimate settler-colonial state. The problem of the Palestinians, according to the movement, can only be solved by undoing Israel's founding in 1948 and establishing a single Arab-majority state, from the river to the sea.
- And yet, Palestinians on the front lines of the conflict in Israel have gone to the polls, and what they have voted for violates the core principles of BDS.

His NYT Op-ed

“Our decision to recommend Mr. Gantz as the next prime minister without joining his expected national unity coalition government is a clear message that the only future for this country is a shared future, and there is no shared future without the full and equal participation of Arab Palestinian citizens.”

And In Other News

- Preindictment hearing of P.M. begins with lead prosecutor going on vacation after 2 days
 - A.G. expected to take 1-2 months to make a decision
 - So how does that effect Netanyahu building a coalition in 4 weeks?
 - Netanyahu not expected to call for snap Likud primary
 - Why?
 - It might be too risky
 - Lapid says he will not hold Gantz to rotation agreement if unity government is formed
- F.M. Katz confirms there are negotiations for a historic non-aggression pact with Gulf states

Sharon and the Arabs

ture Ariel Sharon declared that he had undertaken an “offensive” to “stem the hold of foreigners on state lands,” to be achieved in part through Judaizing the Galilee.⁴⁶ Sharon’s militaristic terminology and his reference to Arab citizens of Israel as foreigners coincided with his attitude toward West Bank Arabs living in what had been Israel; he identified them all as alien to a Jewish state. His assumptions resembled those of Meir Kahane, former head of the right-wing party, Kach, who in the 1980s called for the expulsion of all Israeli Arabs in order to purify Israel by ridding it of alien blood.⁴⁷ These activities and their stated justification created a greater sense of kinship between Israeli and West Bank Arabs after 1977 than might have otherwise existed.

Lebanon

- By the end of 1980, Bashir Gemayel and his Phalange Militia had established their dominance over all the Maronite military forces in Lebanon
- Phalange had received military training in Israel
- Despite minority status objective was to gain total Maronite control of the country
- Goal supported by Begin and Sharon because it would ensure a friendly state on northern border
- Mutual objective to remove PLO
- But Gemayel wanted to remove all Palestinians
- Assad of Syria wanted to install as president Sulayman Franjiyah, the one Maronite to which he had ties



SO

ties. This threatened Bashir Gemayel's presidential aspirations, which Israel encouraged. As a result, Gemayel decided to challenge Syria by gaining control of Zahle, an important city adjacent to the Beirut-Damascus highway in central Lebanon, whose population was primarily Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. With Syria's forces situated just east of the city, the Maronite action could incite hostilities that would draw Israel in on Gemayel's side and enable him to claim he had defended Christians other than Maronites. Begin had promised him in 1978 that if Syrian planes attacked Christian forces, Israeli planes would intervene on their behalf.⁵⁴

At the beginning of April 1981, clashes between Phalangist and Syrian forces erupted in and around Zahle. Gemayel called for Israeli aid and Israeli planes responded by downing two Syrian helicopters.⁵⁵ Assad replied by installing ground-to-air missiles in the hills overlooking Zahle, a significant escalation; these weapons covered airspace heretofore open only to Israeli reconnaissance and to their attacks on Palestinian positions. A "missile crisis" ensued, with the

Election Results Reminder

Likud	31	Blue and White	33
Yamina	7	Joint Arab List	13
Shas	9	Democratic Union	5
UTJ	8	Labor	6
Otzma	0		
Total	55	Total	57

Israeli Politics

- Netanyahu is interim P.M. and Gantz is P.M. designate
- Gantz given mandate to form Government
- Presidents Proposal
 - Netanyahu would serve as first PM. Under an unspecified rotation agreement, but agree to take an open ended leave of absence if indicted
 - Liberman wants Netanyahu to give up his 55 member bloc
 - Legal problem-Basic Law requires the MK who is given the mandate must be P.M.
- Liberman wants a unity government
- If only one accepts proposal Liberman will support whoever accepts
- Bennett of New Right has been appointed defense minister
- Netanyahu still holds cabinet portfolio of agriculture ,diaspora and welfare in addition to interim P.M.
- Then there is the possibility of Minority government being formed

Lebanese Groups

- PLO
- **Non-PLO Palestinian groups**
- Palestinian groups in the radical Rejectionist Front fought on the Muslim-leftist side. The following were members of the Rejectionist Front:
 - Arab Liberation Front (ALF) Pro-Iraqi
 - As-Sa'iqa (also known as the Vanguard for the Popular Liberation War), a Palestinian Ba'athist political and military faction created and controlled by Syria.
 - Abu Nidal's Fatah-Revolutionary Council
 - Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
 - Palestine Liberation Army(PLA) Includes the Popular Liberation Forces (Arabic, quwwat at-tahrir ash-sha'biyya), better known as the Yarmouk Brigade, a PLA Commando force.
 - Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)
 - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
 - Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)
- Some, such as As-Sa'iqa, the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestine Liberation Army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) were essentially mercenary armies for foreign governments (Syria, Iraq, and Libya, respectively).

Paramilitary Forces

- **RIGHT WING**

- South Lebanon Army, founded in 1979 the SLA fought against both the PLO and Hezbollah. The SLA was composed of Christians, Shias and Druze from the areas that it controlled but the officers were mostly Christians.
- Guardians of the Cedars, exclusively Maronite with strong anti-Syrian views, 3,000–6,000 uniformed militiamen armed with modern small-arms

- **LEFT WING**

- The Lebanese National Resistance Front forces totaled about 30,000 fighting men and women. It was the successor of the Lebanese National Movement.
- The Druze were initially neutral but turned against the LF when the new government attempted to force their way into Druze controlled territory. The People's Liberation Army – PLA (Arabic: Jayish al-Tahrir al-Sha'aby)
- The Al-Mourabitoun (Guardians or Saviours in Arabic) is a secular, non-sectarian movement, its membership has always been overwhelmingly Muslim, being perceived within Lebanon as a predominantly Sunni organization. The Mourabitoun fought alongside the PLO in the Beirut area until the cease fire after which they acquired much cast-off PLO equipment such as tanks and rocket launchers. They were supported largely by Libya and Syria.
- The Kurdistan Workers' Party at the time had training camps in Lebanon, where they received support from the Syrians and the PLO. During the Israeli invasion all PKK units were ordered to fight the Israeli forces.







Religious Groups

- **CHRISTIAN**




- The Christian Lebanese Front, was a coalition of mainly Christian parties formed in 1976, during the Lebanese Civil War..


- **MUSLIM**

- Muslim forces were Shiite organizations:
- Amal Movement is the militia wing of the Movement of the Disinherited, a Shi'a political movement. Initially neutral. The Shia Amal guerrillas had been ordered by their leaders not to fight and to surrender their weapons if necessary.
- Hezbollah is the other Shiite militia ostensibly formed during the invasion around Beirut and backed by Iran.
- Pasdaran – In July 1982 Iran dispatched an expeditionary force of Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon, ostensibly to fight the Israeli invaders.¹
- The political fission that characterized Lebanese politics also afflicted the Shia movement, as groups split off from Amal. Husayn al Musawi, a former Amal lieutenant, entered into an alliance with the Revolutionary Guard and established Islamic Amal.
- Other Shia groups included Jundallah (Soldiers of God), the Husayn Suicide Commandos, the Dawah (Call) Party, and the notorious Islamic Jihad Organization, reportedly headed by Imad Mughniyahh.

▲	Major Refugee Camp (location approximate)
	North Lebanon – predominantly Sunni (Tripoli), Greek Orthodox, Maronites
	North Mount Lebanon – mainly Maronite and Greek Orthodox
	South Mount Lebanon – Maronites and Druze
	South Lebanon – mostly Shias, some Christians, Druze at Hasbaya
	Bekaa – predominantly Shias, Greek Catholics at Zahle
	Beirut – Sunni, Shi'ite, Maronites, and other Christians



▲	Major Refugee Camp (location approximate)
	North Lebanon – predominantly Sunni (Tripoli), Greek Orthodox, Maronites
	North Mount Lebanon – mainly Maronite and Greek Orthodox
	South Mount Lebanon – Maronites and Druze



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 Based on data published by Lebanon Demographics
<http://www.katagogi.com/LV2009/LebMap.aspx?i=EN>

Israel View

Christians of Lebanon held a special place because they allegedly faced the danger of destruction at the hands of their Arab and Muslim opponents. Begin was determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Munich conference of September 1938, at which Britain and France abandoned Czechoslovakia to Adolf Hitler's tender mercies. Begin likened Israel to the Western powers, the Maronites to the Czechs, and the Syrians and Palestinians to Nazi

Sharon's Objectives

- Use Israel's military power to establish hegemony in Middle East
- So had to:
 - Destroy PLO's infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization
 - Establish new political order with Maronite friends in charge, who would sign a peace treaty with Israel
 - Which necessitates expulsion of Syrian forces in Lebanon
- Destruction of PLO would break backbone of Palestinian nationalism and facilitate the absorption of the West Bank into Greater Israel
- Palestinians from Lebanon would move from Lebanon & West Bank to Jordan, sweep away the Hashemite monarchy and become a Palestinian state
- Ending international pressure to withdraw from West Bank
- But Haig felt just the opposite: "... after the resolution of the Lebanon problem, the U.S. expected Israeli settlement on the West Bank would come to an end and rapid progress toward an agreement on autonomy would be realized."

House Resolution and Executive Order on Antisemitism

- EO requires government departments enforcing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition of antisemitism.
- **“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”**
- So what does that mean?

Examples Included in Definition

- Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms and action, and employs sinister stereotypes and negative character traits.

Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

- Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective — such as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.
- Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

And

- Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.
- Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
- Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
- Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

And in Israel

- Another election.
- Will Netanyahu request immunity?
- Likud leadership primary 12/26.
- Attorney General announces intention to indict over submarine affair—not the P.M.
- Gaza protests resume

Operation Big Pines Presented to Cabinet 12/81

Lebanon. "If the Syrians start anything," he said, "we'll respond in Lebanon and solve the problem there." Eytan then presented, with the help of a map, the operational plan for reaching Beirut and beyond. The ministers were astonished by the scale of the proposed operation, and several of them spoke against it. Begin abruptly terminated the discussion without putting the proposal to a vote when it became clear that it would be defeated by a large majority.¹⁶

Sharon and Eytan, realizing that there was no chance of persuading the cabinet to approve a large-scale operation in Lebanon, adopted a different tactic. They started presenting to the cabinet limited proposals for bombing PLO targets in Lebanon, expecting that the guerrillas would retaliate by firing Katyusha rockets on Israel's northern settlements and that this would force the cabinet to approve more drastic measures. The idea was to implement Operation Big Pines in stages by manipulating enemy provocation and Israel's response. A number of confrontations took place in the cabinet as a result of these tactics. Ministers opposed to a war in Lebanon opposed the more modest proposals for bombing targets in Lebanon because they recognized where these proposals were intended to lead.¹⁷

Relationships

Ministers were explicitly warned by the heads of the intelligence community, at a meeting in Begin's home in April 1982, against the idea of trying to secure Bashir Gemayel's election to the presidency. On this occasion the head of the Mossad, General Yitzhak Hofi, sided with Saguy. Both of them cautioned against assuming that it would be possible to engineer Gemayel's election through the good offices of the IDF and then turn around and withdraw from Lebanon a few weeks later.¹⁹ But by this time the personal relationship between Sharon and Gemayel was so intimate and their joint plans were so far advanced that the opinion of the experts was brushed aside and their warning against interference in the Lebanese political process was not heeded. The influence of the experts began to decline as soon as the Phalangists found their way directly to Sharon's ranch in the Negev.

Concurrent Sinai Withdrawal

As minister of defense, Sharon was responsible for implementing the withdrawal. The most painful and problematic part of the process was the evacuation of the Israeli civilians who had made their homes in Sinai. Generous financial compensation was offered to these settlers, but many of them refused to leave of their own accord. Political extremists from the rest of the country infiltrated into Sinai to demonstrate their solidarity and sabotage the withdrawal. Resistance to the withdrawal lasted several days and was accompanied by heartbreaking scenes on television. But in the end the IDF succeeded in evacuating all the settlers and demonstrators without bloodshed. Sharon ordered the IDF to destroy the town of Yamit to its foundations instead of surrendering it intact to the Egyptians as envisaged in the peace treaty.²¹ He claimed that the Egyptians themselves had requested the destruction of Yamit, but this claim later turned out to be untrue. Sharon's real motives for carrying out this barbaric act was a subject for speculation. One suggestion was that Sharon deliberately made the whole process more traumatic than it needed to be so that the Israeli public

Sharon
of
Yamit
B

AND

would balk at the dismantling of any other settlements even for the sake of peace. What the whole episode proved was how ruthless Sharon could be in pursuit of his own designs and how little he cared for the opinion of his ministerial colleagues who had not approved the destruction of Yamit. Begin was well pleased with the energetic and efficient manner in which the evacuation was carried out. He, too, did not regard this as a precedent. Indeed, he proposed a resolution, which found a majority in the Knesset, intended to make it impossible for future governments to sign an agreement that involved withdrawal from the Land of Israel or the removal of Jewish settlements from this land.²²

Welcome to Today's Discussion On Israeli History/Jewish-Israeli Current Events

- Please silence your cell phone during our discussion
- Respect each person speaking—please refrain from side conversations
- If you're not called upon by name, please tell us your first name
- “Israeli History” meets 2nd and 4th Thursday of each month
- “Current Events” meets 1st and 3rd Thursday of each month
- Visit our website for more information about our discussions:
 - *suggested readings for Israeli History*
 - *current Israeli History discussion topic*
 - *copies of the Israeli History slides – pdf format*
 - *Current Events topics updated regularly*
 - *Other locations and times Ron and Mark lead discussions*
- Pick up a Handout at the front of the room with our web address

Go Back to April 1981

At the beginning of April 1981, clashes between Phalangist and Syrian forces erupted in and around Zahle. Gemayel called for Israeli aid and Israeli planes responded by downing two Syrian helicopters.⁵⁵ Assad replied by installing ground-to-air missiles in the hills overlooking Zahle, a significant escalation; these weapons covered airspace heretofore open only to Israeli reconnaissance and to their attacks on Palestinian positions. A “missile crisis” ensued, with the United States sending veteran diplomat Philip Habib to restrain both sides, a task he concluded successfully in May.

The disparity between the Haig and the Habib visits, one a junket and the other a specific effort to dampen hostilities, highlighted the contradictions in Reagan administration policy. Washington’s search for a strategic consensus against the Soviets encouraged confrontation with Soviet “clients,” whereas efforts to resolve regional disputes necessarily included clients such as Syria, whose truculence was inspired in part by its determination not to be omitted from any peacekeeping efforts. This disparity in interpretations would recur, with bloody ramifications for U.S. troops, after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Where is PLO in all of this?

In the spring of 1981, the PLO found itself caught between the Maronite militias to the north and a possible Israeli invasion from the south (see Map 8.1). In addition, those factions supporting Arafat found that they faced increasing Syrian hostility. Damascus feared he might seek an accord in tandem with Jordan that would further isolate Syria in a direct confrontation with Israel while its forces were divided between the Golan region and Lebanon. There was some basis for Syrian alarm. Although Arafat's approaches to Washington had failed, his diplomatic overtures had scored impressive gains. In June 1980 the nine-member European Economic Community issued the Venice Declaration, which called for recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the PLO's right to be linked with any peace initiative.

- And all Israeli settlements in west bank should be dismantled

AND

As Arafat pushed his peace option in 1981, Fatah operations against Israel seemed to decline, although numerous clashes between PLO groups and the Israeli-supplied militia of Saad Haddad occurred in the strip contiguous to Israel's northern border. Then, in early July, Israeli forces again raided Palestinian positions, resulting in a war of escalation. Artillery and rocket shells fired into Israel led Israel to intensify its attacks, which culminated in an air strike against Fatah and the PDFLP headquarters in a crowded suburb of West Beirut. Casualties were estimated at 200 dead and 600 wounded, nearly all civilians, with about 30 assumed to be members of the PLO. The PLO responded with a massive rocket bombardment of northern Israeli settlements that paralyzed the region for several days, killing six Israeli civilians and wounding fifty-nine.⁵⁷ The intensity of these exchanges and the numerous civilian casualties in Beirut brought U.S. envoy Philip Habib back to the region. On July 24, he gained a

Reluctance

One reason for the cabinet's reluctance to go to war in Lebanon was the fear of antagonizing the United States. In July 1981 Philip Habib, a senior American diplomat of Lebanese ancestry, had succeeded in brokering a cease-fire agreement between Israel and the PLO. The two parties, however, interpreted the agreement in different ways. The PLO considered that the agreement applied only to the Lebanese-Israeli front. The Israelis maintained that it required a complete halt to the terrorist attacks on all Israel's fronts, inside Israel, and anywhere in the world. The Americans held that the agreement meant precisely what it said: "There will be no hostile activities from Lebanon directed at targets in Israel [and vice versa]." In accordance with this interpretation, the Americans repeatedly warned the Israelis not to imperil the cease-fire.

BUT

In the eyes of many Israeli analysts, the PLO-Israeli cease-fire, though negotiated indirectly through Habib, posed a major threat to Israel. First, it suggested Israel's implicit recognition of the PLO. Second, it permitted the PLO to resume its buildup of forces in Lebanon, which might be used against Israel. Third, the willingness of the United States to deal with the PLO was itself alarming, even though Washington's position on PLO acceptance of Resolution 242 remained unchanged. Once again, the Palestinians posed a greater challenge to Israel as a peacemaking organization than as a military one; the continuance of the cease-fire was more unsettling than its collapse. This was particularly galling because Arafat was unwilling to denounce PLO incursions into Israel from Jordan; he held that the cease-fire applied only to Lebanon, whereas Israel argued that it was all-embracing. Following the cease-fire, Begin became even more convinced that the PLO should be destroyed rather than permitted to exist behind a truce.

Haig & Sharon Meet 5/82

ing the likelihood of an Israeli assault. In late May, Sharon met Haig and his staff in Washington. He showed them maps and detailed plans for two different invasions, one restricted to south Lebanon and the other going north to Beirut. Haig again informed Sharon that such an undertaking required a major provocation, but in a subsequent private meeting with Sharon, Haig may well have been more encouraging than he was in front of his aides.⁶⁰

The Cause of the War?

60. Feldman and Rechnitz-Kijner, *Deception, Consensus and War*, 22–23; and Rabinovich, *War for Lebanon*, 134, note Israeli, Arab, and American news comments on Israeli plans up to three months before the invasion. For differing views of Haig's conversations with Sharon, compare Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 67–77, who believe Haig approved an attack, with Haig, who presents himself in his memoirs as forcefully opposed to Sharon's designs when they met; Haig, *Caveat, Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York, 1984), 334–35. Doubts about Haig's continued opposition to Sharon's plans were shared by his own staff, including his chief negotiator, Philip Habib, who in an interview with Rashid Khalidi accused both Sharon and Haig of collusion and of lying regarding the process of negotiations for the PLO withdrawal from Beirut in the summer of 1982. See Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 172, and especially n. 10, 212.

Cabinet Approves?

On 3 June the casus belli that the hard-liners had been waiting for materialized. A group of Palestinian terrorists shot and grievously wounded Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to London, outside the Dorchester Hotel. The gunmen belonged to the breakaway group led by Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna), Yasser Arafat's sworn enemy. Abu Nidal was supported by Iraq in his struggle against Arafat's "capitulationist" leadership of the PLO. Abu Nidal customarily referred to Arafat as "the Jewess's son." The PLO had passed a death sentence on Abu Nidal for assassinating some of its moderate members who advocated a dialogue with Israel. Mossad sources had intelligence to suggest that the attempt on Argov's life was intended to provoke an Israeli assault on Arafat's stronghold in Lebanon in order to break his power.

complicated

So

- Israeli Jets attack sports stadium in west Beirut and Southern Lebanon resulting in 100 casualties
- PLO reacts with artillery barrage targeting 20 villages and wounding 6 civilians
- Reagan sends message to Begin not to widen attack
- Arafat, in Saudi Arabia agrees to suspend cross border shelling
- According to Shlaim Begin was in no mood to listen

And Begin Tells Cabinet on 6/5

With the PLO rocket and artillery barrage, the Israeli cabinet met to approve the invasion. What they were told and what was planned were two different things. Sharon informed them of a plan for an invasion of twenty-five miles to wipe out PLO positions in southern Lebanon, whereas he and Eitan had actually ordered the armed forces to proceed directly toward Beirut, which they did once the invasion began on June 6. From then on, the cabinet was briefed in piecemeal fashion as Sharon carried out his plan. Warned not to clash with the Syrians, he apparently ordered his troops to fire on Syrian positions to provoke a response that he could use to justify an attack. In this manner he and Eitan escalated the cabinet-approved limited strike to fit his prearranged design.⁶¹

And Sharon Tells Cabinet

- In “Operation Peace for Galilee” IDF will advance no further than 40 kilometers into Lebanon
- But in practice the war was conducted in accordance to the “big plan” which was submitted to the cabinet on 20 December 1981 and rejected
- Sharon claims all “understood”
- None of the ministers could confirm this “understanding”
- Sharon knew from his experience that once IDF hit it’s stride it would be difficult to assert political control over its actions


Begin Defends Sharon

I say to the article writers: Stuff and nonsense. Nothing of the sort. Just idle gossip of journalists who invent things. I read all the papers every day, I simply pay them no attention. They don't know what to write.

What kind of dragging? This is a functioning government. It met sometimes twice a day. All the facts were reported to it. The discussion covered every detail. A decision was taken on everything. No one dragged the Government; no one could have dragged. And why does the Defense Minister, a real veteran of combat, need to drag the Cabinet and act behind its back? Nothing of the sort. I would really like to take the opportunity to appeal to the journalists: Would you finally start writing facts? Maybe stop inventing. There was no deception, no dragging. Things were carried out in accordance with Cabinet decisions.

WAR!

- June 6, 1982 - War begins:
 - 4 Israeli armored columns cross the border
 - Seaborn forces land south of Sidon attacking PLO forces
- June 7 - Sharon orders forces to fight Syria and move to Beirut Damascus Highway
- June 8 - Bashir Gamayel meets with Eytan who tells Gamayel, Gamayel should prepare to capture Beirut, link up with Israeli forces and form a new Government in Lebanon
- June 9 - IAF attacks SAM-6 sites on both sides of border, destroys them all and downs 23 Syrian MiGs. No Israeli planes lost
- Conversation not reported to cabinet according to Shlaim
- Broad national and Labor support



Begin Addresses Knesset on 6/8/82

to the Israeli cabinet.³⁵ At this stage there was a broad national consensus, which included the Labor opposition, in support of Operation Peace for Galilee. On 8 June, Begin assured the Knesset that Israel did not want war with Syria and that all fighting would come to an end as soon as the IDF had cleared a zone of forty kilometers from Israel's northern border. "From this rostrum," declared Begin in dramatic tones, "I appeal to President Assad to direct the Syrian army not to attack Israel's soldiers and then they will come to no harm."

But Assad Biographer Writes

what was to be the goriest engagement in the struggle for the Middle East. Lebanon in the 1980s was the hapless arena for the collision between the dominant and expanded Israel which Begin was determined to build and the rival regional order with which Asad tried to stop him. Each man recognized the other as the principal enemy who could put at risk everything he held dear. In shorthand terms, “Greater Israel” went to war against “Greater Syria,” both controversial concepts of uncertain definition but which certainly ruled each other out. The struggle, in a way the climax of their political lives, very nearly destroyed them both.³⁶

Objectives Achieved?

- June 13 – August 12: Beirut under siege without help from Maronite forces
- But they linked up with those forces
- Syrian units in Beirut had been isolated from main body of Syrians in Bekka Valley
- Israel bombed Palestinian refugee camps in southwest Beirut, home to significant PLO positions, relentlessly & successfully
- Next objective was to eradicate PLO quasi government from Beirut
- 200 Israeli soldiers killed; 1,000 wounded

Reagan Steps

- Demands an immediate halt to Beirut shelling

thousand more had been wounded. For the first time, many Israelis felt that they were fighting a war that Israel had chosen to start, not one that had been forced on them.

Lebanon was becoming Israel's Vietnam.

Israel's international image also suffered. Despite his own losses, Arafat refused to leave Beirut. He appeared on Western television regularly, showing pictures of maimed Palestinian children and still-smoldering Palestinian homes. As a result of Israel's attack on Beirut, to many millions of international viewers, Arafat was suddenly a hero, the redeemer of the Palestinian people.

Washington's Mixed Messages

- Bush & Weinberger tell Saudi's (at King Kahalid's funeral) on 6/16/82 that the U.S. will not allow Israel into Beirut.
- But Haig issues statement "...emphasizing that all foreign forces must leave Lebanon and that given the events that lead up to the crisis careful analysis was required 'before any value judgements would be appropriate '—implying there should be no rush to judgment about what the Israelis were doing"
- "But the next day Weinberger publicly differs with him, equating the Israeli actions with Argentina's aggression in the Falkland's the previous year."
- This emboldened Arafat

Go Back to April 1981

At the beginning of April 1981, clashes between Phalangist and Syrian forces erupted in and around Zahle. Gemayel called for Israeli aid and Israeli planes responded by downing two Syrian helicopters.⁵⁵ Assad replied by installing ground-to-air missiles in the hills overlooking Zahle, a significant escalation;

The disparity between the Haig and the Habib visits, one a junket and the other a specific effort to dampen hostilities, highlighted the contradictions in Reagan administration policy. Washington's search for a strategic consensus against the Soviets encouraged confrontation with Soviet "clients," whereas efforts to resolve regional disputes necessarily included clients such as Syria, whose truculence was inspired in part by its determination not to be omitted from any peacekeeping efforts. This disparity in interpretations would recur, with bloody ramifications for U.S. troops, after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

PLO Problem

In the spring of 1981, the PLO found itself caught between the Maronite militias to the north and a possible Israeli invasion from the south (see Map 8.1). In addition, those factions supporting Arafat found that they faced increasing Syrian hostility. Damascus feared he might seek an accord in tandem with Jordan that would further isolate Syria in a direct confrontation with Israel while its forces were divided between the Golan region and Lebanon. There was some basis for Syrian alarm. Although Arafat's approaches to Washington had failed, his diplomatic overtures had scored impressive gains. In June 1980 the nine-member European Economic Community issued the Venice Declaration, which called for recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the PLO's right to be linked with any peace initiative.

And Begin Tells Cabinet on 6/5

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Begin

The hour of decision has arrived. You know what I have done, and what all of us have done, to prevent war and bereavement. But our fate is that in the Land of Israel there is no escape from fighting in the spirit of self-sacrifice. Believe me, the alternative to fighting is Treblinka, and we have resolved that there would be no more Treblinkas. This is the moment in which a courageous choice has to be made. The criminal ter-

- Invocation of the Holocaust upset many Israelis

And Sharon Tells Cabinet

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- But Begin replies

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- "But the next day Weinberger publicly differs with him, equating the Israeli actions with Argentina's aggression in the Falkland's the previous year."
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Begin Tells Reagan's

Now may I tell you, dear Mr President, how I feel these days when I turn to the creator of my soul in deep gratitude. I feel as a Prime Minister empowered to instruct a valiant army facing "Berlin" where amongst innocent civilians, Hitler and his henchmen hide in a bunker deep beneath the surface. My generation, dear Ron, swore on the altar of God that whoever proclaims his intent to destroy the Jewish state or the Jewish people, or both, seals his fate, so that which happened once on instructions from Berlin—with or without inverted commas—will never happen again.³⁸

Reagan's Confusion Per Ross

Although Reagan was unhappy with the Israelis, he also resisted, at least at this juncture, the instincts of Bush and Weinberger. On the contrary, in his diary on June 16—the same day Bush and Weinberger were in Saudi Arabia conveying a different message—he indirectly described the value of Israeli coercion as he explained that the Lebanese president, Elias Sarkis, couldn't say this openly, but “he apparently wants Israel to stay near until the P.L.O. can be disarmed, then he wants to restore the Central government of Lebanon . . . and get all foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon. The world is waiting for us to use our muscle and order Israel out. We can't do this if we want to help Sarkis, but we can't explain the situation either.”⁴⁷

Reagan seemed to share Haig's strategy, but he allowed the mixed messages to be sent. On June 22, the day after Reagan met with Begin at the White House, Clark conveyed to the Saudi ambassador that the Israelis would not go into Beirut. And two days later, Clark had Larry Speaks, the White House press secretary, say that the Israelis had promised not to go

U.S. Intervention

- Haig is forced to resign as Secretary of State because he is accused of tacitly approving Israeli invasion
- George Schultz replaces him and sends Philip Habib to negotiate a cease fire with the following objectives:
 - Palestinian and Syrian forces would withdraw from Beirut
 - Israel would not try to enter the city
 - Lebanese government would regain complete control over Beirut
 - American & French forces would supervise evacuation
- Begin willing to negotiate, but
- Sharon orders saturation bombing of Beirut where 300 people are killed
- Which results in Begin losing trust in Sharon and Begin assuming most of powers of defense minister
- Agreement reached on 8/12/82

The PLO?

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Lebanese Election

- Bashir Gemayel elected by parliament, But
- Muslim and rival Maronite deputies boycotted the election because it was being held under the shadow of Israeli guns

- But

Habib eventually succeeded in arranging for the withdrawal of the PLO to Tunisia. A first contingent of fighters left by sea on 21 August. Arafat left on 30 August aboard a Greek merchant ship with the U.S. Sixth Fleet providing cover. Altogether, 8,500 men were evacuated by sea to Tunisia. Another 2,500 men made the journey by land to Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms refused to accept PLO evacuees. After seventy-five days of heavy fighting, the PLO was banished from its stronghold in Lebanon to the periphery of the Arab world, a good deal more than forty kilometers from Israel's border. Begin was pleased with the outcome and announced that Operation Peace for Galilee had achieved most of its objectives.

Begin announced that the stage was now set for imple-

Cooperation?

in mounting the presidential horse, Gemayel was anxious to demonstrate his independence, to widen his domestic political base, and to emphasize the Arab rather than the Israeli orientation of his foreign policy. But the more evasive he appeared, the more insistently the Israelis demanded an early discharge of his political debt. The Israelis wanted nothing short of a peace treaty and full diplomatic relations with Lebanon, as they had previously achieved with Egypt. What the Israelis seemed unable to understand was that, unlike Egypt, Lebanon was too small and too weak to defy the entire Arab world.

Cooperation (continued)?

On the night of 1 September, Bashir Gemayel was summoned to a secret meeting with Begin in Nahariya, a coastal resort in northern Israel. Begin kept him waiting for two hours. The fragility of the understanding between them did not take long to manifest itself. While Begin demanded open normalization in the relations between Israel and Lebanon and the signing of a peace treaty, Gemayel pleaded for time to consolidate his position and merely mentioned the possibility of a nonaggression pact. Another bone of contention was the future of Major Sa'ad Haddad, the Christian militia leader in southern Lebanon who was financed by the Israelis. Begin remarked that Haddad at least knew which side his bread was buttered on and held him as an example to be emulated. Gemayel countered that he was going to put Haddad on

More Cooperation?

trial for desertion from the Lebanese army. When Begin cut in with the suggestion that Haddad be appointed chief of staff, the meeting disintegrated into a shouting match. The loudest voice in the room was that of Sharon. Sharon reminded Gemayel that Israel had Lebanon in its grasp and told him he would be well advised to do what was expected of him. Gemayel held out both arms to Sharon. "Put the handcuffs on!" he cried. "I am your vassal." The meeting ended abruptly and acrimoniously and without any agreement being reached.⁴⁵

Reagan Plan

On the same day, September 1, President Reagan proposed a new initiative designed to reinvigorate the Camp David Accords. The Reagan Plan called for a freeze on Israeli settlements on the West Bank and denied Israeli claims of sovereignty over that area and Gaza. At the same time Reagan rejected the idea of an independent Palestinian state. Instead, he called for “full Palestinian autonomy,” to be realized through confederation with Jordan in such a manner that “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians” would be realized without compromising the “legitimate security concerns of Israel.” Reagan repudiated the basic PLO and Israeli positions. He pointedly remarked that in America’s view, “the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza,” thereby denying Begin’s claim that these areas were excluded. At the same time Reagan implicitly and the new secretary of state, George Shultz, explicitly dismissed the right of Palestinians to “self-determination,” since to them it meant an independent state.⁶³

Per Ross

Given Jordan's centrality to the plan, Nick Veliotis, the assistant secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, flew secretly to Amman to present the initiative to King Hussein on August 20, eleven days before Begin would be briefed by Sam Lewis. Veliotis reported that the king reacted positively to the plan and would shortly respond in writing to it. Above all else, he said that Hussein wanted assurances that we would stay the course and stick to our opposition to both Palestinian statehood and Israeli sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as our support for the political association between the Palestinian entity and Jordan.⁵⁹ Shultz received the king's formal written response within twenty-four hours after Veliotis's discus-

sions with him, but it conveyed a very different message from the one the assistant secretary heard and reported. In Shultz's words, before the king could do anything, the United States "had to get wide Arab support, go far toward meeting PLO needs, and make clear that this initiative was not linked to Camp David."⁶⁰

Because

Veliotos and Ames both claimed it was a good response and were confident Hussein “would come around.” Shultz, not prone to wishful thinking or inclined to put the best face on the Arabs’ positions, would say the letter amounted to a no. The king was asking us “to stay the course but was not going to get on course himself.”⁶¹ Even when our ambassador to Jordan, Dick Viets, cabled that the king was giving the initiative a “green light” and would be going to the Saudis, the PLO, and the Egyptians to seek their support to cooperate with us, Shultz was skeptical, saying that although his “Arabist advisers” saw the king as being forthcoming, his view was that Hussein would support us only if he had a broad Arab consensus behind him, and that was unlikely to be forthcoming. At this time only King Hussein had been briefed—though without Shultz knowing, Ames would convey to Arafat a two-page summary of the Reagan plan before Begin was presented it.⁶² Notwithstanding the Ford-Rabin letter, which obligated us to go to the Israelis before presenting any peace initiative, the administration had not done this. Why?

Rejection

There are probably two explanations. First, the anger over Israel's behavior during the course of the siege was very high, and the impulse to be attentive to a leadership that misled us was correspondingly low. Second, the well-founded presumption was that Begin would reject the proposal and probably try to get his friends in Congress and the American Jewish community to put pressure on the administration to "block the initiative."⁶³

More Ross

They were certainly right about Begin's rejection, though they underestimated how bitter he would be. Sam Lewis briefed Begin on August 31, the day before Reagan gave the speech, and the Israeli prime minister was surprised. No doubt, he was hoping for a respite after finally producing withdrawal of PLO forces from Lebanon. Riveted on the price Israel had paid in casualties—not his lost credibility with Reagan—he could focus only on what he saw as an American betrayal. The United States had betrayed its commitment to come to Israel first; we were walking away from the Camp David Accords that left the final status issues to be resolved by the parties after the transition period and not by the United States stating its position when it had not even consulted with Israel. Even before the president's speech, Begin and his cabinet vehemently rejected the Reagan Plan, without

Continued

even waiting for the Arab leaders' reaction. Begin publicly denounced
then conveyed his anger to Reagan: "We have chosen for the last two y
to call our countries friends and allies; such being the case, a friend doe
weaken his friend, an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy; this woul
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Reaction to begin Plan

even waiting for the Arab leaders' reaction. Begin publicly denounced it, then conveyed his anger to Reagan: "We have chosen for the last two years to call our countries friends and allies; such being the case, a friend does not weaken his friend, an ally does not put his ally in jeopardy; this would be the inevitable consequence for the positions transmitted to me on Aug. 31 to become a reality. I believe they won't."⁶⁴

The Arabs felt little need to respond publicly to the Reagan Plan, but they would also not embrace it. Indeed, when an Arab summit convened in September, it adopted positions completely at variance with it: calling for a Palestinian state; reaffirming the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians; and demanding Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines.

The Reagan Plan would gain us nothing with the Arabs, but would not mark the low point in U.S.-Israel relations.

Then What Happens?

- Bashir Gamayel assassinated 9/14/82!
- Who did it?
 - Palestinians?
 - Syrians?
 - No one knows.
- But it knocked out Sharon's plan for a new political order in Lebanon because
 - Bashir 's younger brother Amin becomes president
 - and he has close ties to Syria
- And "...Israel learns the hard way that Bashir nor Amin did not fully represent the Phalange and the Phalange did not represent the whole Maronite community and the Maronite Community did not speak for all Lebanese Christians, and that Maronite Christians were no longer in a period of ascendancy."
- Shlaim claims assassination was used as a pretext to send Israeli forces into West Beirut in areas formerly held by PLO and then allows the Phalangists to enter the refugee camps on the south side of Beirut on 9/16—Sabra & Shalita
- Smith says Gamayel agreed to it on 9/12

Which Results In

Inside the camps the revenge-thirsty Christian militiamen perpetrated a terrible massacre, killing hundreds of men, women, and children. Israel estimated the number of dead at seven to eight hundred, while the Palestinian Red Crescent put the number at over two thousand. The carnage went on from the evening of Thursday, 16 September, until Sunday. Already on Thursday evening, not long after dropping their Christian allies outside the camps, Israeli soldiers got wind of the massacre but did nothing to stop it. Begin heard about the massacre when listening to the BBC on Saturday afternoon. He called Sharon, who promised to get a report from the IDF. At first official spokesmen tried to obscure the fact that the Christian militia men entered the refugee camps with the knowledge and help of the IDF commanders. Begin himself said, more than a touch self-righteously, "*Goyim* [non-Jews] are killing *goyim*, and the whole world is trying to hang Jews for the crime." Nevertheless, as Rabbi Arthur

And U.S. Reaction

ing to hang Jews for the crime.” Nevertheless, as Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, a liberal American-Jewish leader, prophetically observed, Menachem Begin could not remain in office “if he has squandered Israel’s fundamental asset—its respect for itself and the respect of the world.”⁴⁷ The sense of shock and revulsion in Israel and the international outcry forced the government to appoint a commission of inquiry under Supreme Court Justice

Vishhak Kohan

assassination, Shultz had a very tough exchange with Moshe Arens, in which the Israeli ambassador said, “Without Israeli forces in Beirut now, all hell would break loose . . . You want Israelis to clean up the mess while you Americans stay clean with the Arabs!” And Shultz responded, “The occupy-

ing power of a city is responsible for everything that takes place there; Israel should not want such a responsibility, nor can it possibly fulfill it.”⁶⁵ The slaughter in the camps had made Shultz’s words prophetic.

And Thus

The Kahan Commission presented its report on 7 February 1983. It concluded that Israel bore indirect responsibility for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, inasmuch as the Phalange entered the refugee camps with the knowledge of the government and with the encouragement of the army. It recommended the removal of the minister of defense and a number of senior officers from their posts. Sharon immediately announced his rejection of the findings and the recommendations of the Kahan Commission. On 14 February the cabinet decided, by a majority of sixteen against Sharon's single vote, to accept the recommendations of the Kahan report. Sharon remained in the cabinet as minister without portfolio. He was replaced as minister of defense by Moshe Arens, the ambassador to the United States.

Israel? Bore Indirect Responsibility?

Excerpts from Report

- It is our view that responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for having disregarded the danger of acts of vengeance and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population of the refugee camps, and having failed to take this danger into account when he decided to have the Phalangists enter the camps. In addition, responsibility is to be imputed to the Minister of Defense for not ordering appropriate measures for preventing or reducing the danger of massacre as a condition for the Phalangists' entry into the camps. These blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.
- We determine that the Chief of Staff's inaction, described above, and his order to provide the Phalangist forces with tractors, or a tractor, constitute a breach of duty and dereliction of the duty incumbent upon the Chief of Staff.
- This inaction constitutes breach of the duty incumbent on the director of Military Intelligence in this capacity.

But Still Cooperation?

- Ross goes to Israel to meet with IDF to gain an agreement on learning the operational and doctrinal lessons of the war
- Why?
- Israeli tactics had worked effectively against Soviet arms.
- The IDF used drones, which was an eye opener for the U.S.
- Agreement reached, but Weinberger vetoed it. Why?
- He wasn't in favor of improving relationship with Israel according to Ross.
- But Congress passes a bill to provide \$250 million in aid to Israel, even though even Reagan and Schultz oppose.
- Reagan and Schultz oppose because Habib is making no headway in getting IDF out of Lebanon
- Congress also demanded that Hussein negotiate directly with Israel, without the PLO, which mirrored Israel requirements. , but Hussein breaks off talks

Habib Negotiations

President Reagan decided to send our own forces back into Beirut with the French and Italians, reconstituting the MNF, after demanding that the Israeli forces leave the city. The Israelis withdrew, remaining in the surrounding areas and close to the airport, where our contingent of forces—U.S. Marines—would deploy.

Weinberger resisted any serious patrolling or active role for our forces. The division between him and Shultz and Habib, who was now charged with helping the Lebanese reestablish their independence as he negotiated the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces from Lebanon, would become even wider. Shultz and Habib felt the U.S. forces, with their French and Italian counterparts, needed to play an active role in filling the vacuum, providing law and order and helping the Lebanese reconstitute their army so at some point Lebanon could be responsible for its own security. Weinberger wanted our forces simply to hunker down and stay put at the airport—let others play the role Habib sought.

Amin Gemayel, Bashir's brother, was elected as the new Lebanese president with very active Saudi backing. The Saudis assured us that the Syrians would withdraw their forces from Lebanon if we could get the Israelis to withdraw from the country—and Habib focused on trying to produce an agreement on withdrawal even as he mediated among the different Lebanese groups in an effort to shape a working political consensus.⁶⁷

Habib Report

From the time of the PLO's withdrawal, Habib had emphasized that the future of Lebanon depended on getting all foreign forces out. So long as Israel was there, Syria had a pretext to stay. In September, with his forces having suffered terrible losses, Hafez al Assad had committed to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia that Syrian forces would be withdrawn if the Israelis left. For Habib, this became a mantra: if Israel withdrew, everything could fall into place in Lebanon. In a lunch with Reagan after the president's return from his Latin American trip in December, Habib said that as long as the Israelis refused to withdraw from the country, "the Arabs would cite their refusal as proof that they didn't want peace, and that it was a waste of the Arabs' time to negotiate with Habib." Reagan instructed Habib on his return to the area to tell Begin that "Israel's intransigence might cost it its special relationship with America."⁷⁰

Security Agreement?

Angered by the collapse of the American overture to Husayn when the Soviets were rearming Damascus, Shultz, after much wrangling over terms, engineered a Lebanese-Israeli security agreement, signed on May 17, 1983, that provided for Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon. This was conditional on a similar commitment from Damascus, highly unlikely because Shultz had excluded Syria from the talks. The agreement in effect ratified continued Israeli control of southern Lebanon through proxies. Haddad's forces would be integrated with other troops from the southern region into the reconstituted Lebanese army that would oversee the area; no troops from central and northern Lebanon could enter the south. If implemented, the treaty would have forced Syria to concede the loss of any influence in Lebanon but allowed Israel to retain a major foothold through Haddad.

Not the least of the...

And More Fighting

...not as a whole from being "incorporated into the Soviet bloc."⁷² In the renewed clash between regional tensions and global anti-Soviet perceptions of their significance in Washington, the latter again emerged victorious, to Israel's benefit. Shultz and Reagan, over Defense Department objections, decided to offer Israel a strategic agreement aimed at increasing "military and political cooperation" to counter "the threat to our mutual interests posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East." The agreement also offered advanced military technology and favorable aid terms.⁷³ No conditions applied and Israel did not restrict its settlement activities on the West Bank, which the United States opposed.

In Lebanon itself, the United States escalated its attacks on Syrian positions, which culminated in air strikes and bombardments by the USS *Nev Jersey* at the turn of the year. With his aides divided on the merits of further confrontation, Reagan played both sides of the issue. Having accused his critics of seeking to surrender American interests, he decided to remove the troops from Lebanon and to deploy them on ships offshore. He then ordered renewed shelling of Druze and Shi'i positions, creating a facade of militancy behind which the American navy sailed away in February 1984, leaving Lebanon an open battleground for regional competitors.⁷⁴ With Syria the apparent victor, Amin Gemayel now declared the security agreement with Israel to be dead. Assad would be the new broker of a Lebanese political pact if any could be achieved.

Reasons for Failure

negotiations with Amin Gemayel about the withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon. This policy of toughness, however, failed to achieve its objectives. The Syrians had no intention of honoring the 17 May agreement, which completely ignored their interests. The American-Israeli axis was not equal to the task of deterring Syria or keeping President Gemayel's domestic opponents at bay. In March 1984 he was summoned to Damascus and ordered to abrogate the 17 May agreement. Israel's policy shifted as a result from reliance on the Lebanese government and army to seeking security arrangements in southern Lebanon in collaboration with its Christian proxies there. Under Shamir's leadership Israel thus remained involved in the protracted and costly, but inconclusive, conflict in Lebanon.

The political results of the war could hardly have been more

Consequences of the “War of Choice”

noes when put to the test. The greatest misconception, and the one underlying all the others, lay in thinking that Israel's military superiority could be translated into lasting political achievements. In fact, the exchange rate between military power and political gains has never been favorable in Israel's case, and the Lebanon War was no exception. Sharon misread the Israeli political map by not realizing that national consensus was bound to fracture, given the offensive and expansionist character of this war. In his planning for the destruction of the PLO, Sharon underestimated the organization's resilience and the nonmilitary sources of its strength. Sharon also misread the Lebanese political map and deluded himself in believing that Maronite hegemony could be asserted in the face of all the opposition. Sharon counted on political change inside Lebanon to start a chain reaction that would eclipse all of Israel's enemies and catapult it into a position of unchallengeable regional mastery. The political change that Sharon sought in Lebanon could only be achieved over Syria's dead body. Sharon realized, though he never admitted this to his cabinet colleagues, that the expulsion of the Syrian forces from Lebanon was essential if Israel was to emerge as the dominant regional power. But, once again, he underestimated Syria's tenacity and resilience. Syria suffered serious military setbacks during the Lebanon War, but, like Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Suez War, Hafez al-Assad snatched a political victory out of the jaws of military defeat.

Smith's Conclusions

As American forces departed from Lebanon's shores in early 1984, the U.S. policy lay in ruins, the victim of the perceptions of its policymakers as well as the entangled web of regional and communal hatreds. The Reagan administration had assumed contradictory postures. Despite Syria's importance to any agreement, Washington did not address Syrian concerns; it excluded Syria from its strategic alliance aimed at expelling Soviet influence from the region. Though opposed in principle to Israeli actions, the administration either willingly or unwittingly became captive to Israel's strategic designs encompassed within the framework of the 1982 war. Frustrated by Israeli excesses and those of its clients, the Reagan government then tried to restore the internal balance in Lebanon by gaining the withdrawal of both Syria and Israel, but it did so without Syria's agreement and in terms clearly supportive of Israel's objectives. America's inability to impose its will on Syria aroused Washington's wrath, resulting in bombardments that indicated petulance rather than strategy. The

And Smith Further States

retaliatory bombing of the marines' barracks signaled the bankruptcy of the United States' attempt to force the issue. What remained was a return to a total global perspective, dominated by the polarization of American and Soviet interests and clients, in which Israel played a willing and prominent role.

Shlaim's Analysis

Shi'ites had at first welcomed Israel's 1982 assault as a means of ousting the PLO. But they and most southern Lebanese soon turned against Israel, angered by its exploitation of the region including blockading access to northern markets and dumping Israeli goods on the domestic economy to deliberately undercut local merchants. These steps, coupled with roundups and abductions of suspected "terrorists," ignited attacks and suicide bombings, both locally inspired and directed from Damascus. In retaliation, Israeli terror squads invaded villages and assassinated those who they claimed were involved in the assaults.

Here, Israel faced a new and formidable adversary, the Iranian-backed Shi'ite force Hizbollah (Party of God), which replaced Amal after 1982 as the major military wing of the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. Hizbollah's militancy challenged Israel, as well as its client Lebanese forces in the southern zone, and triggered Israeli air strikes and the kidnapping of Hizbollah leaders.⁷⁶ These confrontations reached such intensity, with increasingly high Israeli casualties, that in 2000 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak would order Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the enclave, accompanied by many Lebanese refugees who had sided with Israel since the 1980s.

And Consequences

- 4/18/83 - U.S . Embassy in Beirut bombed resulting in 63 dead
- 5/17/83 – George Schultz negotiates a peace agreement that formally terminated the state of war and recognized the international border.
- Requires Syrian and Israeli forces to withdraw, but
- Assad does not agree. Why?
 - Syria had been excluded from talks
 - Soviets had rebuilt Syrian armed forces
 - Provided Soviet crews to man long range SAM-5s
 - Syria can gain control of Beirut Damascus Highway
- Israel's proxy forces under Haddad would remain in the south
- Intercommunal fighting in Lebanon begins again.

With U.S. in the Middle

- Because of Israeli withdrawal
- White House orders naval bombardment of Druze positions resulting in mostly civilian casualties
- Resulting in suicide bombing of Marine barracks in 10/83 and 241 deaths
- Druze leader warns of similar action if the U.S. pursued "... its hostile policy toward the Arab and Islamic world"
- Reagan argued that keeping the Marines in Lebanon was "... central to U.S. credibility on a global scale "and from stopping the Middle East as a whole from being "...incorporated into the Soviet bloc"

Conclusion

- According to Shlaim, Begin's unstated reason for the war in Lebanon was to secure Israel's hold over Judea and Samaria
- "But the quest for absolute security is self-defeating because it generates insecurity on the part of one's enemies and prompts them to resort to countermeasures that they see as self-defense. The result is a vicious circle of power measures and insecurity" Shlaim. P423.
- Do you agree?

Internal Lebanon Postscript

- Internal fighting continues
- Arab heads of state meet in Taif, Saudi Arabia to draft a peace plan which is unsuccessful as the new president is assassinated by diehard Maronite Christian groups led by General Michael Aoun
- Stalemate not resolved until October of 1990 during the American mobilization of forces in Saudi Arabia against Iraq that Syria agreed to join
- New moderate president asks Syria to oust his fellow Maronite General Anoun
- Though officially denied the Syrian action was cleared by Washington as a payoff to Syria for joining the alliance
- Syria becomes the de facto ruler of Lebanon in 1991

And Then There is Operation Salt Fish

- Killing Yassir Arafat
- This operation set up when Lebanon War started in June 1982
- Preceded by Operation Olympia
 - Massive rally in Beirut stadium on 1/182 to celebrate the PLO's first operation against Israel
 - Massive set of bombs to be planted under VIP dais to destroy entire PLO leadership
 - And 3 vehicles loaded with explosives to be detonated after the dais exploded
- But Begin shuts down Operation Olympia because AMMAN tells Begin "The whole world will be after us"

Many Attempts/Opportunities

- 7/3/82 - Israeli journalists interview Arafat in Beirut
- Salt Fish Team trailed them, but lost them
 - Apparently willing to kill Journalist in attempt to kill Arafat
- 8/4/82- Intelligence that Arafat attending a meeting in Beirut
 - Chief of Staff and head of IAF actually pilot a plane to bomb Arafat, but the bombs hit just before Arafat arrived!
- 10/82-Mossad get's information that Arafat is on a transport leaving Athens
 - F-15's scrambled to shoot plane down
 - At last minute Mossad & Amman confirm it is Arafat's younger brother on the plane with 30 wounded Palestinian children from the Sabra& Shatila massacre

Sharon's Directives

- From 11/82-1/83 F-15's and 16's were scrambled at least 5 times to shoot down a commercial airliner believed to be carrying Arafat
- Plan was to shoot down plane in a spot over the Mediterranean beyond Israel's radar and radio range , but coordinated by a 707 overhead
- In each case the air force intentionally obstructed the operation
- Why?
- Air Force head believed order was manifestly illegal under the "Black Flag Test" and eventually so stated to Chief of Staff

Begin Announces resignation 8/28/83

- Why?


... had a common enemy—Israel. ... but now all the communi

Moreover, the war in Lebanon had a very negative effect on Arab perceptions of Israel. By honoring its commitment to withdraw from Sinai, Israel had gained much credit in Egypt and some credit in the rest of the Arab world. Egypt could hold its head high and show the skeptics that the peace with Israel yielded tangible benefits. By invading Lebanon, Israel dissipated all the credit and placed Egypt in a highly uncomfortable position. The massive force that Israel deployed in Lebanon, the scale of the suffering it inflicted, the siege of Beirut, and the massacre in Sabra and Shatila stunned the entire Arab world, and above all the Egyptians. The Egyptians were convinced that Israel's aim was to impose on Lebanon a separate peace by force. While they had an interest in other Arab countries following in their footsteps and making peace with Israel, they utterly rejected the means employed by Israel to this end. The Egyptians did not renounce the peace treaty with Israel, but they recalled their ambassador from Tel Aviv, froze the process of normalization, and took refuge in what Minister of State Boutros Boutros-Ghali was first to term a "cold peace."⁵⁰

After his resignation Begin became a recluse. He retreated to his home a man broken in body and spirit. The reason for his resignation remained something of a puzzle, since he himself never explained why he could no longer carry on. Psychologically, he had always tended to swing from high elation to deep depression, and the death of his wife, Aliza, in September 1982, plunged him into deep depression. On the political plane the war in Lebanon was probably the main cause for his disappointment and despair. The war that Begin said would last two days was now in its second year, with no end in sight. The cost of the war in human lives, to which Begin was particularly sensitive, was mounting all the time.

Shamir Becomes Prime Minister

- Born Yizhak Yezernitsky, 10/22/15, Ruzhany , Grodno province, Russian Empire
- Member of Betar
- Studied law at University of Warsaw, but then
- Emigrates to Palestine in 1915
- Changed his name to Shamir “thorn that stabs a rock and can cut steel.”
- Joined the Irgun
- 1940- joined Stern Gang when split
- 1943- became leader of Stern Gang
- 1946- Arrested, escapes and granted political asylum in France
- 1948- Came back to Israel where he ordered the murder of Count Folke Bernadotte
- Israel declares Stern gang a terrorist organization, Shamir arrested, but then given a state pardon



Shamir's Government Positions

- 1955-Joins Mossad
- 1973- Elected to Knesset as member of Likud (initially Herut)
- 1977- Speaker of Knesset
- 1980- Foreign Minister
- 1983-1992 Prime Minister

Shamir Ideology

In terms of outlook and ideology, however, the difference between Shamir and Begin was not all that great. Both were disciples of Ze'ev Jabotinsky. Both were dedicated to the Land of Israel. Both subscribed to the lachrymose version of Jewish history, seeing it as a long series of trials and tribulations culminating in the Holocaust. Both were suspicious of outside powers, and both were strong advocates of Israeli self-reliance. In some ways Shamir was more intransigent than Begin. For Shamir there could be no retreat from any territory, not just the territory of the Land of Israel. That was why he opposed withdrawal from Sinai and why he supported the annexation of the Golan Heights. He was generally unreceptive to the idea of bargaining and compromise, his natural instinct being to stand firm in the face of external pressure.

Shamir visits Reagan

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Weinberger Objects

strategic cooperation.

On November 29, 1983, Prime Minister Shamir visited the White House, and President Reagan announced the formation of a Joint Political Military Group (JPMG) with Israel, which would “examine ways in which we can enhance U.S.-Israel cooperation. This group will give priority attention to the threat to our mutual interest posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East.” The administration was particularly concerned about a growing Soviet military presence in Syria that in many ways recalled the

Notwithstanding Weinberger's continuing fear that we would pay a terrible price for any security cooperation with the Israelis, there was little practical Arab reaction. Indeed, much as was the case after the Six-Day War when no Arab state receiving U.S. arms wanted anything to change, the announcement of the JPMG had no impact on our security relationships with any Arab state. According to Howard Teicher, who was on the NSC staff and involved in cooperative programs with a number of Arab states, “None of Washington's Arab military allies decreased the level of their ongoing joint planning or cooperation with the United States.”⁸²

Reagan's Global View

ity prevailed, and Weinberger's fears about the consequences of strategic cooperation with Israel did not materialize because those Arab leaders who depended on us saw no alternative to that dependence. No one could take our place. They were drawn to us not by values but by interests. They might urge us to press Israel to change its policies or not to embarrass them by asking for certain forms of public security cooperation, but they were not going to make what mattered to them dependent on what we did with Israel.

Shas Formed 1984

- By Sephardic Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef
- Shas is an acronym for Shomrei Sefarad which can be translated as either Sephardic guardians of the Torah or Guardians of the Sephardim
- Religiously Orthodox
- Took care of Mizrachi social and educational needs
- Even Mizrachim who were not particularly religious were attracted to the party instead of supporting the largely secular Likud

Aryeh Deri

- Considered co-founder of Shas
- Gordis attributes Shas rise in popularity to him as he is described as an astute politician and charismatic.
- Receives 4 seats in Knesset in 1984
- And by 1999 receives 13% of the vote and 17 seats in the Knesset
- But in 1999 he is convicted of corruption and goes to prison.



New Vision of Zionism Described by Deri

Now secular Israelis are afraid that Shas will change the secular character of the state. They call themselves Zionists, but they are not really Zionists. Their movement is a movement of heresy. They see our fathers and mothers as primitives. They wanted to convert them. They sent them to remote towns and villages where life was hard. They gave their children a good-for-nothing education. Until we came and began taking care of all these people who were suffering in all these remote places. That's why they are afraid of us. That's why they persecute us. And this persecution is both ethnic and religious. But the more they humiliate us, the more we will grow. We shall change the character of the State of Israel.²

And what about the Arabs?

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Benefits from 1967-1981

- Per capita income in Gaza Strip increases from \$80 to \$1,700
- In West Bank GDP triples
- In 1967 only 18% of households in Gaza had electricity
- By 1981 it was 89%
- But Gaza overcrowded
- Untreated sewage ran in the streets
- Many homes didn't have running water.
- Economic growth stalled in the mid 1980's
- And there were still refugee camps

But


During the 1970s and 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood became the most prominent of the Islamist organizations. In many places in the Arab world, it began developing effective systems for providing critical social services—services that the secular governments had failed to provide.³ Its social service organizations, though, brought with them a distinct, highly traditionalist religious message, which spread rapidly. Soon, the impact could be seen plainly on the Arab street. There were more women donning a hijab (a traditional Muslim headdress), more bearded men (also a sign of greater religious devotion). Twenty years after the Six-Day War, a new devotion to Islam could be seen in the religious institutions being created everywhere Israelis looked.

National Unity Government

- Election 7/23/84
- Inflation running at 400% according to Shlaim
- And 1,260% in 1985 according to Ross
- In the 1984 elections, both major parties made the mistake of assuming that the floating vote was centrist and moderate. Hence, both tried to move toward the middle in their election campaigning and to gloss over the issues in the process. This, in turn, led to a shift among those voters not irrevocably wedded to either party. Disgusted with the wishy-washy character of the major party campaigns, they turned toward the smaller parties. It was only when the Likud caught on to what was happening and began to project a firmer image that it recovered enough of those voters within its camp and on the margins to prevent a significant Labor victory.
- Labor Alignment wins 44 seats
- Likud wins 41 seats
- Compromise
 - 1st 25 months Peres serves as P.M. and Shamir Deputy P.M. and foreign minister
 - Then swap positions for an additional 25 months
 - Rabin is Defense minister for 50 months
 - Inner Cabinet established with 5 members from each party with majority required to reach a recommendation to full cabinet

Shimon Peres

- Born 8/2/23-Szymon Perski in Wiszniew, Poland
- Home educated in Poland by Haredi grandfather
- Followed his father with his family to Palestine in 1934
- After agriculture education in Israel became farmer and was founder of Kibbutz Almont
- Became a protege to Ben-Gurion in 1943
- Peres and Dayan chosen as 2 youth delegates in the Mapai delegation to Zionist Congress in Basel
- In early 1950's studied English, Economics and philosophy at NYU and advanced management at Harvard
- Spoke 6 languages
- Nobel Peace Prize 1994
- First cousin to Lauren Bacall (born Betty Joan Persky)
- Died 9/28/16



Shimon Peres Government Positions

- 1947-Joins Hagganah –responsible for personnel and arms purchases
- 1948-Heads naval service
- 1952-Deputy Director –General of Ministry of Defense
- MK from 1959-2007
- Transportation Minister- 1970-1974
- Defense Minister-1974-1977; 1995-1996
- Finance Minister- 1988-1990
- Foreign Minister 1986-1988; 1992-1995; 2001-2002
- Prime Minister-1984-1986; 1995-1996
- President- 2007-2014

The Odd Couple

to Israel; Shamir believed that any change in Arab attitudes was merely tactical and that the ultimate aim of all Arabs was the destruction of the State of Israel and the throwing of the Jews into the sea. This belief was encapsulated in his often repeated saying "The Arabs are the same Arabs, and the sea is the same sea." Peres believed that the status quo in the occupied territories could not be sustained for very long; Shamir regarded the preservation of the status quo as the supreme national interest. The foreign policy styles of the two men were also markedly different. Peres was predisposed to debate and dialogue with political opponents, to cultivating international contacts, to exploiting opportunities and making deals. He combined extraordinary talent for persuasion and conciliation with dogged tenacity. Shamir, by contrast, was sullen and suspicious, prone to seeing only dangers and traps, contemptuous of compromises, and steadfast in his resistance to international pressures to make peace. The two-headed government they formed was bound to be at cross-purposes and to speak with more than one voice. The arrangement they worked out for sharing the premiership was certainly odd, and they themselves were described, not inaccurately, as the odd couple.

Peres Priorities

- Bring inflation under control
- Get the IDF out of Lebanon
- Revive the Middle East Peace process

The Economy

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Lebanon

During the remainder of the Reagan administration, we built on the institutional framework for strategic cooperation and added significantly to our help to Israel. The change was dramatic. We concluded a Free Trade Agreement. At the initiative of George Shultz, we provided Israel an infusion of \$1.5 billion per year above the annual Camp David allotment in 1985 and 1986 to help Israel deal with hyperinflation. Shimon Peres was the prime minister in a national unity government at that time, and he agreed to a series of economic reforms that Shultz required in order for us to provide the additional grant assistance. These monies and the reforms succeeded in reducing Israel's staggering inflation of 1,260 percent in 1985 to 15 percent in 1986.

Out of Lebanon

Peres's second achievement was to get the IDF out of Lebanon. The war in Lebanon had cost Israel 660 dead, exacerbated its economic difficulties, subverted the national consensus on security, and tarnished Israel's image abroad. The war also spawned a new militant group named Hizbullah (Party of God) which, with Iranian and Syrian support, conducted a fierce guerrilla war to drive Israel's soldiers out of Lebanon. All the efforts to obtain the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon in return for withdrawing Israel's forces had failed. The IDF chiefs favored an orderly unilateral withdrawal in order to cut their losses in Lebanon. Yet most of the Likud ministers remained unconvinced of the necessity to withdraw. In the struggle to persuade the cabinet to agree to disengage from Lebanon, Peres found in Yitzhak Rabin a strong ally. Rabin presented a detailed plan to the inner cabinet for a phased withdrawal that would leave the IDF patrolling a narrow security zone along the border in collaboration with its proxy, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). The Likud ministers, led by Shamir, opposed the plan, but their ranks broke when David Levy, the minister of housing, voted for the plan. This meant that the plan could be recommended to the full cabinet. On 4 January 1985 the cabinet approved the plan. Nearly all the Likud ministers, including Shamir, supported the plan.

Revive Middle East Peace Process

- Peres wants to change the climate surrounding Israel's relations with its neighbors and project himself as a statesman with a vision and a reasonable actor with a genuine interest in regional stability and peace
- How?
- Give back Taba?
- A beach resort at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba that was retained at the time of withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982.
- Begin had allowed a luxury resort and holiday village to be built.
- Shlaim says this was retained as a future negotiating tool, not because Israel was legally entitled to it.
- Mubarak wouldn't meet with Peres until this dispute was resolved.

But First Convince Israel Cabinet

- Mubarak offers to reestablish normal relations with Israel and return the Egyptian ambassador to Israel
- Mubarak wants to go to arbitration
- Peres willing to accept
- Inner cabinet split down the middle because Likud would not accept.
- Full cabinet accepts after a 12 hour meeting.
- Arbitrators eventually find in favor of Egypt and in 3/89 Taba returned to Egypt

Shamir's Reaction

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And then there is the Jordanian Option

- Peres felt there were 2 bad alternatives
 - Annexation of West Bank
 - Continuing Jewish occupation
- First alternative Peres felt would undermine democratic and Jewish character of Israel
- Second alternative requires control of 1.5 million Arabs at a substantial cost.
- Jordanian Option- Give to Jordan the heavily populated areas of the West Bank and Gaza and retain the strategically important areas in Israel's hands
- Shamir agrees.

How?

- Camp David Model
- Direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan with the involvement of the U.S.
- Hussein is open to negotiations, but he faces problems
- What are they?

So

In his memoirs Shamir wrote, "It wasn't a happy moment for me; I remained unhappily convinced that if we had held out united we could have kept Taba—without forfeiting anything—and I thought it was ironic that I, and those who like myself resist handing over bits of land to Israel's enemies, should be castigated for 'fanaticism' while no one at all protested or even paid any attention (except the Likud) when the Egyptians, risking peace itself, clutched at Taba solely for reasons of national prestige. Of course nothing changed after Taba; it was as though nothing had happened."³ These comments merit close attention for a number of reasons. First and most striking is the fact that Shamir referred to Egypt as an enemy, although it had signed a peace treaty with Israel a decade earlier. Then there was Shamir's disregard for international law and for the rights of other states. Last but not least, these comments betrayed a complete inability on the part of Shamir to comprehend any point of view except his own.

But

Now he was prepared to consider commencing negotiations without preconditions, but he faced two problems. First, the Arab League summit, in Rabat in 1974, had endorsed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. So he could not enter into official negotiations with Israel without the approval of the PLO. Second, the Arab League summit at Fez, Morocco, in 1982 had endorsed the idea of negotiations with Israel but only within the framework of an international conference. So he could not embark on separate negotiations with Israel without the Arab world turning against him, perhaps fatally. To overcome these problems Hussein proposed an international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and of all the parties to the conflict, including the

SO

problems Hussein proposed an international conference with the participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and of all the parties to the conflict, including the

Palestinians. An international conference, he hoped, would enable him to remain within the limits of the inter-Arab consensus while providing a cover for the direct talks that the Israelis wanted so badly.

In Israel

In Israel, however, the idea of an international conference was extremely unpopular. An international conference was equated with an externally imposed solution, and this was rejected by all the mainstream parties. The Labor Party had always resisted the idea, preferring direct talks with individual Arab states. Peres was not prepared to allow outside powers to have a say in determining Israel's borders, and he feared that at an international conference the most extreme Arab parties would set the tone. The Likud regarded an international conference not as a forum for negotiations but as a code for forcing Israel to relinquish the occupied territories. Shamir was especially vehement and vocal in his rejection of an international conference in any guise or form. He maintained that an international conference would imperil Israel's very existence. The reasons were set out in his memoirs: "I thought that we would all too soon find ourselves more and more isolated, under the kind of intensive international pressure that we might be unable to withstand, and forced to yield to Arab demands (backed by almost everyone else) that would return Israel to the untenable territorial situation in which we had lived prior to 1967."⁵ The

What's the Challenge Facing Peres?

Find a formula to enable Hussein to open talks with Israel under an international umbrella and to set up a Jordanian Palestinian team for the talks bypassing the PLO

And Hussein and Arafat Issue a Joint Statement

he needed to gain legitimacy for negotiating over the future of the West Bank from his nemesis—Yasser Arafat. On 11 February 1985 he and Arafat concluded an agreement on a common approach to a peace process involving Israel. The aim was Palestinian self-determination exercised through a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, and the method was a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to negotiate with Israel at an international conference and an “out at the beginning, in at the end” formula for PLO participation. The three conditions that the PLO was expected to meet in order to qualify for participation at a later stage were to accept Resolution 242, to recognize Israel’s right to exist, and to renounce violence. These were the conditions that Henry Kissinger had laid down in 1975 for talks between the United States and the PLO. The

But

call for a Palestinian state on the West Bank that would include East Jerusalem, but this “state” would exist in confederation with Jordan, whose ruler would have final authority over it. Israel would withdraw completely from the occupied territories in return for peace. Jordanian officials said that by accepting inclusion in a confederation with Jordan, Arafat was implicitly abandoning the 1968 PLO Charter that called for Palestinian statehood in what was now Israel. This meant acceptance of Israel’s existence, to be acknowledged openly if a settlement were reached.

U.S. Reaction

- “The administration was unenthusiastic about the idea of an international conference, because it involved Soviet participation on an equal footing with the U.S., but it was more than willing to try and devise some sort of international cover for Jordanian –Israeli negotiations”
- What does International cover mean?

But Peres Still wants to Pursue the Peace Process Because

Husayn would have preferred to regain the West Bank without Arafat, but he needed an alliance with the PLO to legitimize his aspirations in the eyes of the Arab world as well as in those of West Bank Arabs. For his part, Arafat had no love for Husayn but saw him as a vehicle through which to gain U.S. support for PLO involvement in the negotiating process. Both viewed American approval of their overtures as a way to stop further Israeli settlements in the territories, but Arafat's gambit was restricted by obligations to his constituency. He would not recognize Israel before being accepted into the international diplomatic arena, since to do so would prejudice his position within PLO councils. Thus, he could not take the one initiative that would have forced the American hand, namely, open acceptance of Resolution 242.²

Peres Meets with Hussein and Agreed to Move Forward in Stages

1. Jordanian – Palestinian delegation would meet with the assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern affairs
2. PLO would meet the U.S. conditions for a dialogue
3. But Peres would not agree on the King's desire to have a joint delegation that included some PLO supporters

But

- According to George Schultz's memoirs: Peres said if PLO supporters were included in the delegation in the preliminary talks Israel would live with it even though they would publicly object.
- But, again according to Schultz: Shamir said he didn't want any Palestinians to be included even in the preliminary negotiations.
- So the unity government is speaking out of both sides of its mouth
- Reagan decides there should be no ambiguity about their refusal to deal with anyone even vaguely connected to the PLO. Why?
- Because when Arafat sought U.S. recognition of the Palestinian right to "self-determination" even in the context of a confederation with Jordan, this meant a Palestinian State, which was also anathema to Israel

Thus

the peace process had ripened. He listed four reasons. The first concerned the Iran-Iraq war. This focused Iraq on containing the Iranian-Shiite threat in the Arab world, and as a consequence Baghdad had come to accept Egypt's strategy of accommodation with Israel. Second, the position of the PLO had changed as a result of the loss of its military infrastructure in Lebanon. This change accounted for the Hussein-Arafat pact, for the splits in the PLO between the radicals and the moderates, for the decision of the moderates to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem in partnership with Jordan, and for their willingness to consider the acceptance of Resolution 242. Third, Egypt's regaining of its traditional position of primacy in the Arab world strengthened the trend in favor of the peaceful resolution of international disputes. Fourth, the policies of the Israeli government had helped create a better climate for negotiations. These included the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, the freeze on the building of settlements on the West Bank, the improvement in the living conditions of the Arab population of the West Bank, progress toward the settlement of the Taba dispute by arbitration, and willingness to enter into negotiations with Jordan without preconditions concerning the final outcome. Peres, Rabin, and their aides agreed with this analysis. Peres's strategy was to concentrate on the construction of a frame

And Then the U.K. Get's Involved

- Thatcher invites 2 Fatah members of The palesyinian Liberation Council to meet, But

of Israeli-Jordanian relations observed, "For Peres and the Labor Party, the higher the profile of the PLO in any negotiations, the harder to create a political majority for the process in Israel. For Hussein and the Hashemites, the higher the profile of the PLO, the fewer the risks in any negotiations, both in the regional and in the Jordanian domestic framework. Hussein felt he could not proceed without the PLO; Peres could not proceed with it."⁹

Impasse Results In

- Fatah killing 3 Israeli's in Cyprus thought to be Mossad agents
- Sharon wants to attack “the terrorist headquarters in Amman”
- But Peres and Rabin don't want to attack a Jordanian target
- But also don't want to appear soft *and according to Smith really want to derail the peace process)
- So the IAF attacks the PLO headquarters in Tunis
- Ezer Weizman only one who opposes. Why?
- He believed it would cause damage to relations with Egypt
- Security Council condemns the raid
- But Reagan sends Peres a note expressing his satisfaction
- Tunisia upset because they accepted Arafat at U.S. request
- If you remember in 1986 Reagan order an air strike on Libya

Peres and Hussein Meet Again

- Peres thinks he can persuade Israeli public
- Agrees to dismantle unity government if Likud ministers are final obstacle
- Hussein afraid that he will have to deal with Shamir in a year
- Peres makes speech to U.N. General Assembly and announces that Israel and Jordan (or a joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation) will enter into negotiations to:
 - Reach peace with the Arab states
 - Resolve the Palestinian issue
- But he didn't use the words "international conference " but did allow for "...the support of an international forum in initiating bilateral negotiations"(whatever that means)

What About Shamir?

- He doesn't like it. But doesn't oppose it. Why?
- Shamir believes that a political crisis over this issue would lead either to the formation of a narrow government headed by Peres or to new elections that Peres was expected to win.
- So he bides his time.

U.S. Gets Creative

- Richard Murphy, Ass't Secretary of State shuttles between Jerusalem and Amman and comes up with a 10 point procedural document
 - There was to be an international conference with no real real powee
 - Negotiations were to take place in bilateral committees that were independent of one another
 - No party could participate in the conference unless it accepted Resolutions 242 and 338
 - And renounced violence
- This is a major achievement for Peres

But

- Hussein delivers a speech:
 - Announced he was ending his efforts to construct a joint peace strategy with Arafat
 - Arafat is untrustworthy
 - Arafat won't accept the unconditionally the Resolutions 242 and 338
- This drew the curtain on the peace process
- And Hussein proposes a 5 year plan for improving conditions on the West Bank
- Israeli government supports because:
 - It supports Hussein's efforts to get U.S. funding for the plan
 - And to rebuild Hussein's political influence on the West Bank
- But PLO assassinates the pro-Jordanian mayor of Nablus on 3/3/86

And the Final Nail In the Peace Process Coffin

The upcoming meeting between Thatcher and Fatah representatives posed a serious threat to those who opposed Arafat's participation in the peace process. They included not only Palestinian factions such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), but also Israel, because such overtures might place pressure on the United States to modify its hostility to the PLO. A series of events took place in which radical Arab and Israeli governmental interests coincided.

On September 25, 1985, a Palestinian assassination squad (including



Rabin and Hussein Meet

- Hussein asks for Israel's help in strengthening economic and institutional links between Palestinian population of the West Bank and Jordanian government
- He will not allow PLO attacks from Jordan
- Closes down PLO offices in Amman and expels Arafat's deputy
- Hussein agrees to cultivate moderate leaders on West Bank as a PLO alternative
- Israel agrees to help get U.S. economic aid for the West Bank-Hussein wants \$1.5 billion over 5 years but Congress allocates \$90 million
- Rabin states: "The policy of Israel is to strengthen the position of Jordan in Judea and Samaria and to strike at the PLO"

Cold War Calculations

The Reagan administration had viewed Israel as a strong component of its anticommunist crusade from the time the president took office. In 1984 with U.S. troops withdrawn from Lebanon, Secretary of State George Shultz initiated a closer strategic alliance with Israel that included technological exchanges related to the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as Star Wars. Shultz declared in late 1986 that the goal of American-Israeli strategic cooperation was “to build institutional arrangements so that eight years from now, if there is a secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the United States that we have established.” This cooperation could have domestic benefits as well. The administration encouraged Israel’s involvement in the Star Wars project in part to overcome opposition to it from liberal members of Congress, who usually backed Israel.⁷

So

- Closer ties to Israel regardless of actions against Palestinians
- PLO remains isolated “ The PLO had no military option and lacked an effective strategy beyond perpetuating it’s own survival”
- And Jordan feels PLO is also weak and therefore should be excluded from any diplomatic process

Shamir Rotates to the Premiership on October 20, 1986

- And the Iran-Contra scandal breaks in November
- In 1985 Israel had sold American weapons to Iran and return for hostages being released
- Rationale was that by supplying arms the U.S. would help the moderates against the radicals
- Both Weinberger and Schultz had rejected the idea.

But

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Iran Was the Most Extreme Ideological Opponent of Israel

- So why did they do it?
 1. Wanted to maintain a subterranean relationship with Iran after the Iranian revolution to help Iranian Jews
 2. Iran-Iraq war which had been going on since 1980
 - Israel wanted both sides to lose or
 - Demolish one another, but
 - The supply of arms to Iran was under U.S. embargo and this was one way of fueling the war and sustaining the stalemate
 - And as long as Iraq remained bogged down it could not join forces with Syria or Jordan
 - Jordan had close relations with Iraq
 - Syria supported Iran
 - So relationships indirectly get reversed-indirectly on the same side as Syria and opposed to Jordan

And More Policy Contradictions

The Israelis, it was revealed, conspired with officials in the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC) despite the opposition of Shultz and Weinberger. Robert McFarlane, Reagan's national security adviser, and Oliver North, an NSC staff aide, secretly delivered arms to Iran and used the proceeds to fund one of the president's pet projects, aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, which Congress had prohibited. The upshot was to make the Reagan administration a party, if a slightly muddled one, to this transaction and to give Israel political cover for its ongoing arms shipments to Iran. Israel was immediately thrown on the defensive by the exposure of its trafficking in arms, covert support for the most anti-Western country in the Middle East, and manipulation of the American government. Israel chose not to deny specific allegations but to concentrate on damage limitation with the administration, Congress, and the public.

The Final Contradiction

own was “legitimate self-defense.” Moreover, Israel was in the vanguard of the crusade against international terrorism. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations, had become a compelling spokesman for a tough counterterrorist policy for the West. In 1986 Netanyahu published the proceedings of a conference held in Washington by Israel’s Jonathan Institute under the title *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*. By its scathing attacks on the PLO, Libya, and Syria, this book fostered the impression that Israel’s enemies were also America’s, that the Arabs who used violence against Israel were terrorists, that the countries that sponsored violence against Israel were terrorist states, and that brute force against them was not only legitimate but desirable. “If a government has harbored, trained, and launched terrorists,” wrote Netanyahu, “it becomes the legitimate object of a military response.”¹⁹ The book had a major influence on American attitudes during Reagan’s second term at the White House. Reagan himself was greatly impressed by the book and recommended it to his senior staff.

Damaged Reagan Foreign Policy

- Even came close to destroying Reagan presidency and as Shultz described:

The Iran-Contra scandal, however, revealed a fatal contradiction in Israel's own policy on terrorism. Israel was denouncing Syria because of its terrorist record while secretly shipping arms to Iran in spite of its terrorist record.²⁰ By contradicting its own precepts, by maintaining the flow of arms to Khomeini's Iran at a time when that country was the chief sponsor of anti-Western terrorism, Israel sank into the morass of the Iran-Contra affair and dragged America along into it.

Schultz's View

After years of work, the keystone of our counterterrorism policy was set: No deals with terrorists. Now we have fallen into the trap. We have voluntarily made ourselves the victims of the terrorist extortion racket. We have spawned a hostage-taking industry. Every principle that the president praised in Netanyahu's book on terrorism has been dealt a terrible blow by what has been done.

We have assaulted our own Middle East policy. The Arabs counted on us to play a strong and responsible role to contain and eventually bring the Gulf War to an end. Now we are seen to be aiding the most radical forces in the region. We have acted directly counter to our own major effort to dry up the war by denying the weapons needed to continue it. The Jordanians—and other moderate Arabs—are appalled at what we have done. And our hopes of getting united allied action against Syria have foundered as the allies see us doing precisely what we have relentlessly pressured them not to do.²¹

Shamir Wants to Scrap Diplomatic Initiatives with Jordan

- But Peres doesn't give up on the Jordanian option
- Peres and Hussein meet in London on 4/11/87
- Hussein thought
 - Reagan's objectives in region were confused
 - Felt PLO rejected all openings for productive negotiations
 - No conference should include PLO unless it embraced 242 and 338
- Peres has same thoughts and at the Socialist International conference a Soviet envoy told him that Moscow would accept a "non-coercive international conference"
 - What does that mean?

Peres – Hussein Agreement

The Peres-Hussein agreement was unsigned, but it had the date and venue at the bottom and came to be known as the London Agreement. Typed in English on a single sheet of paper, it was divided into three parts. The first part proposed that the UN secretary-general should invite the five permanent members of the Security Council and the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338 “with the object of bringing a comprehensive peace to the area, se-

Third Part the Key

1. The international conference will not impose any solution or veto any agreement arrived at between the parties. 2. The negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees directly. 3. The Palestinian issue will be dealt with in the committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations. 4. The Palestinians' representatives will be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. 5. Participation in the conference will be based on the parties' acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism. 6. Each committee will negotiate independently. 7. Other issues will be decided by mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel.

Peres then Meets with Shamir

- Peres doesn't show Shamir the document.
- Huh! Why not???
- Peres claims he is afraid of leaks from the P.M.'s office.
- The U.S. is to put it forward as their idea so it's better that Shamir receive it directly from the U.S.
- Shamir does not trust Peres
- Shamir Fears:
 - Peres made secret concessions to Hussein
 - Start of slippery slope that would result in territorial concessions favored by Peres

Bellini Meets Schultz

said. "It's in your hands now." Shultz had no difficulty with the idea of a carefully controlled international conference that would meet to propel the parties into direct, bilateral negotiations. Yet he thought it extraordinary for the foreign minister of Israel's government of national unity to ask him to sell to Israel's prime minister, the head of a rival party, an agreement made with a foreign head of state. The problem was compounded by the fact that Shamir, in his Passover message to President Reagan on 1 April, had stated that it was "inconceivable that there may be in the U.S. support of the idea of an international conference, which will inevitably reintroduce the Soviets into our region in a major role."²⁵

Schultz Willing to come to Middle East

- But Moshe Arens (Minister without Portfolio) meets with Schultz and foreign minister. Arens said bluntly that the prime minister and his party were opposed to the holding of an international conference on the Middle East and that if Shultz visited Israel to present the Peres-Hussein agreement, he would find himself embroiled in an internal Israeli political debate. Shultz described to Arens in great detail exactly how a conference could work and be kept under control, but Arens would not budge. Nothing could go forward, Arens concluded, until Shamir and King Hussein met face-to-face. The conversation ended on this sober note but with what amounted to a request for help in arranging such an encounter.²⁶

Hussein's Take

The London Agreement floundered on two levels. Shimon Peres came as foreign minister, and we reached an agreement in London and initialed it. He said he would go back and he would send it immediately to George Shultz, and within forty-eight hours it would come as an American addendum to the Reagan plan. Peres also said that the agreement would be accepted by Israel, and I promised it would be accepted by Jordan. So he left. Two weeks later nothing had happened. And then a letter was sent by Shultz to the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzhak Shamir, telling him that this is the agreement that Peres and I had reached and asking him for his views. And of course Shamir took a negative stand against it, and the whole thing fell apart. I cannot say what happened in Israel, but Peres, as far as I was concerned, was the Israeli interlocutor. I talked with him. I agreed with him on something, and he couldn't deliver.²⁸

Shamir Meets with Hussein

- Reports to Schultz differ
- Shamir puts forth various cooperative steps, go over interim arrangements for Palestinian self-rule and promises to send an emissary to Amman soon.
- Hussein says Shamir is hopeless, that he cannot work with him

But Schultz Comes Up With Another Idea

Since the parties made no headway on their own, Shultz came up with the idea of linking Middle Eastern peace talks to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit that was due to take place in Washington at the end of the year. His idea was that Reagan and Gorbachev, as an adjunct to their summit, would invite Hussein and Shamir, as well as representatives from Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, to meet in the United States under U.S.-Soviet auspices and with the UN secretary-general in attendance. Ronald Reagan,

- And Shamir says:

"Well, Mr. Secretary," Shamir concluded, "you know our dreams and you know our nightmares. We trust you. Go ahead."

But Hussein Says

Shamir. "I can't be alone with that man," he said in an aside to Richard Murphy. Hussein did not believe that Shamir would ever permit negotiations to go beyond the issue of "transitional" arrangements for those living in the West Bank and Gaza. And he also did not believe Shamir would ever give up an inch of territory or work on a "final status" agreement for the territories. So no, and that was that, said the king.³¹

Shamir's King

To Summarize

By his own lights Shamir was a successful prime minister. He believed that time was on Israel's side, and he successfully played for time. He did not like the London Agreement and managed to scupper it. He was opposed to an international conference in any shape or form, and that conference was not convened until 1991. He was committed to maintaining the status quo in the occupied territories, and it was maintained, at least on the surface. Below the surface, Palestinian frustration and despondency were increasing all the time. All the hopes that the London Agreement had raised in the occupied territories had come to nothing. A feeling of hopelessness took hold as the Palestinians watched more and more of their land being swallowed up by Israeli settlements. Economic conditions remained as miserable as ever, while Israel's military government was becoming more intrusive and more heavy-handed. The occupied territories were like a tinderbox waiting for a spark.